

Presidential Decision Making in the Clinton Administrations' Foreign Policy: An Ad Hoc or Coherent Approach?

What factors motivated President Clinton to respond militarily in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 and Serbia in 1999?

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Preface and acknowledgements

This thesis grew out of my professional military education at the United States Air Command and Staff College in Montgomery, AL (2002-03) and my assignments to Serbia (2005-06) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (2008-09), supporting the ongoing Security- and Defense Sector Reforms in these two nations. This thesis is written during late evenings and weekends during my assignment as staff officer at NATO Headquarters in Sarajevo from October 2008 until July 2009.

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Acronyms

BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CJCS	Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
EC	European Community
EU	European Union
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
IFOR	Implementation Force
JNA	Yugoslavian National Army
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC	National Security Council
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
RRF	Rapid Reaction Force
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SFOR	Stabilization Force
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force

1. Introduction

The United States recognizes that we have a special responsibility that goes along with being a great power.

---- President Bill Clinton¹

The end of the Cold War fundamentally changed the United States 'security imperative, even when parts of the world clearly remained dangerous places.² As President William Jefferson Clinton entered the White House in January 1993, ethnic hatred, religious strife and the violation of human rights in the Balkans would soon demand his attention. Even if the United States (U.S.) stood unrivaled, indeed historically unparalleled among nations, evidence presented in this thesis suggests that President Clinton and his Administrations for years displayed hesitation, vacillation and ambivalence in addressing the conflicts and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina³ (BiH) and Kosovo, which carried international ramifications and challenged America's role in the trans-Atlantic relations. However, in the end President Clinton reversed years of indecision by taking successful decisive action for BiH and Kosovo which stopped much of the violence and ethnic cleansing.

With this brief introduction in mind, the purpose of this thesis is to analyze what significant factors finally motivated President Clinton to respond with military force after years of indecisiveness to the crisis in BiH and Kosovo. The study will not elaborate on *how* the U.S. forces were deployed or fulfilled their military objectives. The concerns in this study are neither BiH nor Kosovo, nor the rights and wrongs of particular sides of the violent conflicts. It aims instead to shed light on the decision-making processes by which the U.S.' policies on BiH and later Kosovo were made and the calculation underlying them. The major focus is on Clinton's Administrations, the corridors of power where decisions were made or ignored, and the pushing and pulling of Washington's intense bureaucratic struggles. The detailed examination of these decision-making processes will reveal a number of factors which can be found in the U.S. governments' policy processes. However, to narrow the scope, the questions guiding this thesis are:

¹ President Bill Clinton. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (White House: February 1995), ii.

² For those who assumed the ending of the Cold War would lead to a less dangerous world, the switch from inter-national to inter-faith hostilities boded ill

³ The official local name of the country is Bosne i Hercegovine or the acronym "BiH." In English the name is "Bosnia and Herzegovina". However, many authors use "Bosnia" others use "Bosnia-Herzegovina." In this study the author uses BiH.

What factors motivated President Clinton to respond militarily⁴ in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 and Serbia in 1999?

While these two questions have the appearance of being rather straightforward, the range of possible departures to approach them is broad. A multitude of theoretical tools are available to bring to bear on the given questions. Even if both *realist* and *liberalist* approaches to international order were evident in the major post-Cold War debates, a different approach will guide this thesis. Roger Hilsman's *Political Process Model of Foreign and Defense Policy-Making*⁵ seems among the most relevant and helpful; first, because it falls under the rubric of decision-making models and second, because it opens up a multifactor analysis of the Clinton Administrations' decision-making processes in foreign policy and defense issues. Further, Hilsman's model challenges the premises that it is fruitful to conceptualize a nation as a unitary rational actor, because individuals, groups and organizations acting in the name of the nation are sensitive to different types of domestic and international pressures. In this research, Hilsman's model with some tailored modifications is adopted as the guiding methodological approach. As a point of departure it is helpful to mention that the outcome of the two political-military cases explored are products of President Clinton's decision-making processes in which five actors, or power centers, to various degrees played dominating roles: (1) the President of the United States; (2) the President's advisors and the bureaucrats in the Departments of State and Defense; (3) Congress; (4) the electoral politics; and (5) the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosević. Slobodan Milosević turned out to have been far more influential than initially thought.

Structure of this thesis

This story of the making of U.S. policies in BiH and Kosovo is told in five chapters. The first chapter begins with a brief presentation of methodological and theoretical perspectives considered in this thesis; secondly it presents a closer account of Roger Hilsman's *Political Process Model* - the methodology chosen for this study and; third,

⁴ The terms *militarily* or *use of force* are used to describe and analyze specific action or involvement by third parties. These two phrases are necessarily broad and encompass a host of possibilities. See Andrea Talentino, *Military Intervention after the Cold war* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2005), 52-54; Richard N. Haass, *Intervention: The use of American military Force in the Post Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press 1999), 50; and Karin Von Hippel, *Democracy by Force: U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 3.

⁵ Roger Hilsman with his co-writers; Laura Gaughran and Patricia A. Weitsman, present this conceptual model in the book: *Politics of Policy Making in Defence and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Models and Bureaucratic Politics* (Eaglewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1993). Hereafter, Hilsman is referred to as the author.

arguments will be presented *why* Hilsman's political process model is adopted over other possible methodical approaches.

Chapter Two reviews the contextual framework of contemporary debates that shaped the legacy confronting the incoming Clinton Administration on political-military issues in 1993. First, this chapter briefly discusses issues evolving from the Vietnam War legacy; the Weinberger-Powell Doctrines and the two dominant schools of thoughts for use of U.S. forces. Secondly, the contemporary debate over sovereignty and humanitarian intervention is briefly introduced, followed by lessons identified from the U.S. post-Cold War interventions in Iraq (1990-91) and Somalia (1992-93). Third, an overview of the breakup of the former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia and how that crisis escalated internecine war in BiH and the escalating conflict in Kosovo will be presented. Forth, the George H. Bush Administration's responses to the crises in the Balkans are presented before a summary concludes this chapter.

Chapters Three and Four turn to the case studies from BiH and Kosovo respectively. These chapters examine the influence of the five power centers over the Clinton Administrations' handling of the crises in BiH and Kosovo. Each chapter ends with a summary presenting the chapters' conclusions.

In the fifth and concluding chapter, conclusions will be drawn on which factors significantly motivated President Clinton to intervene in the Balkans twice.

Sources

The sources used in this thesis are a mix of primary and secondary materials: public and government documents, speeches, remarks, congressional testimonies, biographies, memoirs, and academic articles and books. The analysis places a special emphasis on public documents, speeches and statements made by senior officials before and during the review process. Maintaining a healthy distance from the memoirs of the key players is a necessity. Few governmental officials are eager to downplay their role in solving international crisis or to highlight their own mistakes. Officials may seek to rationalize their decisions by advocating that the imperatives of foreign affairs left them no choice; or they may take credit for making a choice where none really existed. Despite these warnings, the memoirs of President George H. Bush, President Bill Clinton, Secretary Madeleine Albright, Secretary Warren Christopher, General Colin Powell and General Wesley Clark have been of importance in understanding their roles and justification for their actions in these political-military endeavors. Their memoirs have been weighed against other sources.

Secondary sources and analyses of the conflicts in the Balkans are numerous and they have provided a natural point of departure for this study. David Halberstam's book *War in a Time of Peace* provided valuable contributions on both BiH and Kosovo because his book provides great insight into the struggles for dominance among the key actors in the Clinton Administrations. Ivo H. Daalder's great knowledge from his service in the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) as Director for European Affairs (1995-1996) are well-presented in his two books;⁶ *Getting to Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy* and *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to save Kosovo*. Bob Woodward presents in his two books:⁷ *The Agenda* and *The Choice* how President Clinton and his advisors grappled with some of the major questions in Clinton's first term. Richard Holbrooke's book *To End a War* is a well written memoir to understand the intricacies of how American actions were decisive in bringing and end to the tragedy in BiH.⁸ Dusko Doder and Louise Branson have written a chilling portrait of Slobodan Milosević, the croupier of the modern games of the Balkans in their book *Milosević portrait of a Tyrant*.⁹ Armed with years of experience as a diplomat and analyst of the Balkans, Louis Sell has written the biography *Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia* that merits attention from anyone who wants to understand the nature of Slobodan Milosević.¹⁰

On the other hand, several documents which could have provided even deeper insight into the internal processes leading up to President Clinton's final decisions remain classified by the U.S. Government. This lack of access to such documents might reduce the insight and precision of some parts of this thesis. It has been almost impossible to find documents that could provide extensive knowledge about Slobodan Milosević's intentions and plans. Milosević was the type of politician who left no traces. He never wrote articles under his name and his short speeches contained no plans. He never held a press conference. However, based on the extensive number of different sources used, the author is quite confident that the following accounts are well-grounded, accurate, and hopefully - convincing.

⁶ Ivo H. Daalder, *Getting to Dayton. The Making of America's Bosnia Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000) and Ivo H. Daalder with Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly. NATO's War to Save Kosovo*, (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2000)

⁷ Bob Woodward, *The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House* (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1995, 2005 edition) and Bob Woodward, *The Choice: How Clinton won* (New York: Touchstone, 1996).

⁸ Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: The Modern Library, 1999).

⁹ Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, *Milosević: Portrait of a tyrant* (New York: The Free Press, 1999).

¹⁰ Louis Sell, *Slobodan Milosević and the Destruction of Yugoslavia* (London: Duke University Press, 2002).

1.1 Identifying factors of explanation: Theoretical and methodical considerations

The purposes of this subchapter are first to give a brief presentation of different theoretical perspectives considered as possible points of departure in this thesis: Second, to give a more detailed account of the chosen methodology, Roger Hilsman's *Political Process Model of Foreign and Defense Policymaking* and how this model is tailored to fit the conditions of this study; and third, argue why Hilsman's model was adopted over other possible methodical approaches.

The foreign policy of the U.S., in the post Cold War era, covers so much history and so many events that it is capable of sustaining many interpretations, even contradictory ones. The subject is supplied with an overabundance of possible theoretical approaches. The author has been confronted with divergent approaches to President Bill Clinton's foreign policy in the Balkans. Part of the challenge has been to clarify and compare alternative explanations of the Clinton Administrations' policies. Such explanations can be found, among other places, in the decisions of the President, in the policies of the U.S. government, and in patterns of the political-military history of the U.S. Beginning with the basics; the separation of powers between the President and Congress is a central feature of American democracy. It is widely accepted that the President is the single most influential actor in determining U.S. foreign policy and as the Commander in Chief, at the centre of any decision to deploy military forces abroad.¹¹ However, even though the President is paramount in foreign affairs, coalitions of other power centers sometimes defeat him. An example of this is the Presidential War Powers Act of 1973.¹²

In practice, presidential political-military decisions, when committing U.S. forces abroad, are normally based on comprehensive political processes within the Administration. According to Roger Hilsman, characteristics of such governmental political processes are: (1) disagreements, struggle or conflicts not only about objectives and values, but also the available means for achieving them; (2) presence of competing actors with alternative

¹¹ The Constitution of the United States, Article II and section 2: "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States."

¹² For decades Presidents and Congress feuded over the wording of the U.S. Constitution, Article I, section 8, which reserved to Congress rather than the President the power to declare war. The War Powers Act of 1973 is a federal law providing that the President can send armed forces abroad only by authorization of Congress or if the U.S. is already under attack or serious threat. Source: The War Powers Act - the joint resolution 93rd Congress H.J. Resolution, November 7, 1973. Available at: <http://www.thecre.com/fedlaw/legal22/warpow.htm> accessed March 11, 2009.

objectives or policies; (3) along with disagreements and struggles there is simultaneously and paradoxically a strain toward agreement; and (4) struggle for power is involved.¹³

Selected Concepts of International order

The foreign and defense policies of the U.S. are based on American cultural values. It is commonly accepted that no single theory of international relations provides a complete account of the true answers. As an example, Madeleine Albright advocated the following in her memoirs:

The first is that I hoped never again to hear foreign policy described as a debate between Wilsonian idealists and geopolitical realists. In the last part of the last millennium no President or Secretary of State could manage events without combining the two.¹⁴

However, the issues discussed in this thesis are dependent in large part on views of international relations or foreign policy in the post Cold War era which depends on different theoretical perspectives. The brief introduction presented here cannot do justice to the entire range of theoretical perspectives found in current literature. Among the approaches considered were *realism* and *liberalism*, which in American diplomatic history is revealed as the most influential explanatory structural theories of international relations. Robert S. Litwak has argued that competing realist and liberal approaches were evident in the major foreign policy debates and swings of American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.¹⁵ The realist-liberal cleavage framed the post Cold War debate on the crucial issues of humanitarian intervention to prevent ethnic conflicts within states.¹⁶

On the other hand, several literatures probe the theories of foreign policy decision-making. One group focuses on the manner in which government bureaucracy shapes the outcomes of policy. Graham A. Allison's bureaucratic-organizational perspectives in *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*¹⁷ is one such example considered in this

¹³ Roger Hilsman, *The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs*, 78-82.

¹⁴ Quoted in Madeleine Albright with Bill Woodward, *Madam Secretary: A memoir* (New York: Pan Books, 2003), 505.

¹⁵ Robert S. Litwak, *Regime Change: U.S. Security through the Prism of 9/11* (Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2007), 20.

¹⁶ See Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and approaches* (2. ed). New York: Oxford University, 2003), 67-138; Ole R Holsti, "Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy," 1989; M Mastanduno, D.A.Lake and G J Ikenberry "Toward a Realist Theory of State Action," 1989; Jervis, R "Realism, Neoliberalism and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," 1999; and Talentin, *Military Intervention After the Cold War*, 4-8.

¹⁷ See Allison, Graham and Zelikow, Phillip. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2ed. (Charlottesville: Longman, 1999). This is an analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Allison used the crisis as a case study for governmental decision-making. The book was originally published by Allison in 1971. In 1999, he published the second edition with Philip Zelikow.

thesis. Decision-making models challenge the premises that it is fruitful to conceptualize a nation as a unitary, rational actor because individuals, groups and organizations acting in the name of the nation are sensitive to different types of domestic pressures.¹⁸ Answering this *thesis' questions*, the prime interests are theories that explain the political-military issues during Clinton's presidency in terms of the reasons, beliefs, and processes by which the actors or power-centers made their choices. Subsequently, this thesis will be guided by Roger Hilsman's *Political Process Model of Foreign and Defense Policymaking*, which falls under the rubric of decision-making models.

The Political Process Model of Foreign and Defense Policymaking

Roger Hilsman advocated his political process model allows a more comprehensive examination of the evolution of foreign policy, compared with most other methodical approaches. His approach allows a range of *actors*, or *power centers* to be considered. For Hilsman, in the broadest sense, there are nine power centers, involved in U.S. foreign policymaking processes: (1) the President; (2) the President's staff and advisors; (3) the political appointees; (4) Congress; (5) the bureaucrats; (6) interest groups; (7) the media; (8) public opinion; and (9) the electorate.¹⁹

This list of power centers is presented in the form of three concentric – rings of power.²⁰ Each ring denotes a difference in the degree of power or influence upon decision-making, with the inner most ring being those that are most powerful. Hilsman's model operates on the assumption that the procedures for internal decision making are of great importance to understand the foreign policy of states. Consequently, Hilsman underlines that a variety of actors are involved in the making of government decisions. Those most directly involved hold government office: the President of the United States, members of Congress and bureaucrats in the Departments of State and Defense. Others actively trying to influence policy decisions do not hold offices; interest groups, the media, academia and the electorate. Some have more power than others and the power of each varies with the subject matter. Each power center has its own motives and goals. Most power centers presumably share the state goals of preserving the sovereignty, prosperity, defense, democracy prestige, and global influence of the U.S.

¹⁸ Holsti, "Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy," 47-48

¹⁹ Hilsman, *The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs*, Chapters 9-17.

²⁰ The inner ring is made up of the power centers: The President, the Presidents staff and advisors, the political appointees, Congress and the bureaucrats, which comprise government officials. Ring number 2 holds the power centers; interest groups and the media. The outer ring is the power centers; public opinion and the electorate.

However, even though a majority of power centers share a commitment to state goals, they also have other goals. In addition, each power center might have a different view about how to achieve a particular goal. Hilsman advocated that policy disagreements are more frequently over means rather than goals.²¹ Because power centers differ in their goals, each of them attempt to build coalitions among like-minded as they persuade, bargain, logroll, manipulate, outmaneuver or even use power to achieve their goals. At the same time as the various power centers maneuver in their political wheeling and dealing there is, according to Hilsman, a “strain toward agreement.”

However, Hilsman does not envision foreign actors as possible power centers in his Political Process Model. This is a weakness in Hilsman’s model. Subsequently, this author had two choices; either he fully accepted Hilsman’s sole domestic approach or developed another approach that even better fit the conditions of this thesis. Evidence found among sources used, suggested that actions of external actors probably influenced President Clinton’s decision-making processes in the cases examined. Consequently, this author decided to consider the influence major international organizations and selected political leaders in the Balkans and Moscow had on the Clinton Administrations’ decision-making processes.

The power centers of this analysis

In this section of the chapter, the more general organization of the *Political Process Model* put forth by Hilsman will be tailored to better fit the special conditions of this study. Based on available sources and Hilsman’s descriptions of the selected methodical approach, two of the power centers are obvious; the President and Congress. *First*, in the U.S. political system, with its separation of powers, foreign policy is the area in which presidents have the greatest personal discretion. The President is granted this key power centre because he is the single most influential actor in determining U.S. foreign policy, as specified in the Constitution of the United States. *Secondly*, Although Congress is obviously a power centre as the body of purse and legislation, the exact nature of its power in foreign affairs and defense is elusive. However, Congress acting as unit on foreign policy issues is a power centre. Evidence suggests this became an issue when the Republicans held the majority in both the House and Senate after the 1994 mid-term elections. In discussing Congress’ impact on foreign policy, the 1973 War Powers Act, Defense budget, and the annual Foreign Assistance Act that funds

²¹ Hilsman, *The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs*, 87.

foreign aid programs have to be considered. Due to obvious reasons mentioned here, Congress is incorporated as a power centre in this study as the model envisions.

Regarding the additional seven introduced power centers in Hilsman's model their relevance has been researched and considered to fit the conditions of this study. Based on this research the following approach was chosen: First, separation of Hilsman's three power centers; the President's staff, his advisors, and his political appointees and bureaucrats seemed unworkable. In the Clinton Administrations they seemed not to have been divided the way Hilsman envisioned them in his model. Subsequently, Hilsman's division seemed unnecessary. Without inside access to the White House or Departments' classified documents it seemed almost impossible to differentiate between the positions of these three power centers. For this reason, this study does not divide the department secretaries, who have been confirmed by the U.S. Senate and for other staff members/advisors where such a confirmation is not needed. Given the lack of clear distinction between these three power centers, it seems most sensible, in this study to focus on the role of the Presidential Staff and advisors. Included in this power centre are the NSC²² and the two most predominant bureaucracies in U.S. foreign policymaking: the Department of State and the Department of Defense. These two departments and the NSC were clearly involved in the policy formulations that led to the interventions in the Balkans. However, evidence presented, in Chapters 3 and 4, suggests that these two departments disagreed on several occasions over goals and the means to respond to the crises in the Balkans. Other bureaucracies such as the Departments of Justice and Treasury are not considered power centers in this study due to the limited evidence that they influenced the decision-making processes in the Balkans.

Second, in addition to the evolving international environment, a change of recent years has been the increase in number of interest groups trying to influence U.S. foreign policy. Interest groups influence has been affected by the spread of ideas and networking power that are part of globalization. However, interest groups seemed to play a much less important role in foreign policy than in domestic policy. Evidence in this study's literature supports this

²² President Clinton approved in Presidential Decision Directive 2 on January 21, 1993 a National Security Council (NSC) decision-making system that enlarged the numbers of members of the NSC and included a greater emphasis on economic issues in the formulation of national security policy. The President, Vice President, and Secretaries of State and Defense were members of the NSC as prescribed by statute. The Director of CIA and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as statutory advisers to the NSC, attended its meetings. The new members of the NSC included: the Secretary of the Treasury, the U.S. Representative to the UN, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and the Chief of Staff to the President. Heads of other executive departments and agencies, the special statutory advisers to the NSC, and other senior officials would be invited to attend meetings of the NSC where needed.

view: (1) There were no large organized ex patriot/immigrant constituent interest groups from the former Yugoslavia in the U.S. and (2) no economically important multi-national U.S. corporations with large investments in Yugoslavia. Consequently, the impact of interest groups as power centers is not emphasized in this study.

Third, the impact of the media has been considered. Media is an increasingly powerful foreign policy actor. Television, in particular has the ability to forward a policy agenda through the impact of its images. However, even if media on several occasions probably had impact on the executive, the public opinion and Congress by presenting images of the dead, artillery shelling, refugees and concentration camps in BiH and later from the violence in Kosovo, the media seem not to have been a power centre in their own right. After some consideration, the role of the media in the policy processes leading to the interventions in BiH and Kosovo do not warrant the title as a power centre, but rather should be categorized as a variable influencing the positions of the acknowledged power centers by supplying images and stories linked to the situation on the national agenda.

Fourth, Hillman's separation of public opinion and the electorate seems challenging in discussing military interventions. On the one hand, Clinton in his presidency placed a great deal of emphasis on the results of polls. On the other hand, the voice of the electorate in the mid-term election of 1994 and the presidential election in 1996 had great influence on Clinton's approach to the crisis in BiH. Hilsman noted that the concept referred to as *public opinion* is not a power centre in the same sense as the other examined previously. Even if Clinton's focus and drive for re-election as President might outweigh the influence of public opinion in this context, the author decided to establish a power center called *the electoral politics* which contain elements from both the electorate and public opinion.

Fifth, the views from Belgrade, Zagreb, Sarajevo and Moscow should also be considered as a power center based on their influence on the break up of Yugoslavia, the wars that followed and the Clinton Administrations' policy processes toward the Balkans. The President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosević²³ became a key player and a power center in the conflicts in BiH and Kosovo. When Yugoslavia broke up, Slobodan

²³ Slobodan Milošević was President of Serbia from 1989 until 1997 and President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) from 1997-2000. FRY consisted of the Republics Serbia and Montenegro and had little in common with pre 1991 Yugoslavia. Milosević's political course was set after he uttered the words "None will ever dare beat you again" at a dispute between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo on April 24, 1987. It was exactly what the crowd wanted to hear (see Doder and Branson, Milosević, 3, 43). Serb nationalists regarded Milosević as the leader of all Serbs in the Balkans when he became President of Serbia.

Milosević had different choices. First, he could have accepted the dissolution of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia into new independent republics based on the will of their population. Secondly, he could have ordered the Yugoslavian Army to not interfere. Third, he could have acceded to the demands from the United Nations (UN), the European Community (EC) and the U.S. and promptly withdrawn his forces from BiH and later Kosovo. If he had done so, BiH would probably have been spared from enormous civilian and military casualties. Finally, he could have acceded to the international community's demand of stopping atrocities in Kosovo and avoided the bombing of Belgrade. Evidence suggests that the leadership of Bosnian Serbs in Pale were a part of Milosević's power center, because they wanted to be a part of Serbia. Other possible power centers were considered and rejected. The President of Croatia Franjo Tudjman has also been considered as a possible power center.²⁴ His political platform was the destruction of Yugoslavia, independence for Croatia and hatred of the Serbs. Even if Tudjman to a certain degree influenced the situation in BiH, he had no influence over Kosovo. When the U.S. became increasingly sympathetic to the Bosnian Muslims, Tudjman switched his strategy on BiH from partition to one of using Croatia's geographic proximity to dominate the part of BiH not held by the Bosnian Serbs. Louis Sell argued that Tudjman had little interest in the details of the settlement in BiH.²⁵ Consequently, Tudjman has been rejected as a power center as envisioned by Hilsman. Alija Izetbegović,²⁶ the first President of BiH was also considered as power center. He as the leading Bosnian Muslim politician had the most ambitious political objectives seeking to preserve BiH as an unitary state. However the Muslims were the weakest party in BiH militarily. Subsequently, Izetbegović was a player, but the internal disagreements among the Bosnian Muslims senior leaders downplayed his role and influence to a degree that he should not be regarded as a power center as

²⁴ Franjo Tudjman was the first President of Croatia in the 1990s. Tudjman's nationalist political party, the Croatian Democratic Union won the first post Communist party elections in 1990 and he became the president of Croatia. Tudjman came to power in the first free elections in 1990, riding a wave of Croatian nationalism. Tudjman was a former general in the Yugoslav Army. He channeled the emotions of Croat nationalism onto himself and used them without scruples to establish his political power. Tudjman represented the Bosnian Croats during the Dayton negotiations in November 1995. He was reelected twice and remained in power until his death in 1999. See Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 236; and Doder and Branson, *Milosević*, 81-82.

²⁵ See Sell, *Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia*, 252.

²⁶ Alija Izetbegović became the first President of BiH in 1992. He served in this role until 1996, when he became a member of the Presidency of BiH, serving until 2000. Izetbegović promoted the idea of a multi-ethnic Bosnia under central control, which in the circumstances seemed a hopeless strategy. Izetbegović must bear some of the responsibility for the conflict in BiH by championing Muslim nationalism without having any strategy for handling its disastrous impact in multiethnic BiH. In 1993, he agreed to a peace plan that would divide Bosnia along ethnic lines but continued to insist on a unitary Bosnia government from Sarajevo and on the allocation to the Bosnian Muslims of a large percentage of BiH's territory. During the Dayton negotiations the Muslim delegation seemed to lack dynamics and in the end it was Izetbegović who caused the major challenges to get a final settlement. Sources: Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 285; and Sell, *Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia*, 5.

envisioned.²⁷ Consequently, Izetbegović is rejected as a power center. Russia was arguably a peripheral power center in the Kosovo crisis, but not BiH.²⁸ Russia is, however, not considered a power centers in this study due to the limited evidence that they had leverage to influence the decision-making processes in the Balkans.

Sixth, the UN and NATO have also been considered as power centers. It is obvious that the UN had a key role in decision-making processes in BiH and NATO had a dominant role in the intervention over Kosovo. Both organizations were strong influences on the decisions and decision-makers, only neither was a power center for both interventions. Consequently, the UN and NATO are rejected as power centers.

Consequently, five power centers are acknowledged in this study: (1) the President of the United States (2) the U.S. President's advisors included the Departments of State and Defense; (3) Congress; (4) U.S. electoral politics; and (5) the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosević.

Why Roger Hilman's Political Process Model?

The selection of Roger Hilsman's *Political Process Model* as the theoretical approach for this thesis should raise two questions: (1) why is a decision-making theory chosen over other approaches, such as a liberalism or realism? And (2), of several available decision-making models, why choose Hilsman's political process model?

In his inaugural address, President Clinton used the expected presidential phrase that the U.S. would use military means when "our vital interests are challenged."²⁹ If this was the sole approach for the use of military force then any effort to explain why the Clinton Administrations intervened military in the Balkans would be grounded in one of the traditional schools of international relations scholarship. By drawing on the works of Hans Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger and George Kennan, the frame for explanation of U.S. military interventions in BiH and Kosovo would be in terms of interests, power and the U.S.' prerogative in an anarchic system. If observers, concluding that the U.S. became involved in the Balkans because U.S. national interests were at stake, and that it was such calculations that led to the Clinton policies are fully correct, then any effort to explain its responses should be

²⁷ See Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 154-155, 182, 279, 285, 303 and 308-309.

²⁸ The Russian potential veto in the UNSC and the Russian withdrawal of support for Milosević in June 1999 precipitated his capitulation.

²⁹ President Bill Clinton, "Inaugural Address", 20 January 1993

grounded in realism. However, Clinton also added in his inaugural address the phrase "...or the will and conscience of the international community is defied, we will act, with peaceful diplomacy whenever possible, with force when necessary."³⁰ By this statement, President Clinton seemingly committed the U.S. to act on behalf of collective humanitarian values of the international community. If this were the true case, then efforts to explain why the Clinton Administrations responded with military means in the Balkans would be grounded in the traditional school of liberalism. Consequently, based on Clinton's inaugural address in January 1993 a realism or liberalism approach would, to a certain degree, have been useful methodologies in this research.

However, after some investigation it became evident that these two approaches would not be fully appropriate for two reasons: First, keeping in mind that the crises in the Balkans were at Clinton's desk for years before he reached his conclusions, shows that an attempt to understand the forming of his policies in terms of a unitary state actor would at best uncover only half of the dilemmas Clinton was facing. The Clinton Administration's numerous consultations with other government bodies and allied nations give an assumption that the internal decision-making processes that took place are important in better understanding the U.S. foreign policy in the Balkans. One of the central canons of realism is treating states as the only actors on the world stage and as unitary decisions-makers. This minor interest in the internal dynamics of decision-making, because realists assume that inputs to such processes are generally uniform from case to case, would probably not meet the ambitions of this thesis. Secondly, evidence suggests that Clinton's initial focus on "assertive multilateralism" which could support a liberalism approach for this thesis more or less diminished during his first year in office. The challenges Clinton faced in Somalia in 1993 can explain why he signed Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), which signaled a reformed policy on multilateral peace operations, a more or less complete reversal of what he had promised during his campaign.³¹ PDD-25 seemed to represent the Clinton Administration's formal abandoning of assertive multilateralism and the previous intention to increase the U.S. participation in multilateral peace operations which can be envisioned by liberalism.³²

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ The PDD-25 endorsed UN peacekeeping as an option measured by U.S. interests, while establishing criteria to make it more successful in operations and supportable at home.

³² Robert C. DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians: U.S. Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo* (Baltimore Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, 2002), 25.

Hilsman's *Political Process Model* does not fall within the bounds of the schools of *realism* or *liberalism*. His model operates on the assumptions that the internal decision-making processes are of great importance for understanding the foreign policy of states. Democratically run states, like the U.S., are not unitary actors but comprise several components which operate within the political-military specter, and others which influence the processes from without. Under the rubric of decision-making models, the Hilsman approach was not the only model considered. Graham T. Allison's approach in *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missiles Crises* was also considered, but rejected because; (1) an assumption that Clinton's military interventions could be the results of just bureaucratic politics seemed too simplistic; and (2) the author wanted to test the potential of Hilsman's model. Subsequently, Hilsman's model is chosen because it seems to be a more flexible and comprehensive political decision-making process model in meeting the conditions of this study, than the other methodical approaches considered. Where no one single actor appeared to dominate the decision-making process for U.S. foreign policy regarding the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Hilsman model best describes the competing power centers and their varying influence on that policy and the decisions made.

2. Context: The President's Balkan policy

Today, a generation raised in the shadows of the Cold War assumes new responsibilities in a world warmed by the sunshine of freedom...Our hopes, our hearts and our hands are with those on every continent who are building democracy and freedom. Their cause is America's cause.

--- President Bill Clinton.³³

The Presidents of the U.S. do not inherit clean slates. Like his predecessors, this was true for President Clinton. Consequently, an analysis of what factors motivated President Clinton to respond with two military interventions in the Balkans would not be complete without a discussion of the evolution of major political-military issues that had significantly shaped the American approach to foreign policy and military interventions up to the mid-1990s. A natural starting point for such an analysis, even though evidence suggests it started earlier, is the U.S. involvement in Vietnam.³⁴ The notion, known as the "Vietnam syndrome," discouraged presidents of the U.S. from intervening abroad for many years and hence it has significantly influenced U.S.' foreign policy since 1975.³⁵

Contemporary debate in the U.S. over military intervention was influenced by a number of prominent public figures; Caspar Weinberger, Colin Powell, George H. Bush, and Les Aspin. They all expressed views on the questions *when* and *how* to use (or *not* use) military force. Their positions will be introduced in this chapter. Later on, Bill Clinton, Warren Christopher, Madeleine Albright, William Perry and William Cohen would express their views on the same issues during their governmental service.

³³ President Bill Clinton, "Inaugural Address," Washington, D.C. January 20, 1993.

³⁴ For decades, Vietnam left indelible impressions on the minds of political leaders, members of Congress, the bureaucracies, military personnel, the academic world and the media.

³⁵ Vietnam Syndrome refers to both a collective and an individual ailment stemming from America's long involvement in the Vietnam War (1957-1975). On the collective level, Vietnam syndrome describes America's general reluctance to use military force abroad because of the psychological trauma caused by different aspects of the Vietnam War. The Vietnam syndrome resulted in a political, military, and civilian body unwilling to risk military engagement for fear of "another Vietnam." The syndrome meshed into American foreign and military policy from Richard M. Nixon's presidency to Bill Clinton's. The term Vietnam Syndrome was apparently first coined by Ronald Reagan during his presidential election campaign in 1980, in a speech to a convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Sources: U.S. History Encyclopaedia (www.answers.com/topic/Vitenam-syndrome) accessed March 18, 2009.

2.1 The Weinberger - Powell Doctrines

During the presidencies of Ronald Reagan and George H. Bush, the most influential view on military intervention was the *Weinberger Doctrine*. This doctrine, rooted in the experience of Vietnam and the truck-driven suicide bomb that killed 241 U.S. servicemen in Beirut in Lebanon on October 23, 1983 was first articulated by Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger. Weinberger presented six major tests for guiding when and how the U.S. should commit combat troops in the future:³⁶

1. The United States should not commit forces to combat unless vital national interests of the U.S. or its allies are at stake
2. If it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning. Otherwise troops should not be committed
3. Political and military objectives must be clearly defined and U.S. combat troops must have the capacity to accomplish those objectives
4. Objectives, force structures and dispositions must be continually reassessed and adjusted as events on the ground dictate
5. There must be “some reasonable assurance” of support from the people and Congress
6. Commitment of U.S. forces should be considered only as a last resort.³⁷

The guidelines of the Weinberger Doctrine were received quite differently in the Department of State and Department of Defense. On the one hand, it was embraced in Pentagon circles; but on the other hand, the Secretary of State Georg Shultz was “...worried that American diplomacy, not backed up by credible threats of force, would be hamstrung by the military's supposed reluctance to become involved in limited wars.”³⁸ In 1992, following the decisive victory of U.S. and allied forces in the first Gulf War, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Colin Powell, reiterated in his article *U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead*, the main themes of the Weinberger Doctrine, by advocating:

When the political objective is important, clearly defined and understood, when the risks are acceptable, and when the use of force can be effectively combined with diplomatic and economic policies, then clear and unambiguous objectives must be given to the armed forces. These objectives must be firmly linked with the political objectives.³⁹

³⁶ Casper Weinberger, “The Uses of Military Power”, at the National Press Club, Washington D.C., November 28, 1984.

³⁷ For a more comprehensive outline see Weinberger's speech in Haass, *Intervention*, (1999), 197-205.

³⁸ See Jim Mokhiber and Rick Young, “The Use of Military Force,” PBS/Frontline Report, 1999. Available at: <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/force/> accessed, February 27, 2009. See also Colin Powell with Joseph Persico, *My American Journey* (New York: Ballantine books, 2003), 303.

³⁹ Colin Powell, “U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 5 (winter 1992-93), 38.

General Powell advocated that the strategy for use of force should move from focusing on global war-fighting to a focus on regional contingencies.⁴⁰ Powell explained that two schools of thought were dominant in the U.S. debate over the use of military force: (1) the limited war school and (2) the all-out war school.⁴¹ Powell warned that the use of force should be restricted to occasions where it can do some good by arguing:

We should always be skeptical when so-called experts suggest that all a particular crisis calls for is a little surgical bombing or limited attack. When the “surgery” is over and the desired results are not obtained, a new set of experts then comes forward with talk of just a little escalation--more bombs, more men and women, more force. History has not been kind to this approach to war- making.⁴²

Powell followed up in his memoirs where he endorsed Weinberger’s six guidelines:

Clausewitz would have applauded. And in the future, when it became my responsibility to advise Presidents on committing our forces to combat, Weinberger rules turned out to be a practical guide.⁴³

General Colin Powell’s influence on how U.S. forces were successfully used in the Gulf War of 1991 adhering to the Weinberger Doctrine led commentators to begin using the term “Weinberger-Powell Doctrine.” Robert DiPrizio argued that those sympathetic to the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine would interpret “clear objectives” to mean an “exit strategy.”⁴⁴

In September 1992, the Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services, Les Aspin⁴⁵ presented his thoughts regarding use of force:⁴⁶

1. Force should only be used as a last resort
2. Military force should only be used when there is a clear-cut military objective
3. Military forces should be used only when we can measure that the military objective can be achieved. We need to know when we can bring the troops back home
4. Military force should be used only in an overwhelming fashion.

Aspin argued further that a large group of officers who were veterans of the Vietnam War, associated with General Powell, were strong believers in an “all-or nothing” school. Aspin also elaborated on views that were linked to “a limited objective school.” The latter school

⁴⁰ Ibid, 32-45.

⁴¹ Ibid, 36-38. Powell argued that all wars are limited by three means: by the territory on which they are fought; by the means used to fight them; or by the objectives for which they are fought.

⁴² Ibid, 40.

⁴³ Colin Powell, with Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey* (New York: Random House Ballantine Publishing Group, 1995), 303.

⁴⁴ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians: U.S. Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo*, 3.

⁴⁵ Les Aspin later became Secretary of Defence in the first year of the Clinton Administration.

⁴⁶ Les Aspin: Address to the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, Washington D.C., September 21, 1992. Source: Excerpts of the address in Haass, *Intervention*, (1999), Appendix D

wanted the kind of results that often requires military action or at least the credible threat of military action. Aspin presented Iraq and BiH as examples. Aspin's assessment was that the "all-or-nothing" school was weakened when the collapse of the Soviet Union removed the risk of escalation that had accompanied any limited military venture.⁴⁷ In many ways, Aspin's thoughts were a continuation of more than four decades-long U.S. foreign policy debate of protecting and advancing U.S. interests versus a perceived moral responsibility to use military capabilities to assist people less fortunate. Richard Haass argued that a number of defense thinkers, notably Henry Kissinger, Thomas Schelling and Robert Osgood developed literature devoted to limited war.⁴⁸

In a speech at the United States Military Academy at West Point in the waning days of his presidency, George H. Bush articulated his views on military interventions. Bush argued for a case-by-case approach in deciding *when* and *where* to use military force. He set out five requirements necessary for military intervention to make sense:⁴⁹

Using military force makes sense as a policy where the stakes warrant, where and when force can be effective, where no other policies are likely to be effective, where its application can be limited in scope and time, and where the potential benefits justify the potential costs and sacrifice.

This address by President Bush marked a major departure from the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine because he advocated it was impossible to apply rigid criteria to deciding whether or not to use military force in a given situation. Subsequently, Bush modified the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine with the need to seek and obtain international consensus and multilateral operations.

2.2 Sovereignty and humanitarian norms

Sovereignty and non-intervention form the basis of order in the modern international state system and serve to protect weaker states from stronger ones.⁵⁰ The tenet of the modern

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Haass, *Intervention: The use of American military Force in the Post Cold War World*, 11-13. The premise of this discussion was that during the Cold War, with its inherent danger of escalation to nuclear exchanges, the U.S. did not have the luxury to follow the optimal overwhelming force approach. Consequently, it was argued that the U.S. needed to develop doctrines and forces that would enable limited uses of conventional forces. Military forces thus became instruments of communication as much as destruction.

⁴⁹ President George H. Bush, address at West Point, New York., 5 January 1993: See Haass, *Intervention*, Appendix F, 223-228

⁵⁰ Philosophers and scholars have for hundreds of years debated the subject of sovereignty and military intervention. Immanuel Kant argued in *Perpetual Peace* in 1795 that the concept of a world republic was unrealistic, suggesting instead an ever-expanding union of nations aimed at preventing war. Michael J. Glennon, *Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Interventionism after Kosovo* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 17. State sovereignty has two facets: (1) internally, the state holds

world is primarily designed to make inter-state violence less frequent. In the 1990s, inter-state intervention, was at odds with the cardinal principle of state sovereignty. The intervention over Kosovo, discussed later in this thesis, is an example of this disagreement. Joseph Nye argued that “sovereignty” was a slippery term. Those who resist multilateralism would define sovereignty narrowly as domestic authority and control.⁵¹ However, all members of the United Nations (UN) are bound by the UN Charter’s articles.⁵² A centerpiece of the UN Charter regime is a flat prohibition against the use of force by individual states as enshrined in Chapter I, Article 2 (4)⁵³:

All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

This bias is reinforced by a ban against UN intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of any state, set out in the UN Charter’s Chapter I, Article 2 (7):

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.

The UN Charter’s Chapter VII permits the Security Council to advocate military intervention in the interests of international peace and security:

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.⁵⁴

With the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of bipolar competition and the consequent threat of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) veto, along with the increase in civil conflicts, caused the U.S. Administrations to rethink their role because of the demand for involvement in new humanitarian crises had increased significantly. Somalia established, as presented in the successive subchapter, the link between humanitarian objectives and the use of U.S. military force. In the Balkans, when Yugoslavia broke apart, the international community would be confused by conflict between two principles: self determination and territorial sovereignty. International reluctance to become embroiled in the

final decision-making authority and (2) externally, there is formal equality between all states. This norm of state sovereignty confers on states to determine their own domestic affairs which can contradict the protection of individual human rights

⁵¹ Joseph S. Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, (London: Oxford University Press, 2002), 163.

⁵² The UN Charter states that obligations to the UN prevails over all others treaty obligations

⁵³ Glennon, *Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power*, 17.

⁵⁴ See Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, Article 39.

Kosovo crisis in 1998 was initially based on the widely accepted international law norm of non-intervention in domestic affairs of a sovereign state, as guaranteed by the UN Charter.

2.3 U.S. Post Cold War interventions in Iraq and Somalia

The first real test of the Weinberger Doctrine and the use of overwhelming force came when Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990.⁵⁵ President George H. Bush responded rapidly by issuing several Executive Orders imposing a comprehensive embargo against Iraq and additional economic measures.⁵⁶ In response to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, a lengthy series of UNSC resolutions were passed.⁵⁷ On 16 January 1991, Operation Desert Storm, began when a U.S.-led coalition attacked Iraq.⁵⁸ In a speech to the American people a few hours after the armed conflict began, President Bush said:

Our objectives are clear: Saddam Hussein's forces will leave Kuwait. The legitimate government of Kuwait will be restored to its rightful place, and Kuwait will once again be free.⁵⁹

The use of overwhelming force showed the American public a wholehearted refutation of the failed gradualism of Vietnam.⁶⁰ The impact of new technologies, especially the use of air power with its new precision guided munitions received lots of attention from politicians, the public and the media.⁶¹ The Gulf War was generally considered a political and military success because the objectives were clear and limited, the available military force was well-suited to achieve the political and military objectives, and the operation was supported by Congress and the public.⁶²

⁵⁵ To obtain a more comprehensive insight into the political considerations, the military planning and the execution of the First Gulf War see: Alberto Bin, Richard Hill and Archer Jones, *Desert Storm: A forgotten war* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998). For a better account and military analysis of the actions leading up to the decisive victory of Operation Desert Storm see Robert H. Scales jr., *Certain Victory* (Dulles, VA: Brassey's Inc, 1997).

⁵⁶ President George H. Bush, Letter to Congressional leaders on Additional Economic Measures Taken with Respect to Iraq and Kuwait, 9 August 1990.

⁵⁷ See UNSC Resolution 660 on August 2, 1990 which demanded that Iraq withdraw its forces unconditionally to the positions in which they were located on August 1, 1990. The most important was UNSC Resolution 678 that gave Iraq a withdrawal deadline of 15 January 1991. UNSC Resolution 678 – for the first time since the Korean War, invoked Art. 42, Chapter VII of the UN Charter to use “all means necessary” to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait and restore the sovereignty and original borders of Kuwait. See also UNSC Resolution 661 placing economic sanctions on Iraq.

⁵⁸ U.S. troops represented more than 70 % of the coalition's 956.000 troops in Iraq.

⁵⁹ President George H. Bush, Address to the Nation announcing Allied Military Action in the Persian Gulf, White House, January 16, 1991.

⁶⁰ Wesley Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat*, (New York: Public Affairs Perseus, 2001), 7.

⁶¹ David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace, Bush, Clinton and the Generals*, (New York: Scribner, 2001), 12.

⁶² It can be argued that the Gulf War met all six of the major tests presented by Caspar Weinberger in 1984.

Two peripheral humanitarian crises were escalating early in 1992 and called on the Bush Administration: Somalia and BiH. Neither of these crises involved vital U.S. interests. However, Somalia became the first American military intervention solely for humanitarian purposes.⁶³ The Bush Administration was consistent in its opposition to sending U.S. forces to Somalia.⁶⁴ Consequently, editorials in the *New York Times* criticized the Administration and demanded that the President take action in Somalia to quell the warlords.⁶⁵ Obviously, President Bush changed his mind on Somalia.⁶⁶ On December 3, 1992, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) voted unanimously to intervene with military forces under the authority of the UN Charters Chapter VII, and created the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF).⁶⁷ On December 9, a joint force of 1,300 U.S. troops landed in Mogadishu and within weeks 24,000 other U.S. military forces joined them on the ground in Somalia.⁶⁸ The deployment to Somalia was accepted by the President-elect Bill Clinton. By not rejecting the President's letter of notice to Congress in accordance with the War Powers Act, the Congress did authorize the action by their silent consent.⁶⁹ However, in a letter from President Bush to Congress dated December 14, 1992, the President claimed:

In my judgment, the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces under U.S. command to Somalia as part of this multilateral response to the Resolution is necessary to address a major humanitarian calamity, avert related threats to international peace and security, and protect the safety of Americans and other engaged in this relief operation ... We do not intend that U.S. Armed Forces deployed to Somalia become involved in hostilities.⁷⁰

The intervention into Somalia was regarded by many as a unique geopolitical event where U.S. Armed Forces were deployed for a humanitarian action in an area where no American security interests seemed to be involved. Elaboration is needed on two major questions: (1) why did President Bush ultimately decide to launch a U.S. military intervention

⁶³ During the Cold War, Somalia was regarded as a strategic asset because of its strategic geographic location. For the United States, Somalia had mainly been considered of strategic interest because the Soviets had established airbases there which could interdict oil shipments and commerce transiting the Red Sea. When the Soviet Union was thrown out of Somalia, there was no threat to U.S. interests.

⁶⁴ However critics, in August 1992, the U.S. provided approximately 1500 troops deployed to Kenya and thousand of tons of humanitarian aid by air and seafift in Operation Provide Relief to assist with the humanitarian crisis in Somalia.

⁶⁵ See editorials in *New York Times*: "The Hell Called Somalia," July 22, 1992 and "Don't Forsake Somalia," November 4, 1992. Available at www.nytimes.com accessed April 10, 2009.

⁶⁶ Albright, *Madame Secretary*, 142. In November 1992, acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger informed the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, that the United States was willing to lead a multinational relief effort to Somalia

⁶⁷ UNSC Resolution 794 (1992) on Somalia.

⁶⁸ It should be noted the all together, twenty-five nations provided 14,000 foreign and 24,000 U.S. forces in Operation Restore Hope in accordance with UNSC Resolution 794.

⁶⁹ See William G. Hyland, *Clintons World: Remaking American Foreign Policy* (Connecticut: Praeger, 1999), 51. See also Bill Clinton *My Life* (London: Arrow Books, 2005), 550.

⁷⁰ President George Bush, "Humanitarian Crisis in Somalia." Letter to Congress, December 14, 1992.

in peripheral Somalia after he had lost the presidential election? And, (2) why did the CJCS, General Powell, reverse his arguments presented in the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine? Jon Western, presented several plausible conventional explanations that would not violate the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine: (1) the situation in Somalia became dire and only America possessed the capabilities needed; (2) the mission in Somalia was well-defined and achievable; (3) the intervention in Somalia could be done with overwhelming force; (4) public and Congressional support was widespread; and (5) the political and military objectives were clearly defined.⁷¹ These puzzling arguments can be accepted as a prevailing rational explanation for the U.S. intervention in Somalia. However, Western concluded by suggesting another prevailing explanation. He argued that Somalia was selected by Bush and Powell because the situation in Somalia was assessed as a far easier mission to achieve than BiH.⁷² By deploying U.S. forces to Somalia, Bush in his final days of his presidency proved some humanitarian activism by meeting the critics in Congress and the media who had blamed him for not exhibiting to the world his sincerity in establishing “a kinder and gentler America” by his inaction towards the crises in Somalia and BiH. Bush’s approach in Somalia made an announcement containing “seeds” for a new doctrine; that the U.S. would fight for human and moral values, in contrast to the experiences under the Cold War.⁷³ Expectations for U.S. involvements were raised in Liberia, Sudan, East Timor, BiH and elsewhere. At first, the humanitarian operation in Somalia preceded without much controversy, even if the initial Bush objective of “restoring order” was changed by the Clinton Administration to “total pacification and nation building.” In the coming months the humanitarian intervention in Somalia would turn out to be a major political challenge for the Clinton Administration, discussed in the following chapters.

2.4 The break up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

A complete history of the breakup of the former Socialistic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia⁷⁴ starting in the 1980s would be too much for this thesis. However, the four wars,

⁷¹ Western, *Selling Intervention & War*, 134.

⁷² Ibid, 135-37. See also Joe Klein, *The Natural: The Misunderstood Presidency of Bill Clinton* (New York: Broadway Books, 2002), 68

⁷³ Talentino, *Military Intervention after the Cold War*, 122-26. See also Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington D.C: Defense University Press, 1995).

⁷⁴ The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia comprised the six republics; Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, BiH and Macedonia. Hereafter, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will be named “Yugoslavia”.

the ethnic cleansing⁷⁵ and massacres that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991 have very complex origins, steeped in lies, myth, and history that go back to 1463 and conquest of the Balkans by the Ottoman Empire. Due to its origins and its violent history, Yugoslavia could not withstand the totality of the pressures from: (1) the economic crisis throughout the 1980s;⁷⁶ (2) the end of the Cold War; (3) the demise of the national Communist Party; (4) the loss of domestic cohesion that stemmed from the 1974 Constitution;⁷⁷ (5) the rise in ethno-nationalism; (6) the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the concurrent fear this created among Orthodox and Catholic Christians and (7) the end of President Josip Broz Tito's leadership.⁷⁸ Yugoslavia would soon cease to exist.

The international community, represented by the UN, the European Community (EC), and individual states such as the United States failed to prevent the breakup of Yugoslavia.⁷⁹ The breakup was not favored but the major international actors were not prepared or willing to take forceful actions to stop it. Moreover, the breakup of Yugoslavia was confused by conflict between the two principles: self determination and territorial sovereignty. The assumptions that recognition of the former Yugoslav republics as new sovereign nations would serve as a preventive measure against further conflicts seems to have been an erroneous approach. Former U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann, summed up the nationalistic manipulation conducted in Yugoslavia:

The breakup of Yugoslavia is a classic example of nationalism from the top down... a manipulated nationalism in a region where peace has historically prevailed more than war and in which a quarter of the population were in mixed marriages. The

⁷⁵ Ethnic cleansing is a term coined during the war. It does not mean genocide, as defined by the Geneva Conventions. It involves the forced migration of one ethnic group from an area by another, so as to create zones inhabited by one homogeneous ethno-religious people. See Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 34; and Sell, *Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia*, 166-68.

⁷⁶ In December 1989 inflation reached the level of 2,500 percent annually. See Sell, *Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia*, 28.

⁷⁷ The 1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia ensured that no ethnic group dominated the Yugoslavian state.

⁷⁸ For a more comprehensive background, see Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War* (London: Penguin, 1992); Diana Johnstone, *Fools' Crusade: Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusion* (London: Pluto Press, 2002); Laura Silber and Allan Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation* (London: Penguin Books, BBC, 1997) and Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia a short history* (London: Pan Books, 2002).

⁷⁹ Sanctions were used as diplomatic tools wielded in the Yugoslav conflicts. Several UNSC Resolutions were imposed. See for example: UNSC Resolution 713 (September 1991) establishing a complete arms embargo, UNSC Resolution 757 (May 30, 1992) included a trade embargo for Serbia and Montenegro, a ban in participating in sports events, technical and scientific cooperation, transfer of funds and aircraft travel, UNSC Resolution 757 (November 1992) prohibited transshipment of certain strategic goods through Serbia and Montenegro, UNSC Resolution 820 (April 1993) prohibited the transshipment of all goods through Serbia and Montenegro. A total of eighty-three resolutions on Yugoslavia emanated from UNSC between 1991 and 1995. Additional UNSC Resolutions followed when the crisis in Kosovo later escalated. The sanctions had severe impact on the Serbian economy. See Sell, *Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia*, 195.

manipulators condoned and even provoked local ethnic violence in order to engender animosities that could then be magnified by the press, leading to further violence.⁸⁰

Overview of major events in BiH (1991-1995)

The violent crises in former Yugoslavia further escalated in March 1992, when also BiH, the most ethnically- and religiously-mixed state among the former Yugoslav republics claimed its independence.⁸¹ For complex historic reasons, the balance between the three ethnicities⁸² in BiH depended on its insertion in a balanced Yugoslavia. The line of previous conflicts in BiH has run mainly between (Catholic) Croatia and (Orthodox) Serbia with the (Muslim) Bosniaks caught between.⁸³ The secessions of Slovenia and Croatia would unbalance the Yugoslav Federation increasing the relative weight of Serbia.⁸⁴ As the war in Croatia intensified in the autumn of 1991 the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat representatives who constituted almost 60 percent of the Republic of BiH Parliamentary Assembly, declared independence from Yugoslavia.⁸⁵ The outcome of the referendum held on March 1, 1992, which a majority of the Bosnian Serbs boycotted, was that 99 percent voted in favor of independence.⁸⁶ By boycotting this referendum, the Bosnian Serbs appeared to the outside world that they refused to play the democratic game and that they were against a multi-ethnic BiH. However, the Bosnian Serbs boycotted because they were strongly against the referendum procedure that they believed to be unconstitutional.⁸⁷ On March 3, 1992 President Izetbegović proclaimed the independence of the Republic of BiH. Backed by Serbia, the Bosnian Serbs demanded that BiH withdrew its declaration of independence.⁸⁸

⁸⁰ Warren Zimmerman, "The last Ambassador: A memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, no. 2, (1995): 2-20.

⁸¹ Halberstam argued that Slobodan Milošević, the President of Serbia and Franjo Tuđman, the President of Croatia met secretly at Karadjordjevo on March 25, 1991 to make a mutually advantageous deal to carve up BiH in two parts. Milošević never admitted that this meeting took place. See Halberstam, *War in a time of Peace*, 95. See also Doder and Branson, *Milošević*, 88.

⁸² The three major ethnicities in BiH were based on the 1991 census: Bosnian Muslims (43.7 percent or 1.9 million people), Bosnian Serbs (31.3 percent or 1.3 million people) and the Bosnian Croats (17.3 percent or 753,000 people). The last 8.7 percent comprised other groups; Montenegrins, Gypsies, Albanians and Yugoslavs. See Tone Brinda, *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village* (Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 26.

⁸³ *Ibid*, 13.

⁸⁴ See Johnstone, *Fools Crusade: Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusions*, 42.

⁸⁵ Sovereign status declared 15 October 1991. The Bosnian Serb delegates, the minority, protested by abstaining from the vote by leaving the parliamentary chamber. On January 25, 1992, the same majority pressed for a vote on a resolution to hold a public referendum on independence, and once again, the Bosnian Serb delegates boycotted the vote.

⁸⁶ See Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 121.

⁸⁷ See Johnstone, *Fools Crusade: Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusions*, 43. The Bosnian Serb political leaders followed up their opposition towards the majority vote by proclaiming the "Serbian Republic of BiH" on January 9, 1992 and pledged their loyalty to their fellow Serbs in Belgrade.

⁸⁸ See Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 34-35.

Even if there were strong domestic disagreements within BiH, international recognition of the new European nation soon followed.⁸⁹ In light of this international recognition, intense fighting among the three ethnicities materialized in April 1992, when the Serb-led JNA forces moved into the newborn nation of BiH to take control of a majority of the territory and to protect the interests of the Bosnian Serbs.⁹⁰ Sarajevo, the capital of BiH, and strategic center of gravity was rapidly surrounded by the Bosnian Serb Army. More than 900 days of siege and lethal bombardment of Sarajevo followed. As the world watched with fascination and horror the tragedy of Sarajevo, the city where the Winter Olympics in 1984 had been successfully held, an even more devastating campaign was taking place in small villages throughout BiH.⁹¹

In order to understand the severe complexity of the conflicts in BiH, it has to be emphasized that this violent war was not between just two domestic parties. It was between the three domestic ethnicities each supported by external powers. Each ethnic group formed their own army.⁹² On some occasions and in some areas, mixes of alliances between two of the parties were established to fight the third. The Bosnian Muslim-Bosnian Croat conflict escalated in the spring of 1993 when the warring parties began battling over Croat-controlled lands in central and southern BiH. This fighting left the Bosnian Serbs with a decisive military advantage and little incentive to concede territory during negotiations.⁹³ In March 1994 after intense negotiations between the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats, mediated by the United States, a truce, alliance power-sharing arrangement was agreed upon by these two sides.⁹⁴ The fighting throughout BiH and the siege and bombardment of Sarajevo continued through 1994. When NATO⁹⁵ in April 1994 responded by air attacks on Bosnian Serb

⁸⁹ The European Community recognized BiH as an independent nation on April 6, 1992. The next day, on April 7, 1992, the U.S. also recognized BiH. The UN General Assembly accepted Croatia, Slovenia and BiH as full members on 22 May 1992.

⁹⁰ Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace Bush, Clinton and the Generals*, 122-123; Doder and Branson, *Milosević*, 99-101; and Sell, *Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia*, 165. When hostilities broke out in BiH, the Bosnian Serbs had well-equipped armed forces of 90,000 soldiers at their disposal. Serb officers from the JNA in other former republics of Yugoslavia were assigned to support the Bosnian Serb Army. It should also be noted that Milosević unleashed paramilitary gangs – “The Tigers”, “The White Eagles” and others as part of the Serb operations in BiH. These paramilitary gangs were motivated by the prospect of plundering.

⁹¹ Hundreds of villages were destroyed; the village populations killed or forced to leave their homes and belongings. The true pattern, systematic “ethnic cleansing,” was predominantly in Bosnian Muslim dominated areas.

⁹² Atrocities, forced evictions, and genocide were committed by all three major ethno-religious groups in BiH. Additionally, thousands of foreign troops (Serbian, Montenegrins, Croatian and Mujahedin Jihadist) volunteers from the Middle East joined in the internecine war in BiH.

⁹³ Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 27.

⁹⁴ The Washington Agreement created the Federation of BiH and recognized two chains of command for BiH component arms.

⁹⁵ In response to UNSC Resolution 816 (1993) NATO commenced Operation Deny Flight which was a NATO air operation that began April 12, 1993 to enforce the UN no-fly zone air space restrictions at the Balkans. Based on UNSC Resolution 836 (June 1993) the NATO mission expanded to include close air support (CAS) for UN units on the ground in BiH and to carry

command control sites and ammunition sites, the Bosnian Serbs and the JNA took hundreds of UN peacekeepers hostage.⁹⁶ The UN concluded it had little choice but to put the safety of its peacekeepers first and reject demands for additional NATO air strikes.⁹⁷ Daalder argued this situation demonstrated the contradiction between using air power to punish and simultaneously having lightly armed dispersed troops on the ground that were taken hostage by those the international community was punishing.⁹⁸ The images of UN troops as hostages presented on television were an embarrassment for UN, NATO, and the EU.

Former President Jimmy Carter had, on initiative from the Bosnian Serbs, negotiated a four month cease-fire that went into effect January 1, 1995.⁹⁹ By the spring of 1995 almost 300,000 people had been killed and 1.2 million were refugees'.¹⁰⁰ The military developments that took place in the spring of 1995 would be decisive for BiH. With the melting snow, fighting again erupted in full force not only in BiH, but also in Croatia, causing new huge waves of refugees when the Croatian Army forcefully reestablished control over Croatian regions western Slavonia and the Krajina. In Sarajevo, the sporadic shelling of the city by the Serbs continued. The UNPROFOR on the ground in BiH was not mandated with enforcement powers to respond forcefully to the Serbs attack on the six UN-declared "safe areas."¹⁰¹ The UN's failure to respond only emboldened the Bosnian Serbs and increased the incentives for the Bosnian Muslims to launch their own offensives. The multinational Contact Group¹⁰² continued unsuccessfully its diplomatic efforts to engage the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs

out strikes/bombing against Bosnian Serb targets. Twelve NATO members contributed forces to this operation that ended December 20, 1995.

⁹⁶ Bosnian Serb and Serbian JNA forces successfully adopted the tactic of capturing UNPROFOR soldiers and chaining them to potential Serb targets for NATO attacks.

⁹⁷ See Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, 348.

⁹⁸ See Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 41-42.

⁹⁹ Former President Jimmy Carter held, in December 1994, extensive discussions with the presidents of BiH, Croatia, and Serbia; the UN special representative for the former Yugoslavia; U.S. representatives to the Contact Group and the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs. An agreement on a four month cease-fire was reached. Available at:

<http://www.jimmycarter.com/countries/bosnia.html> accessed April 2, 2009. It should be noted that there were more than 30 ceasefires and peace-agreements in BiH. All of them collapsed

¹⁰⁰ Chollet, *The Road to the Dayton Accords*, 1

¹⁰¹ UNSC Resolution 819 (1993) declared six areas to be "safe areas" under UN protection. Among these safe areas were Srebrenica. UNPROFOR was intended to be a traditional Chapter VI UN peacekeeping operation and therefore impartial, especially in the face of mounting ethnic cleansing and genocide. Despite of the references to the UN Charter's chapter VII in the resolutions that applied to UNPROFOR, it remained a peace-keeping not peace-enforcement operation. Consequently, force could only be used in self-protection. However, in August 1995 UNPROFOR was mandated with greater enforcement powers.

¹⁰² In April 1994 a new actor the *Contact Group* consisting of the United States, Russia, Germany, France and Britain appeared on the scene in international efforts to mediate the conflict in BiH. The Contact Group took up where the EU, the OCCE and the UN had failed in bringing the three warring parties to the negotiating table. It should be noted that the Contact Group included four out of five fixed members of UNSC. Only China was missing. China's position was an unknown, therefore avoiding the UNSC and a possible veto gave President Clinton more control and less risk of a veto.

in Pale¹⁰³ The next diplomatic step was to persuade the Serbian strongman, the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosević to force the Bosnian Serbs in Pale to the negotiation table.¹⁰⁴

However, in the summer of 1995 full force fighting in BiH and in Croatia would overtake the diplomatic efforts. During twenty weeks from late July 1995, when the situation in BiH seemed most hopeless, a series of new diplomatic efforts, military actions and peace-negotiations ended the war in BiH. First, the Croat offensive during the summer and the NATO large-scale bombing of Bosnian Serb targets in September created the ideal opportunity for the final push for a negotiated settlement in BiH.¹⁰⁵ Subsequently, a cease-fire was achieved in October, successful peace negotiations were held in Dayton, Ohio in November and the final peace agreement called the Dayton Accords was signed in Paris on December 14, 1995. In late December 1995, NATO deployed 60,000 troops to BiH, among them 20,000 American troops.¹⁰⁶

Overview of historical background for the conflict in Kosovo

Kosovo has two complex histories, often mutually exclusive and frequently antagonistic. For the two major ethnic groups in Kosovo; the majority the Kosovar Albanians and the minority the Kosovski Serbs the “truths on Kosovo” are based on two sets of complex interpretations of combinations of historical, demographic and legal details rendering the judgment on which ethnic group has the most rightful claim to the territory of Kosovo. For the two parties it seems possible to prove almost anything by choosing the right starting point. Subsequently, the main arguments about the status of Kosovo are mirror opposites one another.¹⁰⁷ Each side claims the same territory, and in which each has an amount of validity to its arguments and good reasons to distrust the other. Both ethnic groups have used their interpretation of the history in Kosovo to enlighten foreign observers in attempts to build sympathy for their own territorial claims. Both sides present their case to the international community as being the most legitimate and therefore deserving attention and considerations. The constant references, from both sides, to historical events in Kosovo, seem to reinforce the

¹⁰³ Radovan Karadzic was President and leader for the Bosnian Serbs in the “Serbian Republic of BiH” from 1992 until 1996. His political and military headquarters was in Pale.

¹⁰⁴ See Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 39. The principal Contact Group leverage over President Milosević was the prospect of lifting economic sanctions imposed on Serbia by the UN. Many earlier negotiation efforts of both the United States and the Europeans had dealt with the Bosnian Serbs as a separate entity.

¹⁰⁵ Between August 30 and September 20, 1995, NATO launched Operation Deliberate Force.

¹⁰⁶ The NATO troops deployed was the multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) with a one year mission from December 20, 1995. On December 21, 1996 the task of IFOR was taken over by the Stabilization Force (SFOR).

Western myth of Balkan complexities. The most prevailing image among both Serbs and Kosovar Albanians is that of “being the victim” to the other group’s atrocities.¹⁰⁷ The history of Kosovo shows that today’s oppressors would be tomorrows oppressed. On both sides legal arguments are dubious; nevertheless they are used in nationalist rhetoric. The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution gave Kosovo increased freedom, making it a federal unit with rights almost equal to that of the six Yugoslav republics. However, during February and March 1989, Slobodan Milosević crushed Kosovo’s autonomy.¹⁰⁸ Julie A Mertus has argued that the conflict in Kosovo cannot be attributed to ancient hatred alone rather it was a result of recent hatred fueled by propaganda campaigns.¹⁰⁹ The immediate cause of the Kosovo conflict was Slobodan Milosević and his oppression of the Kosovo Albanians in the preceding decade. However, after the peace settlement in BiH and the signing of the Dayton Accords the situation on the ground in Kosovo deteriorated. Richard Caplan argued, “To countless Kosovar Albanians, Dayton had already demonstrated the limits of international support – and, by extension, of Rugova’s own effectiveness.”¹¹⁰ The understanding that ethnic violence and atrocities committed by Serbian forces is what finally led a reluctant U.S. intervention and negotiation of the Dayton Accords strengthened those in Kosovo who urged military actions against the Serbs.¹¹¹ Louis Sell claimed that President Ibrahim Rugova, the Kosovo Albanian leader, made a mistake when he went too far in believing that the international community and especially the U.S. would support independence for Kosovo. The Albanian President Sali

¹⁰⁷ See Julie A Mertus, *Kosovo: How myths and truths started a war* (Berkley/ Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1999), xvii.

¹⁰⁸ See Lasar Nikolić, “Ethnic Prejudices and Discrimination: The Case of Kosovo,” printed in *Understanding the War in Kosovo* edited by Florian Bieber and Zidas Daskalovski (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 54. See also Mertus, *Kosovo: How myths and truths started a war*, 1.

¹⁰⁹ See Sell, *Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia*, 81-87. In his efforts to strengthen his own political power, Milosević, appealed to the Serbian nationalist by denouncing the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo as being unwanted illegal immigrants forced on the Serb population by foreign governments. At the end of March 1989, many of the provisions of the 1974 Constitution were declared null and void. The Albanian delegates in the Kosovo Assembly who stood up against Milosević were expelled from the Assembly, dismissed from their positions and threatened with criminal prosecution.

¹¹⁰ See Mertus, *Kosovo: How myths and truths started a war*, 5.

¹¹¹ Richard Caplan, “International diplomacy and the crisis in Kosovo”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 4, No 74, 1998.

¹¹² Ibrahim Rugova who emerged as Kosovo’s leader was a literary historian and writer. His position was that Kosovo should become independent. Rugova preached passive resistance against the Serbs. In 1989 he founded the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). President Rugova wanted to gradually move the Kosovar Albanians toward independence, but without violence. It should be noted that U.S. diplomats encouraged Rugova to persevere his path of nonviolent resistance. Rugova convinced Kosovar Albanians to believe that a favourable resolution on the Kosovo issue would be a part of a peace treaty for BiH. When this did not occur, critics rose against Rugova and his policy of non-violence. See Mertus, *Kosovo: How myths and truths started a war*, 6; and Sell, *Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia*, 92, 264.

Berisha furthermore undermined Rugova's policy approach when he in December 1996 advocated.¹¹³

...it is very clear for the Kosovo people that their freedom and rights will not come as a gift from anyone and their problems will not be solved in Tirana, Belgrade or Washington, London and Paris. They are solved and will be solved in Pristina and the towns and villages in Kosovo.

Radical and impatient young Kosovo Albanians in 1996-97 began to organize a clandestine military organization, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), in effect creating a armed revolutionary army, that were effectively repudiating Rugova's policy of non-violence.¹¹⁴ Their disappointment with the Clinton Administration's policy at the Dayton Accords in regards to Kosovo was a crucial factor in the rise of the KLA. Starting in 1996, the KLA launched isolated terrorist attacks on Serb police patrols and other Serb targets that provoked swift retribution. The KLA's objective was heightening tension between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovar Albanians which would strengthen their long-term political cause - independence. As the Serbian government would inevitably strike back at the KLA, the West would witness Serb atrocities in an ever escalating cycle of violence, and thus would provoke U.S. and European intervention on the side of the Kosovar Albanians.¹¹⁵ The Serbs responded, as the KLA expected with increasing spirals of violence. In December 1996, the UN General Assembly condemned human rights abuses in Kosovo.¹¹⁶ The U.S. Department of State reported in 1997:

Ethnic Albanians continue to suffer at the hands of security forces conducting searches for arms. Human rights observers report that the police, without following proper legal procedures, frequently extract "confessions" during interrogations that routinely include the beating of suspects' feet, hands, genital areas, and sometimes heads. The police use their fists, nightsticks, and occasionally electric shocks. Apparently confident that there would be no reprisals and, in an attempt to intimidate the wider community, police often beat persons in front of their families.¹¹⁷

¹¹³ Quoted in Doder and Branson, *Milosević*, 238-39. President Berisha's remarks were reported by Reuter agency from Tirana on December 27, 1996.

¹¹⁴ The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was officially regarded by the U.S. as a terrorist group until 1998. However, the Clinton Administration cultivated diplomatic relationships with KLA leaders. In 1997 it is estimated that the KLA had between 15,000 and 20,000 members. Late in 1999 the KLA was officially disbanded and their members entered the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 366.

¹¹⁵ Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 367.

¹¹⁶ See United Nations General Assembly, UN Document: *Situation on human rights in Kosovo*. A/RES/51/111 of March 5, 1997. Available at: <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/51/ares51-111.htm> accessed May 2, 2009.

¹¹⁷ The United States Department of State, *Country Reports for Human Rights Practices for 1996 – Serbia and Montenegro*. U.S. Government Printing Office, January 30, 1997, see Section C.

Shredding every trace of dependence on Serbia became the KLA's primary objective.¹¹⁸ On the other hand, Milosević's objective was to keep Kosovo firmly within Serbia's control, while intimidating the ethnic Albanian population into leaving the province. The Serb pressure on the KLA and the Kosovar Albanian population increased in such a way during the spring and summer of 1998 that villages were burned, potential KLA leaders were murdered, and more than hundred thousand Kosovar civilians escaped their homes and became refugees. By provoking the Serbs into responding to the KLA attacks with overwhelming and sustained force, the KLA leaders achieved more or less what they wanted - increased international and domestic attention. A complete story of the history of Kosovo would be too much for this thesis.¹¹⁹

The Bush Administration's responses to the crises in the Balkans

It was not a surprise for the Bush Administration that a major test of the post Cold War era would take place in the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. According to William Hyland, Washington had worried about Yugoslavia for more than forty years. These worries had been relatively simple: when the communist dictatorship of Tito weakened or was over, Yugoslavia would break apart into ethnic components and the Soviet Union would then intervene to restore "order."¹²⁰ The question was how should the United States respond? According to the last U.S. ambassador in former Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann, in 1990, the CIA predicted that Yugoslavia would break up within eighteen months.¹²¹ When the expected break up became a reality in 1991, the Soviet Union was collapsing and unable to respond to the situation, in Yugoslavia. When the crisis in the Balkans rose to the attention of the Bush Administration, President Bush chose to stay out of this violent conflict. Because the Cold War and the bipolar struggle had ended, the American approach towards the Balkans also changed. There were no vital U.S. interests in the former Yugoslavia. The crisis in Yugoslavia was viewed by the Bush Administration as a European problem that would best be

¹¹⁸ Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 366-67 and 397. KLA's approaches were: (1) attack Serb interests on the ground and thereby escalate the tensions and provoke Milosević to retaliate in a way that provided sympathy for the cause of the Kosovar Albanians; and (2) wrest power away from President Rugova and his non-violence approach. The realization of these two approaches would expectantly establish a dynamic where the Western international community again would respond with military force to stop Serb atrocities, just as had previously happened in BiH

¹¹⁹ For a deeper understanding of the history of Kosovo see Noel Malcolm's book: *Kosovo a Short History*, (London: Macmillan, 1998).

¹²⁰ Hyland, *Clintons World: Remaking American Foreign Policy*, 29. From the early 1950s until the end of the Cold War the U.S. was publicly committed to supporting the "independence and territorial integrity" of Yugoslavia. In doing so the U.S. effectively checked the thrust of Soviet interests toward the Mediterranean.

¹²¹ Warren Zimmermann, "The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, no. 2, (1995): 2-20.

settled by the Europeans.¹²² The message Bush's Secretary of State, James Baker, delivered to European allies was: "We don't have a dog in this fight."¹²³ The President of the European Community (EC) Jacques Delors fully agreed with Washington's view, by arguing that he hoped "that since the EC did not intervene in American affairs, the United States would have enough respect not to interfere in European affairs."¹²⁴ Within the EC, Yugoslavia was initially regarded as a sole European affair.¹²⁵ The principal EC countries; France, Britain and Germany wanted to retain their diplomatic efforts in Yugoslavia in their own hands and help the UN maintain a neutral presence. Consequently, NATO had to be sidetracked; a leading position for NATO in the Balkans would have meant a major U.S. influence, an influence neither Washington nor the major European powers wanted. However, brandishing the threat of military intervention, European leaders apparently ignored the practical limits of power. President Francois Mitterrand of France and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany announced their support for a European force to solve the problems in the former Yugoslavia. Their statements were seen by military experts as "empty" promises intended to win domestic support.¹²⁶ The Bush Administration acceded to Europe's determination to take the lead in Yugoslavia, a situation upon which the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosević, would soon capitalize. Secretary of State, James Baker who visited Belgrade in June 1991 warned the Yugoslav strongman, Slobodan Milosević that the U.S. would not recognize a break-up or recognize any resulting new states. Milosević seems to have concluded that he had nothing to fear from the United States.¹²⁷ The UN response to the deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia was to impose an arms embargo against all parties, an action that grew out of intentions to block Russian support to Serbia. The arms embargo strongly favored the Serb Army because they controlled and were in possession of most of the weapons belonging to the JNA.

David Halberstam argued that the Bush Administration was slow to react to the situation in Yugoslavia for three main reasons: (1) the first and most obvious was the still

¹²² Albright, *Madam Secretary*, 179. For the reader to fully understand where the European nations stood in relations to the former republics of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, it is necessary to see where they had been at the outbreak of World War I in 1914 and World War II in 1940. See also Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 31-33.

¹²³ Quoted in Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United. The evolution of an Alliance* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 117.

¹²⁴ Quoted from Peter W. Rodman, "Bosnian Quagmire" in *National Review* June 26, 1995. See also Hyland, *Clintons World: Remaking American Foreign Policy*, 30. It should also be noted that the Yugoslav crisis coincided with a feeling of a new European self-confidence. The Maastricht Treaty had convinced political leaders that Europe was in a position to play a more comprehensive role in international diplomacy, especially in Europe.

¹²⁵ See Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 86-94.

¹²⁶ *International Herald Tribune*, "EC's Missteps: Did They Fuel Yugoslav Conflict", September 21, 1991.

¹²⁷ Zimmermann, "The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia", *Foreign Affairs* vol. 74 (1995), 11-12.

existing ghosts of Vietnam, the immense resistance of the Pentagon to military involvement, the great fear of being sucked into a Balkan quagmire; (2) downsizing of U.S. forces and the on-going deployments to enforce the peace in Kuwait and Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991; and (3) the future of Eastern Europe and its relations with Russia.¹²⁸ William Hyland argued along the same lines; the Bush Administration was adamantly opposed to military intervention by U.S. ground forces. Bush and his military advisors saw not another *Desert Storm*, but another Vietnam, a bloody conflict with no clear exit strategy. However, even if an exit strategy could be devised, the conflicts in Yugoslavia were assessed as no threat to vital American interests. Finally, the crisis was viewed as a European problem that should and could be settled by Europeans.¹²⁹ In the Balkans as a whole and in BiH in particular, there were no clear military objectives justifying deploying an American force. By rejecting the use of U.S. military strength for any purpose in BiH, President Bush effectively deferred the design of a Western policy. Sell argued President Bush decided early on that Yugoslavia did not touch vital U.S. interests.¹³⁰

2.5 Summary

President Clinton's arrival in the White House coincided with one of the great turning points in modern history: The bipolar struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States had dissolved. Consequently, Cold War alignments lost meaning. President Bush, Clinton's predecessor, brought back the phrase "New World Order," as well as to initiate a cooperative U.S. role in assisting the UN and allied nations to secure stability through multi-lateral economic, diplomatic and military actions. President Bush took action, successfully orchestrating the international community to overturn the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. This use of military force against Iraq, which met the major tests presented in the Weinberger Doctrine, showed the American public a wholehearted refutation of the failed gradualism of Vietnam and convinced the American public that the U.S. military had recovered from the malaise of the Vietnam debacle. The apparent success in Iraq also gave rise to a short lived revival of U.S. enthusiasm for the UN. In the waning days of his Presidency, George H. Bush, intervened in Somalia for strictly humanitarian reasons, but chose not to interfere in the break up of Yugoslavia which had erupted into a war in the Balkans. However, the intervention in Somalia contained the seeds of a new doctrine; that U.S. troops would fight for human and

¹²⁸ Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 32.

¹²⁹ Hyland, *Clintons World: Remaking American Foreign Policy*, 31-32.

moral values. The hopes for what President Bush called a peaceful “New World Order” in Europe, was destroyed in Yugoslavia. The Bush Administration acceded to Europe’s determination to take the lead in former Yugoslavia because the conflicts in Yugoslavia were assessed as no threat to vital American interests. President Bush seemed happy for the EC to assume the lead in efforts to stop the violence in BiH, limiting U.S.’s own actions to little more than supportive votes in the UNSC. In fairness to President George H. Bush, no American president since the end of World War II seem to have confronted such complex and extensive global turmoil as he did on his watch.

¹³⁰ See Sell, *Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia*, 205.

3. Case no. 1: Explaining U.S. engagement in BiH

The conflict in Bosnia deserves American engagement: it is a vast humanitarian tragedy; it is driven by ethnic barbarism; it stemmed from aggression against an independent state; it lies alongside the established and emerging market democracies of Europe and can all too easily explode into a wider Balkan conflict.

---Anthony Lake, President Clinton's National Security Advisor¹³¹

The objective of this chapter is to examine the key factors shaping U.S. policy toward BiH and the role each of the five chosen power centers played. The author seeks to disclose (1) *what* were the factors that moved U.S. policy from being characterized by distancing itself from getting too deeply involved in the crises in BiH to engagement; (2) *who* were the dominant power centers shaping President Clinton's decisions; and (3) *how* the power centers perceived their approach to produce a desirable result. The focus is on the contemporary debates and decision-making processes in Washington and Belgrade during this transition period by employing Roger Hilsman's political process model as described in Chapter One.

3.1 President Clinton's views and interests

The election of Bill Clinton as President of the U.S. in 1992 demonstrated that domestic issues were at the core of the nation's attention and that foreign policy was losing its political value with the disappearance of the Soviet threat. Consequently, the centerpiece of President Clinton's political mandate was to get the domestic economic "house in order." In domestic policy, President Clinton took a hands-on approach. Clinton weighted into discussions with facts and opinions in debates among his domestic specialists.¹³² Clinton's understanding of economics included underpinning both his foreign policy goal of democratic enlargement and the strategy of international engagement.¹³³ In Clinton's view, traditional power politics was an inadequate guide to meet post Cold War challenges because it did not account for modern economic trends and requirements.¹³⁴ Subsequently, globalization became

¹³¹ Anthony Lake. "From Containment to Enlargement." Speech delivered at Johns Hopkins University, Washington D.C., September 21, 1993.

¹³² See Woodward, *The Agenda. Inside the Clinton White House*. This book gives several examples how President Clinton took an unusual hands-on approach on domestic issues.

¹³³ The White House, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement", i.

¹³⁴ The formal process for making foreign and national security policy in the Clinton Administrations was set forth in Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive Number 2 (PDD-2) – "Organization of the National Security Council." White House, January 20, 1993. Available at: <http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-2.htm> accessed April 3, 2009.

a theme President Clinton preached with conviction both at home and aboard. In a speech delivered at American University on February 26, 1993 President Clinton argued:

....we must update our definition of national security and to promote it and to protect it and to foster democracy and human rights around the world....our leadership is especially important for the world's new and emerging democracies. To grow and deepen their legitimacy, to foster a middle class and a civic culture, they need the ability to tap into a growing global economy. And our security and our prosperity will be greatly affected in the years ahead by how many of these nations can become and stay democracies.¹³⁵

During 1993 the situation on the ground in BiH continued to deteriorate significantly, raising questions about the nature of the United State's post Cold War commitment to Europe. *President* Clinton did not carry out what *Candidate* Clinton had proposed.¹³⁶ Clinton failed to back his forceful presidential campaign rhetoric on BiH with action: First, like his immediate predecessor, President Clinton was not willing to take the lead, subsequently he distanced himself from the European allies' negotiation efforts.¹³⁷ Secondly, Clinton showed little stomach for a fight in BiH by being totally unwilling to commit ground forces that appeared necessary if the war were to be brought to a halt.¹³⁸ However, in the first of a series of Presidential Review Directives (PRDs), Clinton asked his National Security Team¹³⁹ in

¹³⁵ Quoted from President Bill Clinton, address titled "Liberal Internationalism: America and the Global Economy" delivered at American University, Washington D.C. February 26, 1993.

¹³⁶ Candidate Clinton campaigned vociferously in support of greater American engagement in BiH. In July 1992, the Clinton campaign released a statement supporting air strikes and appropriate U.S. military support to deter attacks against relief organizations on the ground in BiH. Clinton also suggested the need to lift the arms embargo against Bosnian Muslims. See Clinton's presidential campaign addresses: "American Foreign Policy and the Democratic Ideal" delivered October 1, 1991 at the Institute of World Affairs, Milwaukee, Wisconsin; "A New Covenant for American Security" delivered at Georgetown University, Washington D.C. December 21, 1991; "Accepting the presidential nomination," delivered at the Democratic Party National Convention, New York, July, 13-16 1992; and Clinton's Remarks in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. October 2, 1992. See also Clinton, *My Life*, 510 and Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 6. In his memoirs, General Colin Powell argued that BiH was the foreign policy issue over which presidential candidate Bill Clinton criticized President Bush most sharply. Powell, *My American Journey*, 576.

¹³⁷ Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From Empire by invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 251. See also Albright, *Madam Secretary*, 181.

¹³⁸ See Clinton, *My Life*, 511.

¹³⁹ President Clinton's first National Security Team was drawn largely from the Jimmy Carter Administration (1977-1981). Warren Christopher was selected as Secretary of State. Christopher had served as the Deputy to former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in the Carter Administration. Clinton's choice for Secretary of Defense was Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. Within a year, Les Aspin was replaced by his deputy, William Perry, who had served also in the Carter Administration. The post as Ambassador to the UN was awarded to Madeleine Albright, a Professor at Georgetown University who also had served in the Carter Administration. Anthony Lake was chosen as National Security Advisor. He had been the Chief of Policy Planning in the Department of State under Secretary Cyrus Vance and Warren Christopher in the Carter Administration. The one holdover of importance was the CJCS, General Colin Powell, who had served both the Reagan and Bush Administrations. Strobe Talbott, an expert on Russia and a close friend and classmate of Bill Clinton at Oxford, was named Special Ambassador. James Woolsey became the new Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). He had long experience in policy positions, but later resigned and endorsed Robert Dole for President in the 1996 campaign.

January, 1993 to review American policy toward the Balkans.¹⁴⁰ According to Ivo Daalder, these five options were to be considered:¹⁴¹

1. Using airpower to enforce the no-fly zone over BiH¹⁴²
2. Engaging in air strikes against Serb artillery positions and airfields
3. Altering the UN arms embargo to allow the Bosnian Muslims¹⁴³ to obtain more weapons
4. Establishing UN peacekeeping operation in Kosovo and Macedonia to prevent further spread of conflict in the region
5. Creating an international war crimes commission to investigate reports of atrocities.

None of the five options discussed by the Principals Committee¹⁴⁴ included American “boots on the ground” in BiH. Vietnam was a distant but ever present ghost. President Clinton looked for ways to increase U.S. involvement without placing American lives at risk. However, it can be argued that Clinton initially briefly considered a more aggressive U.S. policy in BiH. However, a majority of Congress, the Department of State and Pentagon, as presented later, arrayed themselves in opposition to such a risky policy change. Consequently, the outcome of the review on U.S. policy towards the Balkans, presented by Secretary Christopher in February 1993 did not include any kind of military measures. Under no circumstances would U.S. ground troops be deployed to BiH. However, the United States participated in NATO’s Operation Deny Flight that took place for more than two and a half years.¹⁴⁵ Ivo Daalder advocated that President Clinton’s unwillingness to involve ground forces left him with very limited options to obtain real influence; with the exception of trying to persuade European allies to influence the outcome on the ground in BiH.¹⁴⁶ Subsequently, U.S. policy in BiH was tied to the UN and EU allies, which had an ineffective peacekeeping force on the ground. During the next two years, President Clinton tried several ways to escape the dilemmas caused

¹⁴⁰ The Presidential Review Directive (PRD) series was the mechanism used by the Clinton Administration to direct that specific reviews and analyses be undertaken by federal departments and agencies.

¹⁴¹ Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 8-9.

¹⁴² See UNSC Resolution 781 (October 9, 1992) which established a no-fly-zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina.

¹⁴³ Quoted in Clinton’s memoirs, *My Life*, 685: “Standing up for the Bosnians had another benefit to the United States: it would demonstrate to Muslims that the United States cared about them and respected them.”

¹⁴⁴ Members in the Principals Committee meetings were the National Security Advisor (Chairman); the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Ambassador to the UN; the Director of the CIA and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). These meeting were somewhat misleadingly named because the President and Vice President rarely attended the meetings which were supposed to be the primary decision-making body in the Executive Branch. See Colin Powell, *My American Journey*, 575; and Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 81.

¹⁴⁵ Operation Deny Flight was a NATO air operation that began April 12, 1993 to enforce the UN no-fly zone air space restrictions at the Balkans. The mission later expanded to include close air support (CAS) for UN units on the ground in BiH and to carry out strikes/bombing against Bosnian Serb targets. Twelve NATO members contributed forces to this operation that ended December 20, 1995, including the U.S. Air Force.

¹⁴⁶ Daalder. *Getting to Dayton*, 7.

by consistently refusing to deploy troops. Postponement and avoidance of decision-making would eventually add up to failure as he ran into the “ceiling” of political courage and will.

The first international peace plan for BiH, known as the Vance-Owen Peace Plan,¹⁴⁷ sought to balance the competing desires for ethnic autonomy between the three parties by dividing BiH into ten semi-autonomous regions. Even if the EU supported the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, President Clinton described the plan as “flawed” and initially decided not to endorse it.¹⁴⁸ The problem with President Clinton’s rejection of the Vance-Owen Plan was that it placed the responsibility for the failure of these peace talks squarely on Clinton. Subsequently, the Clinton Administration announced that the U.S. would like to assist in modifications of the plan and would be willing to help enforce it. New negotiations meant putting more pressure on the Bosnian Serbs and getting the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims “on board.” However, the “Serbian coalition army” refused to accept any peace plan and continued to stonewall all peace efforts; they followed their lessons identified - they achieved their objectives through use of force and by ignoring the international community. Consequently, the Bosnian Serbs continued their operations; in mid-March 1993 an attack was launched on the Muslim enclave in Srebrenica. When the Principles Committee on March 25, 1993 once again discussed the latest developments in BiH, two policy options emerged: (1) increase military pressure against the Bosnian Serbs by lifting the arms embargo and by use of U.S. or NATO air strikes; (2) establish a cease-fire and protect the Muslim enclaves from Bosnian Serb assaults. These two policy options were similar to what *candidate* Clinton had argued in his presidential campaign. However, none of these choices were particularly appealing for *President* Clinton, as they carried significant political costs and military risks.

For international policy, President Clinton adopted a more traditional method of decision-making. In contrast to domestic affairs, he did not take a hands-on approach to

¹⁴⁷ In January 1993 the UN special envoy, prior U.S. Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance and EC representative Lord David Owen negotiated a peace proposal with the leaders of BiH’s warring factions. The proposal, known as the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, involved the division of Bosnia into ten semi-autonomous cantons and Sarajevo the capital should be the tenth canton, patterned on the District of Colombia with all three ethnic groups. This plan received the backing of the UN. In April 1993, the Serbian President Milosević publicly embraced the Vance-Owen plan. On May 5, however, the Bosnian Serb assembly rejected the plan; and in June 1993, Owen declared that the plan was dead. Vance and Owen agreed it was an imperfect plan, but it was the best that could be achieved without military intervention. For a more details of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan see David Owen, *Balkan Odyssey* (Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1995), 89-148. However, it should be noted that many American commentators regarded the Vance-Owen plan as “another Munich,” a precursor to the break-up of BiH. See Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 51.

¹⁴⁸ See Clinton, *My Life*, 511; Daalder *Getting to Dayton*, 11; and Halberstam, *War in a time of Peace*, 197-99. It should be noted that President Clinton was uncomfortable with a settlement that seemed to legitimize Serbian gains made by military aggression. On the other hand, Vance and Owen had drawn up this plan based on the fact that the Europeans and the U.S. were unwilling to intervene militarily to force a conciliatory settlement with the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia.

foreign policy. In foreign policy Clinton seemed to operate under broad guidelines, his national security team would formulate options and then brief the President for his approval or rejection. Observers noted that Clinton deferred decisions on what to do with BiH. He wanted more time to make up his mind, even if his advisors had narrowed the options to two. Geir Lundestad argued that at first President Clinton seemed to assume a position of a lack of interest in foreign affairs. To Clinton, the domestic issues were what counted and only those parts of foreign policy that directly affected the state of the American economy were to be given priority.¹⁴⁹ William Hyland goes a step further when he argued that President Clinton made a nearly fatal decision by turning over his foreign policies to subordinates. Clinton had, according to Hyland, no strong conviction about what the American foreign policy should accomplish except to please voters. Clinton wanted to be informed, but his aids were warned not to take too much of the President's time.¹⁵⁰ David Halberstam claimed that Clinton's interest in BiH became more distant, at best episodic.¹⁵¹ Derek Chollet argued that Clinton entered the spring of 1995 with an approach toward the conflict which he criticized as "unfocused, uninspired and unprincipled."¹⁵² Even some of those closest to President Clinton seemed to chafe at the way he spent so much time making decisions.¹⁵³ A possible explanation to Clinton's approach can be found in his management and decision-making style. President Clinton used a seminar-type style of decision-making, a style which might give an appearance that the president was weak and distanced.¹⁵⁴ Further on, Clinton's thinking and debating seem to have been viewed as indecisiveness. His decision-making approach was sometime held up to ridicule because he allowed an openness of debate. In contrast to that characterization, Bill Clinton personally believed he was unusually decisive for a president.¹⁵⁵ The acquired reputation for indecisiveness had in Clinton's belief, roots in people projecting their own anxieties and uncertainties onto him.¹⁵⁶

¹⁴⁹ See Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945*, 250.

¹⁵⁰ Hyland, *Clintons World: Remaking American Foreign Policy*, 18, 64.

¹⁵¹ Halberstam, *War in a time of Peace*, 196.

¹⁵² See Chollet, *The Road to the Dayton Accords*, 7.

¹⁵³ See Woodward, *The Choice*, 19.

¹⁵⁴ See Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 108. See also, Powell, *My American Journey*, 576. Here Powell wrote: "At subsequent meetings, the discussion continued to meander like graduate-student bull sessions or the think-tank seminars in which many of my new colleagues had spent the last twelve years while their party was out of power. Backbenchers sounded off with the authority of cabinet officers. I was shocked one day to hear one of Tony Lake's subordinates, who was there to take notes, argue with him in front of the rest of us."

¹⁵⁵ This view can be understood because President Clinton had built a new relationship with Russia and other former Soviet republics, handled the problems in Northern Ireland, strengthened U.S. ties with the three Baltic countries, started the enlargement process of NATO and gained congressional support for the GATT and NAFTA trade agreements.

¹⁵⁶ See Woodward, *The Choice*, 14; and Clinton, *My Life*, 502

Finally after considerable delay, Clinton opted for a *lift and strike* policy.¹⁵⁷ The objective of the lift and strike approach was to convince the Bosnian Serbs to sign the Vance-Owen plan.¹⁵⁸ Clinton's motivation for the lift and strike policy can be found in three major factors for considerations: (1) the costs of getting too involved in BiH would involve spending political capital needed on his domestic agenda; (2) Clinton's fear of undermining the on-going reform policies in Russia;¹⁵⁹ and (3) avoiding a possible American military quagmire in BiH, ala Vietnam.¹⁶⁰ Clinton's decision to pursue the lift and strike strategy had a major catch; it needed European and Russian approval. The European allies rejected in early May 1993 Clinton's lift and strike policy arguing it would threaten the transatlantic relationship in NATO and would make the United States solely responsible for the challenges in BiH.¹⁶¹ Consequently, a week later Clinton's lift and strike policy was effectively dead.¹⁶² A new U.S. policy towards BiH was reached two weeks later when the United States, Britain, France, Russia and Spain agreed on a Joint Action Program.¹⁶³ However, the Joint Action Program did

¹⁵⁷ The idea of the "lift and strike" policy was to lift the UNSC arms embargo in BiH in order to allow the poorly armed Bosnian Muslims to arm with imported weapons, thus balancing the conflict, along with the threat of air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs. The policy was initially called for in the summer of 1992 by President Izetbegović in BiH and later adopted by several U.S. Senators. Candidate Bill Clinton adopted it as a part of his 1992 campaign platform, in an effort to distance himself from President Bush's foreign policy. After President Clinton opted for *lift and strike*, Secretary of State Christopher was sent to European governments in May 1993 in order to persuade them to support the strategy, which would have required their involvement, but France, Germany and Britain rejected the proposal, fearing that it would endanger UNPROFOR troops and other humanitarian efforts on the ground in BiH.

¹⁵⁸ See Elisabeth Drew, *On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 156; Lundestad, *the United States and Western Europe since 1945*, 251; and Hyland, *Clintons World*, 34.

¹⁵⁹ See President Clinton's statement on the Situation in Russia, "An Affirmation of Support" presented in Washington, D.C. on September 21, 1993: "I have given my full backing to the historic process of political and economic reform now underway in Russia.... President Yeltsin has made this choice, and I support him fully." See also President Clinton's remarks "A Message of Hope and Encouragement" given to Students of Moscow State University, Moscow on May 10, 1995. See also Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 17 - The Russian President Boris Yeltsin had warned against U.S. military actions towards the Serbs. At the time, U.S.-Russia relations topped the Clinton Administration's foreign policy agenda; see also Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, 248.

¹⁶⁰ See Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 17

¹⁶¹ European allies feared that arming the Bosnian Muslims and the use of air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs would escalate the war and put their UN forces into jeopardy. The Europeans did not want more arms pouring into the Balkans. Another aspect was that U.S. did not share the risks because there were no American military boots on the ground in BiH.

¹⁶² See Halberstam, *War in a time of Peace*, 204 and 224-229; Powell, *My American Journey*, 577; and Chollet, *The Road to the Dayton Accord*, 4-5. According to Halberstam, Clinton responded with anger at the Europeans who were blocking his policy response – lift and strike.

¹⁶³ See Secretary of State Warren Christopher: "Announcement of the Joint Action Program on the conflict in Bosnia" in *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, May 24, 1993, 368-370. Among the issues announced were: "We will continue our program of humanitarian assistance to the people of BiH to save lives, and we will insist that all parties allow this aid to pass without hindrance. We will rigorously enforce the tight and tough regime of sanctions that isolate and pressure Serbia and Montenegro. This pressure will be unrelenting until the necessary conditions of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions are met, including the withdrawal of Bosnian Serb troops from territories occupied by force. Each of us will contribute in our own way...or instance, through monitors, technical assistance, or surveillance...to a joint effort that will ensure that Belgrade's promise to close its border with Bosnia is not a shallow one. We will work in the United Nations for early adoption of measures that will implement certain "safe areas" in BiH. We will continue to enforce vigorously the no-fly zone established over Bosnia. We will remain intensively involved in efforts to achieve a durable, negotiated settlement to this crisis. To the extent that the parties decide to implement mutually agreed provisions of the Vance-Owen agreement, that is something we would encourage."

not calm the situation on the ground. Appalled by images in the media and reports from his staff, President Clinton in July 1993 again asked for a new BiH approach. This time Clinton requested all possible options, including the use of U.S. ground forces.

On August 2, 1993, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) agreed that NATO should make preparations for undertaking stronger measures including air strikes in BiH. The measures should be under authority of the UNSC and within the framework of UNSC Resolutions. Full coordination would be carried out with the UN, including appropriate arrangements between NATO military authorities and UNPROFOR.¹⁶⁴ Close cooperation between the UN and NATO would legitimize the need for U.S.-led NATO missions of maintaining stability in Europe. However, UNPROFOR proved powerless to protect civilians; its humanitarian mission dwindled to an effort to protect the humanitarian convoys. The NATO initiative became a new failure because of the UN-NATO restrictive agreement on air strikes. The UN Secretary General and NATO's SACEUR¹⁶⁵ each held one of two keys needed for an agreement. Consequently, NATO was not allowed to conduct air strikes on its own because of the “*dual key*” system under which UN and NATO had to agree before such military actions could be taken.¹⁶⁶ Given dominant French and British roles in UNPROFOR, air strikes by NATO were vetoed to avoid Bosnian Serb repercussions. The preferred approach of the Clinton Administration; could not be executed as long as UNPROFOR troops were vulnerable to being taken hostage.¹⁶⁷ Consequently, the *dual key* system proved to be a frustrating impediment to protecting the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. The Serb coalition army would once again capitalize on the Western reluctance to use its military “muscles”.

With the U.S. humanitarian intervention in Somalia, President Clinton inherited what would turn out to be a disaster and a lesson learned during his first ten months in the White House. On May 4, 1993, the command of the U.S. forces in Somalia was quietly passed from the U.S.-led UNITAF operation to the second UN-led Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II)

¹⁶⁴ Press Statement by NATO Secretary General, Brussels August 2, 1993. Source: NATO Online Library <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c930802a.htm> accessed March 12, 2009.

¹⁶⁵ The Supreme Allied Commander (SAC) is the title held by the most senior commander within NATO's multilateral military forces in Europe (SACEUR). SACEUR is NATO's most senior commander in Europe. An American four star General or Admiral holds the post of SACEUR.

¹⁶⁶ “Dual key” was a system that required both NATO and the UN to authorize NATO air strikes. In practice, the dual key was a dual veto used by the UN to minimize NATO air strikes. Clinton, *My Life*, 534; Hamilton, *Bill Clinton: Mastering the Presidency* (London: Arrow Books, 2007), 187 and 481; Albright, *Madam Secretary*, 187; and Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 22-23.

¹⁶⁷ Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, 348-349.

without any presidential or congressional complaints.¹⁶⁸ During the upcoming months the situation in Somalia deteriorated. The Administration reluctantly approved sending a battalion of Rangers and a Delta Force unit. The television images on the evening of October 3, 1993 showed the bodies of two U.S. soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu as Somalis kicked them and jeered. U.S. peace-keeping forces had become engaged in a major battle resulting in over 100 U.S. casualties. This experience severely influenced President Clinton's policies concerning other peripheral humanitarian crises.¹⁶⁹ Congress and the public grew increasingly uncomfortable with peace operations in general and the situation in Somalia in particular.¹⁷⁰ How had a humanitarian mission turned into an obsession with getting Mohammad Farah Aideed? Why were American forces doing UN bidding?¹⁷¹ In his memoirs, Bill Clinton described the strong reactions from Senators Robert Byrd and John McCain, both demanding that the President should get the troops out of Somalia.¹⁷² Congress' reaction was intense and furious to the October 3 "fire fight" in Mogadishu, and a large number of Congressional members called for immediate withdrawal. President Clinton ignored the critics from Congress and decided to keep reinforced U.S. forces in Somalia until March 31, 1994. Somalia, a country peripheral to United States interest, influenced President Clinton's actions in the heart of Europe. Clinton became even more reluctant to deploy ground forces to BiH.¹⁷³ Somalia was a tragedy for U.S. - UN relations.¹⁷⁴ Clinton argued in his memoirs: "...I had to consider the consequences of any action that could make it even harder

¹⁶⁸ See statement by Madeleine Albright, U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN, before the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, Human Rights of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on June 24, 1993. This transfer of command meant that few remaining U.S. forces were under command of the UN. However the Task Force Rangers were under U.S. chain of command. See also article written by Elaine Sciolino in the *New York Times*: "U.S. Narrows Terms for Its Peacekeepers" on September 23, 1993. Sciolino quotes an official said: "The evolving policy would require justifying involvement in terms of United States' national interests and would limit situations in which American troops would serve under United Nation's command." The article is available at: www.nytimes.com accessed April 12, 2009.

¹⁶⁹ See Clinton, *My Life*, 554; Albright, *Madam Secretary*, 145-150 and Powell, *My American Journey*, 588.

¹⁷⁰ See President Clinton's "Explaining Somalia to the Congress," message delivered October 23, 1993. See also DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 4.

¹⁷¹ John R. Bolton, "Wrong Turn in Somalia" *Foreign Affairs* vol. 73, no 1 (1994): 55-66.

¹⁷² Clinton, *My Life*, 551.

¹⁷³ Lessons were identified and learned in Somalia: President Clinton grew more weary of risking his "domestic capital" on military operations in states of peripheral interests to the United States. Clinton's cautions would affect his responses in the Balkans and other humanitarian crisis such as the ethnic killings in Rwanda in 1994. Therefore, little consideration was given to sending U.S. Armed Forces to Rwanda when civil war and ethnic cleansing followed the death of Rwanda's president. Nearly, four years later, during his travels to Rwanda, President Clinton accepted in remarks delivered to Rwanda government officials, genocide survivors and assistance workers at Kigali Airport on March 25, 1998, his share of responsibility for inaction in response to the ethnic killing of more than 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu during 90 days that began April 6 in 1994. See Clinton, *My Life*, 782; Albright, *Madam Secretary*, 152; and Halberstam, *War in a time of peace*, 248-66.

¹⁷⁴ The Clinton Administration's belief in multilateralism as directed through the UN blurred the Administration's focus on genuine U.S. national interests. The relationship between the Clinton Administration and UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali would seriously deteriorate after Somalia.

to get Congressional support for sending American troops to Bosnia....”¹⁷⁵ Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) was among Clinton Administration’s policy responses to the controversies over the UN-led multilateral peace operation in Somalia. PDD-25 offers this conclusion:

Properly constituted, peace operations can be one useful tool to advance American national interests and pursue our national security objectives. The U.S. cannot be the world’s policeman. Nor can we ignore the increase in armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars and the collapse of governmental authority in some states-crises that individually and cumulatively may affect U.S. interests.¹⁷⁶

Madeleine Albright argued that the purpose of PDD-25 was to put America squarely on the side of strengthening UN peacekeeping operations. The chain of command between the United States and the UN should be made clearer; missions should have a clear mandate and significant consultations with Congress were required.¹⁷⁷ On the other hand, Republicans in Congress dismissed PDD-25 because the document in their view continued to subordinate the U.S. to the UN.¹⁷⁸

In February 1994, a modified plan for BiH was developed to apply more pressure on the Serbs. The U.S. finally decided to become actively more involved in the diplomatic negotiations in BiH and stimulated NATO’s willingness to implement air strikes.¹⁷⁹ A possible Bosnian Muslim–Bosnian Croat alliance was pushed to improve the military balance between the parties on the ground in BiH.¹⁸⁰ An agreement called “*the Washington Agreement*” was stuck in Washington D.C. on March 18, 1994. President Clinton had achieved his first successful initiative in BiH.¹⁸¹ A new five-nation negotiating forum, *the Contact Group*, was formed. Russia became a welcomed major actor in diplomacy in BiH because this increased access and leverage over the Serb leadership in Belgrade and Pale. For the Clinton Administration, the establishment of the Contact Group made it possible to forge

¹⁷⁵ Quoted from Clinton, *My Life*, 552.

¹⁷⁶ The White House, Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) presented on May 6, 1994. Quote is from the conclusions in this document. Available at: <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm> accessed January 20, 2009.

¹⁷⁷ Albright, *Madam Secretary*, 147.

¹⁷⁸ William Hyland claims PDD-25 restated a version of traditional foreign policy where peacekeeping should henceforth be measured by U.S. interests; and for operations involving substantial use of force, U.S. participation would require a clear commitment to win. See Hyland, *Clintons World*, 64. If one compares the six major tests in the Weinberger Doctrine with PDD-25, it becomes clear that those six tests were woven into the policy of PDD-25.

¹⁷⁹ President Clinton, Remarks delivered at the summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), Brussels, on January 10, 1994.

¹⁸⁰ The Bosnian Muslim-Bosnian Croat conflict in 1993 and 1994 had left the Bosnian Serbs with a decisive military advantage.

¹⁸¹ With the “Washington Agreement,” the Clinton Administration succeeded in isolating the third party, the Bosnian Serbs in the negotiations. See Clinton, *My Life*, 590-91.

greater international unity and avoid the UN system.¹⁸² The “dual key” restrictions in BiH and the experiences from the UN-led UNOSOM II Operation in Somalia had made President Clinton more than reluctant to involve the UN in future operations. Clinton wanted the UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali completely eliminated from the chain of command.¹⁸³ Consequently, in BiH the NATO and UN cooperation would be on a hold in the summer of 1995 after the genocide in Srebrenica.¹⁸⁴

In November 1994, Clinton’s Democratic Party suffered a stunning electoral defeat in the mid-term election and lost both houses of Congress to the Republicans. The Republican Party had long favored lifting the arms-embargo in BiH, unilaterally if necessary.¹⁸⁵ Subsequently, on November 10, President Clinton announced that the United States would no longer enforce the arms embargo.¹⁸⁶ President Clinton’s credibility came under strong pressure from NATO allies who had “boots on the ground” in UNPROFOR. How could he, who did not share the risk of having troops in BiH, unilaterally lift the arms embargo? Further transatlantic disagreements occurred when the Bosnian Serbs responded to U.S.-led NATO air strikes by detaining several hundred UN peacekeepers vulnerable to Bosnian Serb retaliation.¹⁸⁷ NATO looked weak, and as the senior partner in NATO, the U.S. was looking weaker. The differences within NATO over which policy should be followed with regard to BiH, which surfaced at the end of 1994, were the worst in NATO since the Suez crises in 1956.¹⁸⁸ What had worked in Iraq during Desert Storm became a dismal failure in BiH. The

¹⁸² The Clinton Administration’s wish to avoid UN was a major change in policy from the statement made at the Confirmation Hearing of Madeleine Albright for the post as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations where she stated: “When the President announced my appointment last month, he said that, in his Administration, the post of Ambassador to the United Nations will be one of the most critical foreign policy positions. With the end of the Cold War, the United Nations is poised to play a central and positive role for peace.” Source: Quote from “Statement at Confirmation Hearing of Ambassador to the United Nations.” January 21, 1993, reprinted in *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, vol. 4, no 15, April 12, 1993. See also Chollet, *The Road to the Dayton Accords*, 30-35 on disagreements between UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and the Clinton Administration on the UN civilian decision-making authorities over airstrikes.

¹⁸³ See Chollet, *The Road to the Dayton Accords*, 33. See also Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 103 and 202. Holbrooke argued that the struggle over UN’s role foreshadowed the United States determination to later oppose Boutros-Ghali’s quest for a second term as Secretary General. Kofi Annan’s performance to end the dual key problem influenced the Clinton Administration’s support for Annan a year later as the successor of Boutros-Ghali as Secretary-General of the UN.

¹⁸⁴ The Srebrenica Genocide took place in July 1995, killing estimated 7-8,000 Bosnian Muslim boys and men in the Srebrenica area by paramilitary units of the Bosnian Serb Army under command of General Ratko Mladić. Paramilitary units from Serbia also participated in these genocides. The UN had declared Srebrenica an UN-protected “safe area”, but that did not prevent the genocides, even though 400 Dutch UN peacekeepers were present. See Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 66-68; and Clinton, *My Life*, 665-666.

¹⁸⁵ Woodward, *The Choice*, 255. The Republican majority in Congress was behind Senate majority leader Bob Dole when he wanted the U.S. to break with the UN and unilaterally lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims.

¹⁸⁶ See Clinton, *My Life*, 633.

¹⁸⁷ See Chollet, *The Road to the Dayton Accords*, 8; and Wesley K. Clark, with Tom Carhart, *A Time to Lead: For Duty, Honor and Country* (New York: Palgrave, 2007), 177-78.

¹⁸⁸ See Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United. The Evolution of an Alliance*, 116-21; and Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 285.

transatlantic allies' inability to act in harmony undermined NATO's role in Europe and U.S. leadership in NATO. President Clinton's BiH policy ended the year 1994 basically where it had started: without a diplomatic initiative, without a threat of using massive military forces, and without credibility for the United States as the lead nation in NATO.

Again, President Clinton had to make a real choice: either go ahead with unilateral air strikes in support of Bosnian Muslims to defend UN "safe areas" with the possible consequences that NATO allies would withdraw from BiH; or abandon further air strikes with the possible cost of a Bosnian Serb military victory. For President Clinton, the choice seemed to have been simple; he decided to put NATO unity first and refrained from a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo.¹⁸⁹ By this move, President Clinton's policy towards BiH shifted from *intervention* to *containment*. However, to improve the transatlantic relationships, Clinton on December 7, 1994 decided to offer up to 25,000 U.S. troops to help extricate, if necessary, UN peacekeepers from BiH. Clinton's offer seemed to have three objectives: (1) give an incentive to allies that had troops in UNPROFOR to keep their forces in BiH; (2) send a message that U.S. forces would be deployed to handle an eventual worst case extradition of UNPROFOR; and (3) demonstrate U.S. leadership in NATO and keep NATO as a transatlantic alliance relevant.¹⁹⁰ Three months later, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, formally requested NATO to prepare for a possible UNPROFOR withdrawal.¹⁹¹ Thus, President Clinton's promise to provide troops became an uneasy commitment when the fighting throughout BiH continued and NATO airpower was "checkmated" by the Bosnian Serbs' hostage-taking. President Clinton faced critical dilemmas; first, how would a deployment of up to 25,000 troops to BiH, in a context of defeat, influence his political capital? Secondly, what if BiH became the Vietnam-like quagmire feared by the Pentagon?¹⁹² Thirdly, how to avoid a pullout or collapse of UNPROFOR, which would obligate the U.S. to live up its

¹⁸⁹ See Chollet, *The Road to the Dayton Accords*, 4.

¹⁹⁰ President Clinton conditioned this offer of 25,000 troops on the understanding that an extradition operation would be under sole NATO command. This meant no "dual key" arrangements with the UN. See Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 47. General Wesley Clark argued that the American willingness to commit ground troops was the decisive factor in winning European support. See Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 52.

¹⁹¹ See Report of the UN General Secretary to the UN Security Council March 22, 1995 (S/1995/222). Quote from Para 79, 22-23: "In an exchange of correspondence with the Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Willy Claes, I have made it clear that, ...it would be of great value to the UN to be able to call on the services of NATO, with the approval of the Security Council, to protect and if necessary conduct a withdrawal operation." Quotes available at: <http://www.un.org/Docs/secu95.htm> accessed in April 12, 2009. See Woodward, *the Choice*, 256-57; and Chollet, *the Road to the Dayton Accords*, 9. See also UNSC Resolution 982 (March 29, 1995) which extended UNPROFOR's mandate in BiH for an additional period terminating on November 30, 1995.

¹⁹² It should be noted that BiH was a country that was heavily mined, is mostly mountainous terrain, and has poor roads, big rivers and valleys which would make a military operation a very risky and dangerous undertaking. From a logistical point of view support in such rugged terrain is a huge challenge.

commitment? Fourthly, what impact would action or inaction have on the upcoming 1996 presidential election?

Almost “heaven-sent” for Clinton’s political capital was the French¹⁹³ proposal of establishing a 10,000-man multinational Rapid Reaction Force with troops from France, Britain and the Netherlands, and which was successfully organized and deployed to BiH in early July 1995.¹⁹⁴ Consequently, Clinton fully supported this deployment, even if Congress were reluctant to support the logistical support he committed.¹⁹⁵ However, U.S leadership in NATO seemed to still be in jeopardy. President Clinton reaffirmed his commitment to NATO in a speech at the U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs:

We believe still that a strengthened United Nations operation is the best insurance against an even worse humanitarian disaster should they leave. We have a longstanding commitment to help our NATO allies, some of whom have troops in the U.N. operation in Bosnia, to take part in a NATO operation to assist them in a withdrawal if that should ever become necessary. And so, if necessary, and after consultation with Congress, I believe we should be prepared to assist NATO if it decides to meet a request from the United Nations troops for help in a withdrawal or a reconfiguration and a strengthening of its forces.¹⁹⁶

Clinton’s statement was vague regarding a temporary deployment of U.S. forces to BiH. How should “reconfiguration and strengthening” of the UN troops be interpreted? Was this an attempt to reassure a reluctant Congress? Or had Clinton decided to deploy forces as he had promised NATO allies on December 7, 1994? Or was President Clinton again distancing himself from deploying ground forces? Congress raised several critical voices on Clinton’s vague speech at the U.S. Air Force Academy.¹⁹⁷ Consequently, President Clinton addressed the issue again to avoid further misinterpretations:

¹⁹³ It should be noted that French policy toward the crisis at the Balkans became more aggressive when Jacques Chirac took over as President of France from President Francois Mitterrand on May 17, 1995. Chirac was especially upset by how French troops were taken hostage by the Bosnian Serbs and the French troop’s passivity in a moment of crisis. See Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 303.

¹⁹⁴ The Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) was endorsed by the Contact Group in May 1995, by NATO on June 3 and by the UN Security Council on June 16. The U.S. would provide intelligence and logistical support. Source: Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 104th Congress, first session, June 7, 1995. Available at: <http://www.archive.org/details/situationinbosni1996unit> Accessed March, 2, 2009. However, it should be noted that this reinforcement on the ground came too late to alter the image of weakness of the UN. See Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 163.

¹⁹⁵ See article written by Elaine Sciolino, “Money for New U.N. Force: Congress Is Key for Clinton,” in *The New York Times* on June 15, 1995. Available at: www.nytimes.com accessed March 12, 2009.

¹⁹⁶ Quote from speech by President Clinton at the U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs on May 31, 1995. Available at: http://clinton1.nara.gov/White_House/Publications/html/afacad.html accessed April 22, 2009.

¹⁹⁷ Senator Jessie Helms (Rep, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee), said he would not object if the U.S. helped evacuate UN troops. But of the involvement of American forces for any other purpose, Helms declared: “Not on my watch.” Representative J.D. Hayworth (Rep, AZ) advocated: “My constituents, who are among the most conservative, are not neo-isolationists but practical, and their question is: Where is our national interest?” Newt Gingrich (Rep, Speaker of the House)

I determined that we certainly should not have ground forces there, not as a part of the military conflict nor as a part of the United Nations peacekeeping mission... If our allies decide to stay, we want to support them, but within the very careful limits I have outlined. I want to make it clear again what I have said about our ground forces. We will use them only if, first there is a genuine peace with no shooting and no fighting and the United States is part of policing that peace... The question has been raised about whether we would help them to withdraw as a last resort. I have decided that if a U.N. unit needs an emergency extraction, we would assist after consulting with Congress. This would be a limited, temporary operation, and we have not been asked to do this. I think it is highly unlikely that we would be asked to do it.¹⁹⁸

Despite these finely tuned caveats, President Clinton's statements were widely interpreted as a change in strategy. His clarifications in his radio address resolved the confusion and quieted the criticism from Congress.

Once again, events on the ground outpaced Clinton's deliberations and his policy reached a dead end. The Srebrenica genocide in July 1995 became the turning point in BiH. President Clinton was boxed-in by the following: (1) His commitment to deploy forces to a NATO evacuation operation, if the UN decided to leave BiH; (2) his unwillingness to put forces on the ground in BiH; (3) the need to find the morally correct route; (4) the hostile Congress; and (5) his foreign policy records when a presidential election year was approaching. BiH's future and the credibility of Clinton's foreign policy record were inextricably linked. Consequently, giving up BiH was not an option. It was also unthinkable to abandon NATO.¹⁹⁹ President Clinton recognized, although Congress and the American people still would not support it, that the U.S. could no longer avoid involvement. Consequently, the President needed an "endgame" policy that would get him out of the "box" into which he had been squeezed. According to Bob Woodward, a frustrated²⁰⁰ President Clinton demanded: "We need to get the policy straight or we're just going to be kicking the can down the road again. Right now we've got a situation; we've got no clear mission, no one's in control of events."²⁰¹ Several attempts to develop a workable policy towards BiH

said: "It's very important for us to be very cautious." Representative Richard A Gephardt (Dem, The minority leader) argued: "I would reserve judgment on providing limited troops for other purposes until he saw a specific proposal from NATO."

Quoted in article by Katharine Q. Seelye: "Conflict in the Balkans: Capitol Hill: Many in Congress Reluctant to widen U.S. Role in Bosnia," *New York Times*, June 2, 1995. Available at: www.nytimes.com accessed March 12, 2009.

¹⁹⁸ Presidential Radio Address held by President Clinton on June 3, 1995. The address is available at: http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Presidential_Radio_Address_-_3_June_1995 accessed March 12, 2009.

¹⁹⁹ See Woodward, *The Choice*, 257.

²⁰⁰ Bob Woodward described how President Clinton "...erupts in several of his celebrated private blowups, his large body shaking and his voice bellowing." Quoted in Woodward, *The Choice*, 254. See also Halberstam, *War in a time of Peace*, 204.

²⁰¹ Quoted in Woodward, *The Choice*, 255.

had failed.²⁰² Clinton's failed policies made the U.S. look weak and were damaging its standing in the world. At each critical policy juncture, President Clinton had pulled back and deferred to European allies' wishes; including halting pressure for using air power against the Bosnian Serbs. Clinton would finally reverse years of indecision by setting a final policy direction, which would follow a path that two successive Administrations had sought to avoid. It included that the United States seized primary responsibility for BiH's destiny from the UN and the European allies and finally submitted to the reality on the ground in BiH. *Engagement* had to prevail over the *containment* strategy.²⁰³ The process towards the "BiH endgame strategy" started; the Administration's new focus was through diplomacy and balancing "carrots and sticks" getting the Serbian President Slobodan Milosević "onboard" by offering relief from sanctions he had long sought. To get a political settlement in 1995, the U.S. would have to take the lead in the negotiations, as it had done when brokering the Federation agreement²⁰⁴ and the Contact Group Plan.²⁰⁵ In the summer of 1995 the Clinton Administration worked out what should be called the "*Endgame Strategy*." After comprehensive discussions within his Administration, President Clinton decided that the new U.S. initiative should comprise these points, once UNPROFOR was withdrawn from BiH.²⁰⁶

- A comprehensive peace settlement based on the core principles of the Contact Group plan, included a united BiH;
- Three-way recognition among the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia and BiH;
- Consideration of changes in the Contact Group map to take account of recent territorial changes and to ensure viable and defensible borders;
- A reaffirmation of support for the Contact Group plan agreed in June 1994, dividing BiH into two entities, 51 percent of the territory to the Croat-Muslim Federation and 49 percent to the Bosnian Serbs.
- Sanctions relief for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, with the suspension of sanctions once an agreement was signed and complete lifting of sanctions once the agreement was implemented; and
- A comprehensive plan for regional economic integration, to be assisted through an international "mini-Marshall" plan.

²⁰² Despite some U.S. successes in forging NATO consensus on a more assertive policy toward BiH, including some air attacks to stop the shelling of Sarajevo and to support UNPROFOR most efforts ended in failure. U.S. led-NATO air attacks took place from 1993 to 1995.

²⁰³ The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (1995). President Clinton wrote in the preface of this strategy: "We can and must make the difference through our engagement; but our involvement must be carefully tailored to serve our interests and priorities."

²⁰⁴ Agreement established between Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims in Washington D.C. March 18, 1994.

²⁰⁵ See Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 103.

²⁰⁶ Ibid, 112-13; and Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 74.

If the negotiation plan presented failed, the U.S. would follow this approach after UNPROFOR had been withdrawn.²⁰⁷

- Seek to end the arms embargo multi-laterally, through the vote of the UNSC;
- Provide arms, training and support to the Bosnian Muslims²⁰⁸ in order to assist establishing a military balance on the ground;
- Enforce the no-fly zone and conduct air-strikes for a nine month transition period in case the Bosnian Serbs attacked; and
- Encourage the presence of a multinational force to assist the Bosnian Muslims in defending their territory.

The European allies and Russia mostly embraced President Clinton's plan of action.²⁰⁹ Even if there was minor disagreement over some of the issues of arming and training the Bosnian Muslim Army, the most important fact was that the United States' now took the lead to end the war in BiH. The next step for the Clinton Administration was to appoint a White House envoy to lead the negotiations with the intransigent parties in the Balkans. Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke, was selected.²¹⁰ After weeks of negotiations in the Balkan capitals, Holbrooke and his team²¹¹ achieved the wanted breakthroughs. When the Bosnian Serbs launched²¹² a new devastating mortar attack upon a Sarajevo marketplace in late August 1995 NATO began to bomb Bosnian Serb positions.²¹³ For the first time, negotiators in BiH had massive NATO air power muscles behind them.²¹⁴ Holbrooke and his team capitalized on

²⁰⁷ Ibid, 113. See also President Clinton's statement: "Veto of Lifting of Bosnia Arms Embargo," White House, August 11, 1995.

²⁰⁸ This support was predicated on cooperative attitude during negotiations. Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 113.

²⁰⁹ Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, 349

²¹⁰ Richard Holbrooke was U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs from 1994 through 1996, during which time he led the BiH peace talks, which resulted in the Dayton Peace Accords. At the start of the Clinton Administration, Hoolbroke had sent a memo to Secretary Christopher and National Security Advisor Lake; calling for a more aggressive policy in the Balkans to stop Serb aggression. The memo began: "Bosnia will be the key test of American policy in Europe." Quoted in Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 199. See also Holbrooke's article "America, a European Power," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 74 (2), 1995.

²¹¹ It should be noted that three team members (Deputy assistant Secretary of Defense, Joseph Kruzel, Ambassador Robert Frasure and Colonel Nelson Drew) were killed in an accident when the French armored vehicle in which they were riding plunged of the road at Mount Igman close to Sarajevo on August 19, 1995. Another team member who witnessed the accident was General Wesley Clark, who later became SACEUR and played a key role in the NATO operations over Kosovo in 1999. See Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 3-18; Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, 350; Clinton, *My Life*, 668-69; and Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 116.

²¹² The source of the mortar round that exploded in the central market in Sarajevo is disputed. Serb unit commanders claim they did not fire it, but it was generally believed by the U.S. and NATO forces that Serbs were to be blamed for the explosion killing 68 people.

²¹³ After the genocide in Srebrenica in July 1995, sixteen nations and senior UN representatives met for a conference in London to consider new options on BiH. As a result of this "London Conference" UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali gave the UN commander in BiH (General Bernard Janvier) the authority to request NATO air strikes without consulting civilian UN officials. The participants agreed in principle to use large scale NATO air strikes in response to eventual Bosnian Serb aggression. Consequently, on August 30, 1995, NATO launched Operation Deliberate Force with large scale attacks on Serb targets. See Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 129-32; Woodward, *The Choice*, 270; Halberstam, *War in a time of Peace*, 327; and Clinton, *My Life*, 666.

²¹⁴ See Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, 350. It should be noted that the climate for negotiations shifted dramatically during September 1995, due to the Croatian offensive that significantly reduced Bosnian Serb territorial holdings, NATO's

this situation and brought the three parties²¹⁵ together at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base outside Dayton, Ohio in October 1995. On November 21, the three warring parties in BiH initialed an agreement incorporating all the goals pushed forward by U.S. Secretary of State Christopher.²¹⁶ BiH showed both the promise and the limits of coercive diplomacy. Whether diplomacy in BiH could have succeeded without the robust use of military force²¹⁷ is hard to know. However, the Dayton Agreement finally brought a peaceful solution in BiH.²¹⁸ In a televised address to the nation on November 27, 1995 President Clinton explained his decision to finally deploy ground troops to BiH.²¹⁹

3.2 Approaches of the President's staff and advisors

Traditional political-military policy was obviously downgraded, in President Clinton's first term. In short, when the national security team entered the White House there was intellectual confusion over the nature of the post-Cold War era and what the objectives and means of the U.S. foreign policy should be.²²⁰ Within a few months, the Clinton Administration's BiH policy had evolved from tough talk to a hands-off approach. For more than two years BiH was a defining issue for Clinton's national security team's struggles illustrated by its internal disagreements, uncertainties and degree of ambivalence regarding how to move forward to prove America's global leadership as envisioned.

ongoing bombing campaign and Slobodan Milosević's decision to seize control of the peace negotiations. The Croat Army's military operations that took place in September destroyed the Bosnian Serb's perceived invincibility.

²¹⁵ President of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman represented the Bosnian Croats; President in BiH, Alija Izetbegović the Bosnian Muslims and President of Serbia Slobodan Milosević the Bosnian Serbs. Milosević had coerced the Bosnian Serbs into giving him authority to negotiate in Dayton on their behalf. Due to the specific nature of the conflict in BiH it was necessary to include all these three presidents as key participants at Dayton. See Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, 348-55.

²¹⁶ The course of events during the negotiations is now well known, not least because several people present have authored its history in fascinating detail. See: Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War*; and Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, 351-59.

²¹⁷ The use of force here was NATO from the air and the Croatian Army on the ground.

²¹⁸ See "Summary of General Framework Agreement." This is a fact sheet released by Office of the Spokesman the U.S. Department of State on November 30, 1995. Available at: <http://www.nato.int/IFOR/gfa/gfa-summ.htm> accessed April 18, 2009. On December 14, 1995 the General Framework Agreement for Peace was signed in Paris. To support the implementation of the Peace Agreement achieved at Dayton, NATO launched (based on UNSC Resolution 1031) the largest military operation ever undertaken by the NATO. The Implementation Force (IFOR) started its mission in BiH on December 20, 1995. The U.S. deployed 20,000 troops as part of the IFOR (60,000 troops) to keep the peace.

²¹⁹ See speech by President Clinton. "The Dayton Accords: Imposing Peace for Bosnia." The White House, November 27, 1995. President Clinton used the words: "Risks to our troops will be minimized." "By making an overwhelming show of force, they will lessen the need to use force." "And I ask all American, and I ask every Member of Congress." "Our Joint Chiefs of Staff has concluded that this mission should and will take about one year." The observant reader will see that all requirements in the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine were met by these words in Clinton's speech.

²²⁰ In his memoirs Bill Clinton wrote "...in the critical early months, both the staff and I would do a lot on the-the job learning, and some of the lessons would prove to be quite costly." Quoted in Clinton, *My Life*, 467-68.

Evidence suggests that President Clinton's staff and advisors were split in their view how to handle BiH and whether or not to use force.²²¹ The foreign policy team would for more than two years struggle over interests and beliefs on how to best to handle U.S. interests to solve the crisis in BiH.²²² Even though the foreign policy team was split, it understood that U.S. policy had implications beyond BiH; the outcome would shape United States relationship with Europe, Russia, the UN and NATO. The internal debates in the team oscillated between arguments for and against engagement and for and against the use of military force. On the one side the "hawks" consisting of Vice-president Al Gore, UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright and the National Security Advisor Anthony Lake all advocated stronger U.S. engagement and if necessary the use of military force to bring the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiation table. However, Albright was the only principal to advocate in favor of ground troops.²²³ On the other hand the "doves," consisting of Secretary Warren Christopher,²²⁴ Secretary Les Aspin (replaced by Secretary William Perry on February 3, 1994) and the CJCS Colin Powell (replaced by General John Shalikashvili on September 30, 1993²²⁵) were all opposed to the use of U.S. ground forces in BiH.²²⁶ Especially, General Colin Powell was opposed to American military involvement. However, the "doves" accepted an alternative to deploying "boots on the ground;" the use of air power to stop the Bosnian Serbs *if* used to support or enforce diplomacy. The many months of debate among Clinton's advisers also brought up another key issue; should the United States favor a multilateral or unilateral approach when threatening use of air power? Secretary Christopher, in particular, hesitated about having to get NATO allies on board.²²⁷ Subsequently, in the absence of a consensus among the President's advisers, most of the discussed approaches reached virtual dead ends. Clinton, on several occasions was infuriated over his foreign policy team's "helplessness." However, in the late spring of 1995, the internal positions on BiH were changing. Consequently, President Clinton deferred a final decision on what to do until August 1995,

²²¹ See The White House, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" (1995), ii. Quote from this strategy: "We therefore will send American troops abroad only when our interests and our values are sufficiently at stake."

²²² See Albright, *Madam Secretary*, 180; and Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 165

²²³ See Drew, *On the Edge. The Clinton Presidency*, 274-75.

²²⁴ Halberstam argued Christopher was somewhere near the center between hawks and doves, perhaps slightly on the dovish side. See Halberstam, *War in a time of peace*, 226.

²²⁵ General John Shalikashvili was SACEUR when he was selected as Powell's successor as CJCS in 1993. Consequently, Shalikashvili had great knowledge about European allies and the situation in BiH.

²²⁶ See Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 13.

²²⁷ *Ibid*, 21.

when based on advice from his advisers; he decided that the U.S. should take a stronger hand, diplomatically and militarily.

Al Gore, according to Bob Woodward, was President Clinton's most important discussion partner.²²⁸ Al Gore was a hawk on BiH urging strong action to stop the conflict.²²⁹ Halberstam advocated that when Gore pushed for a tougher line in the Balkans, President Clinton seemed responsive.²³⁰ Gore kept BiH on the agenda. However, he was caught in the classical limitations of being Vice President and would not embarrass Clinton. Albright stated "Gore was an advocate for a forceful action."²³¹ According to Woodward, at a meeting in June 1995 Gore argued that the Administration's inaction on BiH "is driving us into a brick wall with Congress."²³² In mid-July 1995, Gore once again went on the offensive over intelligence information provided from BiH by advocating: "We have to come up with something practical to make military sense. Acquiescence is not an option."²³³ The President responded to Gore's arguments by saying: "The United States can not be a punching bag in the world anymore."²³⁴

From the beginning of the Clinton Administration, Madeleine Albright, the UN Ambassador, was the most vocal and persistent advocate for a strong U.S. action in BiH, but her influence was also limited.²³⁵ It should be noted that Albright had a personal affection for Yugoslavia.²³⁶ For almost three years, she pushed for a strong approach with the use of military force to stop Bosnian Serb aggressions. Albright's position was that America, for political and moral reasons, should not be bystanders while Bosnian Serb aggression went unchecked. Force should be used to stop aggression, this included if necessary ground forces. Albright challenged General Colin Powell by asking; "What's the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about if we can't use it?"²³⁷ The ease with which Albright was willing to deploy troops to BiH, some observers thought, was because among her peers in

²²⁸ See Woodward, *The Choice*, 48. Bob Woodward argued that Clinton and Gore grew increasingly close and trusting of each other. They opened up to each other about personnel, legislation, family and the expectations they had for themselves.

²²⁹ See Halberstam, *War in a time of Peace*, 158-159. Senator Gore had served on the Senate Armed Services Committee and was more hawkish than most Democrats. During George H. Bush's presidency Senator Gore was a sharp critic of American policy in the Balkans. See also Klein, *The Natural*, 65.

²³⁰ See Halberstam, *War in a time of Peace*, 159.

²³¹ Quoted in Albright, *Madam Secretary*, 180.

²³² Quoted in Woodward, *The Choice*, 255.

²³³ *Ibid*, 263.

²³⁴ Quoted in Halberstam, *War in a time of Peace*, 331.

²³⁵ See Halberstam, *War in a time of Peace*, 197.

²³⁶ Madeleine Albright was born in Czechoslovakia, a country her family were forced to leave twice: after Munich (1938) and again after the Communist coup in 1948. Albright emphasized the influence these lessons had on her view of strong actions. Albright has lived in Yugoslavia and she has later studied it as an academic. For more on background see, Albright, *Madam Secretary*, 3-17.

²³⁷ Quoted in Powell, *My American Journey*, 576.

the Administration, she was the individual least affected by Vietnam. She strongly warned President Clinton of the dire consequences to his Europe policy and the credibility of NATO and UN. From the beginning of the Clinton Administration she urged him to use airpower to slow Bosnian Serb advances.²³⁸ In the Clinton Administration's first term, Albright's persistent arguments for stronger actions with use of military force in BiH was not until July 1995 adopted as a policy approach to follow. Albright was a hawk on BiH from the start, but she seemed not been taken seriously by her peers.²³⁹

The Department of State's position on BiH was that military force should *only* be deployed to help implement and enforce a negotiated settlement between the parties in BiH.²⁴⁰ Secretary Warren Christopher position was that the U.S. should act alone only when vital national interests were at stake. The crisis in BiH did not meet such a prerequisite. Consequently, the bottom line was that President Clinton's main priority should be to avoid a military ground presence in BiH.²⁴¹ Secretary Christopher²⁴² in many ways the elder statesman of Clinton's Administration described the situation in BiH as "*the problem from hell*."²⁴³ In a hearing before the House of Representatives' Foreign Affairs Committee, Secretary Christopher said:

The United States will not send ground troops into Bosnia to engage in military action. As I said, we are prepared to commit our military forces to implement a peace settlement entered into consensually and in good faith by the parties, but we will not use our military forces to impose a settlement in the Balkans.²⁴⁴

Secretary Christopher was deeply embarrassed in early May 1993, when he failed to persuade the European allies to adopt the more aggressive *lift and strike* policy.²⁴⁵ Christopher's journey to Europe was immensely damaging to the Clinton Administration and

²³⁸ See Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 24; and Hyland, *Clintons World*, 36.

²³⁹ Albright was responsible for U.S.-UN relations. She was not a military professional nor did she have any legal responsibility or authority over the use of U.S. forces. Therefore it is only logical that the President and NSC gave more credence to the Secretary of Defense and the CJCS.

²⁴⁰ See Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, 344; and Halberstam, *War in a time of Peace*, 196.

²⁴¹ See Chollet, *The Road to the Dayton Accords*, 22; and Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 169.

²⁴² Warren Christopher had served as Deputy Attorney General under President Johnson and Deputy Secretary of State under President Carter. See Christopher, *In the Stream of History* 1-14. For further elaboration on how and why Warren Christopher was selected as Secretary of State, see Halberstam, *War in a time of Peace*, 169-175.

²⁴³ Quote from Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, 344

²⁴⁴ Quote from statement of Secretary Warren Christopher in Hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 103 Congress, 1 session, 1993. Available at (see point 93):

www.archive.org/stream/foreignassistan0108unit/foreignassistan0108unit_djvu.txt Accessed May 18, 2009

²⁴⁵ See Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, 345-346; and Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 15-16. Christopher visited London, Moscow, Paris, Brussels, Bonn and Rome. His assignment was to sound out support for Clinton's lift and strike policy. The policy was rejected by European allies, based on their commitment on the ground in BiH in UNPROFOR. Christopher later noted that the absence of presidential passion affected the entire trip.

particularly to Christopher himself. A few months later Christopher again was embarrassed after twelve U.S. Department of State officers revolted, sending the Secretary an “impassioned” letter claiming that diplomacy in BiH had failed and calling for firm military action.²⁴⁶ The New York Times wrote “not since the Vietnam War has a policy caused so much anguish within the foreign service.”²⁴⁷ Christopher became the perfect target for blame for critics of the Clinton policies in the Balkans. Halberstam’s characteristic of Christopher was: “as a weak man personally, who was bearing a weak policy from a weak Administration.”²⁴⁸ Albright argued “Secretary Christopher had trouble identifying any option he could recommend.”²⁴⁹ At a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 24, 1994, Secretary Christopher said that the U.S. had important strategic, political and humanitarian interests in bringing peace to BiH. This testimony contrasted with Christopher’s remarks before the same committee in November 1993, when he had dismissed the crisis in Bosnia as “a difficult situation that had gone exactly as the U.S. had planned.”²⁵⁰ The contradiction between the Administration’s policy speeches and U.S. actions hung over the Department of State like an immense cloud.²⁵¹ The Department of State simply fell back on a mixture of diplomatic and humanitarian approaches. Christopher’s fundamental approach to BiH was that the crisis in BiH should primarily be reviewed as a conflict the Europeans should solve diplomatically, with America distancing itself from getting too deeply involved. Christopher’s view was that European allies and Congress would never support an increased U.S. military engagement in BiH. In an address at Harvard University in January 1995, Secretary Christopher outlined the four core principles for American Foreign Policy: (1) Maintaining American leadership; (2) strengthening cooperative relations with the world’s most powerful nations; (3) adapt and build institutions that will promote economic and security cooperation; and (4) continue to support democracy and human rights.²⁵² In this address, Secretary Christopher gave the Department of State’s updated position on how to

²⁴⁶ See Hyland, *Clintons World*, 5.

²⁴⁷ Article by Elaine Sciolino, “The World: Bosnia’s Plight Divides the State Department,” in the *New York Times*, July 18, 1993. Available at: www.nytimes.com accessed April 18, 2009.

²⁴⁸ Quoted in Halberstam, *War in a time of Peace*, 224.

²⁴⁹ Quoted in Albright, *Madam Secretary*, 180.

²⁵⁰ Article written by Elaine Sciolino, “Republicans Say Congress Could Balk on Bosnia Force,” in the *New York Times* on February 24, 1994. Available at: www.nytimes.com accessed March 12, 2009.

²⁵¹ Late in 1994, Secretary Christopher went to see President Clinton and in effect resigned. Christopher was convinced he had damaged Clinton’s presidency. After Christopher was urged to reconsider, he decided to stay on. See Halberstam, *War in a time of Peace*, 299-301.

²⁵² Secretary Warren Christopher, Address before the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MS, January 20, 1995. Reprinted in Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, 244-56.

solve the crisis in BiH by arguing "...we are seeking a negotiated solution in Bosnia because only a negotiated solution has any chance of lasting and preventing a wider war. What we must not do is make the situation worse by unilaterally lifting the arms embargo."²⁵³

Christopher feared that European allies might respond to a push for U.S. forces by pulling out their own UNPROFOR troops, thus triggering a request for U.S. military support in a withdrawal operation. The Department of State seemed to have accepted stronger U.S. action with the use of massive airstrikes against the Bosnian Serbs after they became aware of the genocide in Srebrenica in mid July 1995.²⁵⁴ From mid July also Christopher would advocate the need to use force against the Bosnian Serbs to reach a negotiated settlement to end the crisis in BiH.

The Department of Defense and the CJCS had no enthusiasm for commitment of U.S. ground troops to force a settlement in BiH. Memories of Vietnam were still present in military circles. General Powell followed the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine and denigrated the effectiveness of air power and other limited forms of military force on the ground.²⁵⁵ The Pentagon²⁵⁶ was adamantly against a military intervention, citing the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine that any use of force should be consistent with the doctrine of using overwhelming force to achieve clear political objectives. Evidence shows that the Pentagon was listened to seriously because General Colin Powell was unquestionably the single most respected and influential member of Clinton's national security team.²⁵⁷ When military planners looked at BiH, experience had taught them that they could not think in terms of airpower alone. U.S. military forces could not do much without commitment, very strong ground and air forces, something far beyond what would be supportable in Congress and by the public. Air power alone could not prevail in the Balkan terrain, only troops on the ground could change Serb behavior.²⁵⁸ Powell's constant unwelcome message at the meetings on BiH was that the United States should not commit forces until a clear political objective was defined. Secretary Les Aspin shared this view. General Shalikashvili was, like his predecessor Powell, disdainful

²⁵³ Quoted in Ibid, 251.

²⁵⁴ In the article "War Crimes Trial Starts with Grisly Images" by Charles Truehart in the *Washington Post* on March 18, 2000 the author argued that the Clinton Administration got conclusive proofs of the scope of the genocide after a U-2 spy plane had photographed fresh graves at the soccer field in Srebrenica on July 27, 1995.

²⁵⁵ See Powell, *My American Journey*, 575-78.

²⁵⁶ The Pentagon is the headquarters for U.S. military forces and the Secretary of Defense, Secretaries of the Armed Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Thus Aspin-Perry and Powell-Shalikashvili were "the Pentagon."

²⁵⁷ See Halberstam, *War in a time of Peace*, 239

²⁵⁸ See Powell, *My American Journey*, 576; Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, 345; and Woodward, *The Choice*, 254. Powell argued that 100,000 or more troops on the ground were needed to guarantee a successful peace in BiH.

of those who believed all that was needed was to unleash U.S. airpower in a military operation. Shalikashvili's view was that the idea of sole use of airpower was put forward by civilians who had no knowledge of how complicated it is to coordinate airpower without ground troops.²⁵⁹ Halberstam argued that the appointment of Les Aspin as Secretary of Defense in many ways was a disaster; unacceptable for the country and the Administration and heartbreaking for Les Aspin.²⁶⁰ Somehow the relationship between President Clinton and Secretary Aspin never worked. Consequently, he was replaced in late 1993 after the catastrophic events in Somalia. In her memoirs, Madeleine Albright said; "Aspin seemed torn between his interventionist instincts and the military reluctance to get involved."²⁶¹ Secretary Aspin's replacement, Defense Secretary William Perry understood how the Pentagon worked and he was "up to speed" from the start.²⁶² Perry was ready to use U.S. airpower, but his views coincided with those of the uniformed chiefs. Subsequently, Perry believed that lift and strike was an incomplete policy, temping because it was warfare on the cheap, but full of vulnerabilities. However, Srebrenica changed the opinion of the Pentagon as it changed the rest of the foreign policy team. Consequently, at the London Conference in July 1995, Perry and Shalikashvili managed to convince UN and European allies that the key to success would be massive high-technology bombing of Bosnian Serb targets.²⁶³

The relationship between James Woolsey, head of the CIA and President Clinton never worked.²⁶⁴ The world had changed and Clinton found the CIA far less important than his predecessor. Woolsey tried to get President Clinton's attention but didn't succeed. Available sources have not presented Woolsey's view or inputs on how to solve the crises in BiH. Neither has Woolsey's successor; John Deutch's views been presented.²⁶⁵ However, Anthony Lake, the National Security Advisor, was one of the "hawks" on BiH policy.²⁶⁶ After more than two years of frustration by some of his colleagues' indecision on what to do with BiH, Lake came up with the beginning of an endgame policy that would help end the White

²⁵⁹ See Halberstam, *War in a time of Peace*, 326

²⁶⁰ See Halberstam, *War in a time of Peace*, 191 and 244-246. See also Powell, *My American Journey*, 563, 578. Holbrooke argues Les Aspin was forced out as Secretary of Defense, see Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 56.

²⁶¹ Quoted in Albright, *Madam Secretary*, 180.

²⁶² Halberstam, *War in a time of Peace*, 328.

²⁶³ See Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 70-72.

²⁶⁴ See Halberstam, *War in a time of peace*, 243-44.

²⁶⁵ John Deutch was in May 1995 sworn in as Director of CIA. He served until December 1996. He was replaced by George John Tenet.

²⁶⁶ See Chollet, *The Road to the Dayton Accords*, 20; and Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 167-68.

House's drift.²⁶⁷ In the Clinton Administration's first year, Lake had argued the need for lowering barriers to humanitarian interventions:

Where we can make a difference, we should not oppose using our military forces for humanitarian purposes simply because these missions do not resemble major wars for control of territory. Such missions will never be without risk, but as in all other aspects of our security policy, our military leadership is willing to accept reasonable risks in the service of our national objectives.²⁶⁸

In this address, Lake argued that the strategy of "enlargement" of democracies would replace the doctrine of containment of communism. Lake elevated abstract moral and ethical concepts to the same level as national security interests. Morality would be the broad rationale for interventions. Lake wrote, according to Bob Woodward, a confidential letter to President Clinton arguing that "the Administrations' weak, muddle through strategy" in BiH was becoming a cancer on Clinton's entire foreign policy, spreading and eating away at its credibility.²⁶⁹ However, Anthony Lake, who was supposed to be managing the interagency deliberation of the policy on BiH, seemed to lose control of the processes. It was probably in this context that Lake, in June 1995, decided that he should try to come up with a policy proposal that broke from the established mind set. Lake called his approach the "*Endgame Strategy*."²⁷⁰ Among the thoughts brought up was how to rule out that fact that the Europeans could block U.S. policy because of the threat posed to their UN ground troops. The U.S. would start doing what it had shirked doing for so long, exert its leadership. Lake presented his ideas to President Clinton, who showed immediate interest and told Lake to go ahead. Lake requested his top colleagues; Christopher, Perry, Albright, and Shalikashvili to produce comparable papers on where the policy on BiH ought to be in six months. Albright was still urging for use of force while both State and the Pentagon believed in containment. However, the latter views changed when the knowledge of what had happened in Srebrenica became

²⁶⁷ In preparations to the meeting between President Clinton and the French President Chirac on June 14, 1995, Clinton opened up a window for a policy change. Lake exploited this opportunity by drafting this "endgame" paper. See Woodward, *The Choice*, 4; Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 166-68; and Clinton, *My Life*, 684.

²⁶⁸ National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, speech titled "From Containment to Enlargement," delivered at John Hopkins University, September 21, 1993. Of course, these remarks were directly opposed what was accepted U.S. military and foreign policy doctrine i.e. the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine.

²⁶⁹ Quoted in Woodward, *The Choice*, 253.

²⁷⁰ See Woodward, *The Choice*, 257-; and Halberstam, *War in a time of Peace*, 312-14.

known. Once the Endgame strategy was agreed upon and President Clinton was fully committed to it, it was presented to European allies.²⁷¹

3.3 Congress

For more than two-hundred years, Congress and Presidents have wrestled over who has the final authority to send forces where battles threaten. The executive is the chief architect of U.S. foreign policy and therefore he has the primary responsibility to initiate consultations with Congress.²⁷² However, the founders' delegated important foreign policy powers to Congress so that would play a major role in the protection of U.S. vital interests. In the Clinton Administration's National Security Strategy document, presented in February 1995, President Clinton wrote:

The full participation of Congress is essential to the success our new engagement, and I will consult with members of Congress at every step in making and implementing American foreign policy.²⁷³

The uncertainty about what to do in BiH also frustrated Congress. As the conflict in BiH deteriorated, calls were made for greater congressional involvement in decisions. Congress wanted to be given a chance to vote President Clinton's proposed military commitment up or down.²⁷⁴ In April 1993, pressure mounted on Capital Hill to take immediate military action in BiH. Senator Joseph R. Biden, was leading a growing number of lawmakers calling for more forceful action. "The United States must lead the West in a decisive response to Serbian aggression," Senator Biden said.²⁷⁵ Senator Bob Dole, the Senate Minority Leader (from 1994 Majority Leader) argued: "All we're doing is standing by while the Serbs mop up Bosnia and divide it into 11 little pieces and slaughter all the women and children. In my view that's not a policy."²⁷⁶ On May 18, 1993 Secretary Christopher proved there was a new moral ambivalence in the Clinton Administration's policy. In a hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Secretary Christopher presented some

²⁷¹ See Halberstam, *War in a time of Peace*, 315-18. The Allies accepted the Endgame Strategy. It became the successful approach toward ending the war in BiH.

²⁷² Section 3 of the War Powers Resolution (1973) requires the President in every possible instance to consult with Congress before deploying U.S. forces into situations of hostilities, and to continue consultations as long as the forces remain. A challenge is the meaning of the term "consultation." The executive branch and members of Congress have sometimes had different understanding of the term.

²⁷³ The White House, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" (1995), iii.

²⁷⁴ It should be noted that the congressional debates on BiH did not follow party lines.

²⁷⁵ See Article by Elaine Sciolino, "In Congress, Urgent Calls for Action against Serbs" in the *New York Times* on April 20, 1993. Available at www.nytimes.com accessed April 18, 2009.

²⁷⁶ Quoted in *ibid*.

of the acts of atrocities committed by Bosnian Muslims against Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats by advocating: “There are atrocities on all sides in this terrible situation.”²⁷⁷ This testimony went against what had been said in Clinton’s presidential campaign and what Congress believed was policy. It became evident that it was not only the Bosnian Serbs who were wearing “black hats.”

The situation in Somalia in 1993 also concerned Congress. Congress’ reactions were intense and furious to the incidents in Mogadishu in October 1993, and more or less “tied” Clinton’s hands as Commander-in-Chief, except within the Americas.²⁷⁸ Congress held hearings to question the Administration’s approach in Somalia. UN Ambassador Albright testified that: “assertive multilateralism” served U.S. interests. Albright justified the use of military forces in Somalia for the purpose of “rebuilding Somali society and promoting democracy.”²⁷⁹ However, weakness in U.S. policy in Somalia had led to Congressional criticism of the Clinton Administration’s policy under the label of “assertive multilateralism.” Subsequently, the terms of PDD-25 indicate that the Clinton Administration had retreated from its earlier position of “assertive multilateralism.” An explanation of this shift in policy by President Clinton appears to have its basis in domestic politics arising from a self-perpetuating cycle of confrontation and conciliation played out between the President and the Congress and on lessons learned in Somalia.²⁸⁰

The Congressional pressure on President Clinton over his Balkan policy increased. In February 1994, Bob Dole argued that a decision by the President to order air strikes would have “strong bipartisan support” in Congress. Also Senator Joseph Lieberman urged President Clinton to proceed with air strikes.²⁸¹ At a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 24, 1994 Secretary Christopher emphasized that Congress would be fully consulted and its approval sought before American troops were sent to BiH. In the

²⁷⁷ Secretary Christopher. “Testimony on Foreign Assistance Priorities after the Cold War,” at the House Foreign Affairs Committee, May 18, 1993. Available at: <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dossec/1993/9305/930518dossec.html> accessed April 18, 2009.

²⁷⁸ In September 1994 the U.S. intervened in Haiti. For a more comprehensive background, see Clinton, *My Life*, 555, 616-19, Albright, *Madam Secretary*, 155-56; and Hyland, *Clintons World*, 61-62. It should be noted that the involvement in Haiti in 1994 was a lesson identified about the relationship between diplomacy and force. The diplomatic mission in Haiti was backed by a credible threat of military forces and the subsequent military occupation and Administration of the country by U.S. military forces. Consequently, coercive diplomacy was successful.

²⁷⁹ Madeleine Albright, Statement “Myths of Peace-keeping” before the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, Human Rights of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on June 24, 1993 cited in *U.S. Department of State Dispatch* 4, no 26, (1993), 464.

²⁸⁰ See Clinton, *My Life*, 512-14, 576-77 and 622.

²⁸¹ Article written by Elaine Sciolino, “Clinton Rules out a quick response to Bosnia attack,” in *the New York Times* on February 7, 1994. Available at: www.nytimes.com accessed April 2009.

summer of 1994 both houses in Congress demonstrated they were ready to lift the arms embargo unilaterally so the Bosnian Muslims forces could receive U.S. weapons. President Clinton's message to Congress was that such policy would have grave consequences for the transatlantic cooperation between the United States and Europe.²⁸² When the Republicans took control of Congress after the mid-term elections in 1994, the criticism of Clinton's BiH policy not only resumed but became much sharper edged.²⁸³ What had been one of United State's strengths in the Cold war, a bipartisan foreign policy, had reached its end. The Republican majority in Congress regarded BiH as an issue on which Clinton was politically vulnerable.²⁸⁴ Consequently, Congressional pressures designed to satisfy various agendas and Clinton's weak appearance in Somalia and BiH, signified an opportunity for the Republican majority in Congress to influence President Clinton's foreign policy decisions. With Republicans in full control of Congress, every deployment of force or UN issue was a struggle. The Republican Senate majority leader, a likely 1996 presidential candidate and a Bosnian activist intensified his criticism of President Clinton fecklessness and weakness in BiH. Dole wanted the U.S. to break with the UN and unilaterally lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims.²⁸⁵ In a television show Senator Dole said, "If President Clinton had been proving leadership the last 16 to 18 months, we wouldn't be where we are today. We just give the Serbs everything they want and say we've had a victory."²⁸⁶ James Baker, who served as Secretary of State under President Bush criticized Clinton's position: "This is a slippery slope, in capital letters. This is exactly the kind of mission creep that led to disaster in Somalia. This is incrementalism at its worst, and a sure recipe for disaster."²⁸⁷ Subsequently, Senate Majority Leader Dole and House Speaker Gingrich, on behalf of Congress were steadfastly refusing to fund American participation in multinational forces on the ground in BiH.

²⁸² France and Britain, the two leading troop contributing nations to UNPROFOR, let it be known that they would pull out their soldiers from BiH if the United States unilaterally ended the weapon embargo.

²⁸³ Klein, *The Natural*, 140. The House of Representatives quickly passed most of the provisions of the Contract with America. This was Newt Gingrich's ten point governing doctrine.

²⁸⁴ Article written by Steven Greenhouse; "Gingrich is urging a tougher policy on Bosnia's Serbs" in *the New York Times* on December 5, 1994. Available at: www.nytimes.com accessed April 18, 2009.

²⁸⁵ See Woodward, *The Choice*, 255 and 264 -65. Senator Bob Dole had argued for a long time to help the besieged Bosnian Muslims. Consequently, Dole was determined to pass a resolution unilaterally lifting the arms embargo. The majority in Congress would be a veto proof majority. On July 26, 1995, the Senate passed legislation 69 to 29 to lift the arms embargo. See also U.S. Senate "A bill to terminate the United States arms embargo applicable to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina." Available at: <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d104:SN00021:@@@Z> accessed April 10, 2009.

²⁸⁶ Quoted in article by Steven Greenhouse; "Gingrich is urging a tougher policy on Bosnia's Serbs" in *the New York Times* on December 5, 1994. Available at: www.nytimes.com accessed April 18, 2009

²⁸⁷ Quoted in article by R. W. Apple jr., "Conflict in the Balkans: Politics: Allies Seem near Accord to Bolster Bosnia Force" in *the New York Times* on June 2, 1995. Available at: www.nytimes.com accessed March 1, 2009

On July 26, 1995, Congress challenged President Clinton to change the course in BiH by voting overwhelmingly to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims. When it later became clear that a peace agreement in BiH would require NATO to send troops to enforce the peace, Clinton thought it was not required to seek advance approval from Congress.²⁸⁸ Clinton's argument was that it was pre-designed that U.S. troops participate in NATO missions. Congress didn't share Clinton's view. The Majority Leader in the Senate, Senator Bob Dole and House Speaker Newt Gingrich strongly hesitated to support the U.S. portion of the funding of a new multilateral force in BiH.²⁸⁹ Even if President Clinton maintained he had the Constitutional authority as Commander in Chief to dispatch forces on his own, he was seeking a nonbinding resolution of support similar the resolution President Bush pushed through Congress before the war against Iraq in 1991. On the other hand the New York Times wrote in an editorial article on October 20, 1995: "The White House misreads the Constitution and public sentiment on Bosnia if it thinks President Clinton can order American troops into danger without a Congressional debate or vote."²⁹⁰ Therefore, to win the needed Congressional support on his BiH policy, Clinton began inviting members of Congress to the White House and sending Christopher, Perry, Holbrooke and Shalikashvili to the Capitol Hill.²⁹¹ Reaching out to Republicans was a pragmatic action, because the Administration needed their votes. On October 30, 1995 the House passed a resolution which expressed the overwhelming opposition; particularly among Republicans to the possible dispatch of American ground troops to BiH.²⁹² House Speaker, Newt Gingrich called the vote "a referendum on this Administration's incapability of convincing anyone to trust them."²⁹³ However, after several struggles between Congress and the President, Clinton finally got the support from Congress to deploy 20,000 troops for twelve months to BiH as a part of IFOR,

²⁸⁸ Clinton, *My Life*, 674.

²⁸⁹ See Woodward, *The Choice*, 256. However, it should be mentioned that Clinton achieved a compromise agreement with Dole and Gingrich. But the compromise illustrated that the President's hands were tied, showing he was not fully in charge for foreign policy issues in BiH.

²⁹⁰ Editorial in the *New York Times*, "Congress Must Vote on Bosnia," on October 20, 1995. Available at: www.nytimes.com accessed April 18, 2009.

²⁹¹ Clinton, *My Life*, 685.

²⁹² See article written by Elaine Sciolino, "House Tells Clinton to Get Approval to Send Troops to Bosnia" in the *New York Times* on October 31, 1995. Available at: www.nytimes.com accessed April 18, 2009. For the readers notion: The vote was 315 to 103 in favor of a resolution stating that the U.S. should not send or even pledge, U.S. peacekeepers without permission from Congress.

²⁹³ Quoted in Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 225.

as he had requested.²⁹⁴ Without this support from Congress the Dayton peace accord would have been undermined.

3.4 The electoral politics.

The notion that the President should remain in touch with the public's views on foreign-policy matters, such as deployment of forces to peripheral places, has not always been a conviction in U.S. politics. However, Vietnam changed that conviction as political and military leaders watched public opinion and the electorates turn against U.S. policy in South East Asia with tangible political consequences.²⁹⁵ BiH was an issue in transition from being a foreign policy, like Vietnam or the Iran hostage taking, to a domestic policy. The worse the atrocities and ethnic cleansing grew the more likely the television networks and newspapers were to report it, and the more likely it was that Clinton's inaction in BiH would come up in press conferences and in his next presidential campaign. If President Clinton was viewed by the public and the electorate as either passive or politically impotent it could be devastating for his domestic agenda and his reelection. Some Americans felt an emotional urge to punish the Bosnian Serbs with military force. However, to proceed without a strong national consensus and a clearer end state could prove catastrophic for all involved. In his statement at Senate Confirmation Hearing, Warren Christopher argued:

Parishioners of statecraft ...assume foreign policy is too complex for the public to be involved in its formation. That is costly conceit. From Vietnam to Iran-contra, we have too often witnessed the disastrous effects of foreign policies hatched by the experts without proper candor or consultation with the public and their representatives in Congress.²⁹⁶

Consequently, one of the six tests in the Weinberger Doctrine is the "reasonable assurance" of public and congressional support. Nigel Hamilton argued that after the end of the Cold War, most Americans felt more secure and paid less attention to international events.²⁹⁷ Geir Lundestad argues that the strongest restraint on U.S. power in the Balkans appeared to be the reluctance of the American people to remain truly involved in the affairs of

²⁹⁴ The commitment of thousands of U.S. forces to enforce the Dayton Accords would last until NATO handed the mission over to EUFOR in December 2004 – nine years later

²⁹⁵ Every American involvement overseas required support, or at least the passive acceptance, of the American people. This was one of the many lessons identified from Vietnam.

²⁹⁶ See Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, 25.

²⁹⁷ Hamilton, *Bill Clinton .Mastering the Presidency*, 15.

the outside world.²⁹⁸ President Clinton made extensive use of polls and focus groups in formulating his political agenda. However, Clinton argued in his memoirs “Polls...cannot dictate a decision that requires looking down the road and around the corner.”²⁹⁹ Among the considerations President Clinton emphasized was whether the American people were prepared and willing to support the sacrifices required to end the war in BiH, a war that presented no direct threat to U.S. security. According to an editorial article in the *New York Times* on May 7, 1993 only a minority of Americans supported direct U.S. military involvement in BiH.³⁰⁰

Appeals for public support became a routine part of Clinton’s presidency after the Democrats lost the midterm elections in 1994. Public and congressional support for the president’s policy comes only if Americans understand the issues and challenges the United States confront. In an television address to the American people on November 27, 1995 President Clinton urged support for the dispatch of troops to BiH by saying “in this new era, there are still times when America, and America alone, can and should make the difference for peace...Let us never forget: a quarter of a million men, women and children have been shelled, shot and tortured to death.”³⁰¹ In the autumn of 1995, public opinion was heavily opposed to U.S. force deployments; some 70 percent of the American public did not want troops in BiH under any circumstances.³⁰² Consequently, there was no public pressure on Clinton to intervene with combat forces. The general American public, being quite unfamiliar with the Balkans and its history, exerted no or little pressure on the President or Congress either for or against engagement in BiH. Evidence suggests that a majority of the public opposed the use of ground forces. Consequently, the electoral politics should not be regarded as a power center on U.S. BiH policy as envisioned by Roger Hilsman.

3.5 President Slobodan Milosević’s interests and objectives

In the 1980s Serb nationalism raised itself as the most powerful political force in Yugoslavia. In Serbia, Slobodan Milosević, the most agile Yugoslav leader, saw his opportunity in the new-born Serb nationalism by ruthlessly and single mindedly exploiting the

²⁹⁸ Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945*, 249.

²⁹⁹ Clinton, *My Life*, 645.

³⁰⁰ See editorial article “Bosnia. Now What?” in the *New York Times* on May 7, 1993. Available at: www.nytimes.com accessed April 16, 2009.

³⁰¹ President Clinton, “The Dayton Accords: Imposing Peace for Bosnia.” Address delivered from the White House, Washington D.C. on November 27, 1995.

³⁰² Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 219.

anti-Kosovo-Albanian hatred of the Serbs.³⁰³ President Milosević was driven by an impulse for the creation of a Greater Serbia;³⁰⁴ subsequently he started the war in BiH because BiH had declared its independence from Yugoslavia.³⁰⁵ Richard Holbrooke argued Milosević possessed a tactical flexibility and superb negotiation skills.³⁰⁶ Consequently, Milosević matched his military actions to his political objectives, just like the North Vietnamese did during the Vietnam War. Milosević established Serb control of critical public institutions. By gaining control over the army and the state's dominated media he could and did maximize any incident that would inflame Serb feelings.³⁰⁷ He was superb at using the media to sway popular opinion. Milosević's desire was to hold power. Doder and Branson argued that Milosević's history as Serbia's ruler reveals a man whose only pleasure was controlling others.³⁰⁸ In a memorandum to the EU foreign ministers, David Owen argued:

The key as always is Milosević. He understands power and he will only pressurize the Bosnian Serbs further if the Contact Group convinces they are serious. He must receive a sharp reminder... and if he does not deliver, we will take further action against him.³⁰⁹

Milosević had political objectives linked to vital interests; subsequently the Bosnian Serb leadership in Pale was one of his instruments to achieve the objective of a Greater Serbia.³¹⁰ Radovan Karadzic was a convenient scapegoat for the price the Serb nation was paying for Milosević's own misjudgments in BiH.³¹¹ As commander-in-chief of the JNA, he

³⁰³ Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 26; and Doder and Branson, *Milosević*, 37-41. Slobodan Milosević began transforming himself as a nationalist in the fall of 1986 a few months after his appointment as head of the Serbian Communist Party. The Serbian academy of Science and Arts circulated a "Memorandum" published on September, 26, 1986. The Memorandum gave Milosević the idea that he could have a real base among the intellectuals for a nationalist assault on the Communist party's leadership and the Kosovo Serbs could become an instrument to attain power.

³⁰⁴ The creation of a *Greater Serbia* meant conquering territory of the former Yugoslavia where Serbs lived and the expulsion of all non-Serbs from Serbian land. The only way Milosević could create a Greater Serbia was through a military victory. However, once armed conflicts began, it turned out that a minority of Serbs were willing to fight for Milosević's vision. See Sell, *Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia*, 150-51.

³⁰⁵ See Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 169.

³⁰⁶ Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 29.

³⁰⁷ See quote in Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short Story*, 252: "Having watched Radio Television Belgrade in the period 1991-92, I can understand why simple Bosnian Serbs came to believe that they were under threat from Ustaša hordes, fundamentalist jihads... It was as if all television in the USA had been taken over by the Ku Klux Klan." Control of the media was one of the most consistent elements of Milosević's rule in Serbia.

³⁰⁸ Doder and Branson, *Milosević*, 10; and Sell, *Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia* 169-94. What distinguished Milosević from other political leaders in the Balkans was the brutal way he used the concept of external threats to Serbia to tar political opponents with the brush of national treason. It should be noted that Mira Markovic, Slobodan Milosević's wife, played an important behind-the-scenes role during Milosević's political career.

³⁰⁹ Owen, *Balkan Odyssey*, 287.

³¹⁰ See Halberstam, *War in a time of Peace*, 354-355. Milosević denied any relationship between himself and the Bosnian Serb leadership in Pale. According to Halberstam, CIA had evidence that nailed Milosević as the true Serbian leader. However, it was important for Milosević's international image that he was not linked to General Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić. Louis Sell has argued that Milosević's claim of noninvolvement in Bosnia was a lie. See Sell, *Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia*, 160-62.

³¹¹ See Sell, *Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia*, 7.

had control of the Serbian, Montenegrin and Bosnian Serb branches of that Yugoslavian Serb Army. He also had control over the intelligence and police forces, as well as the media and state finances.³¹² To meet his objectives, Milosević developed a dynamic to test the international community by testing a quick military probe to see the response from the international community, and if no resistance by force, then an even more brazen attack would follow. Milosević quickly learned what UN, EC, NATO and the U.S. was not going to do. Based on the lack of international military response on the shelling in Dubrovnik and Vukovar in Croatia, it was unlikely that military ground troops would be deployed to BiH. Consequently, Milosević exploited and magnified all the tensions in the international community and the Clinton Administration. It was that simple. However, Milosević seriously misjudged the international community. He was according to Doder and Branson totally convinced that the United States and the European powers were bluffing by threatening to impose economic sanctions against Serbia in May 1992.³¹³

From a Serbian leadership position the chosen approach in BiH was successful from 1992 until the summer of 1995. The UNPROFOR troops on the ground proved to be a perfect instrument for the Bosnian Serbs: First, the UN soldiers were lightly armed and consequently, were no threat to Serb interests, and secondly, they could be taken as hostages, thus reducing the potential of U.S. or NATO air attacks.³¹⁴ Consequently, Milosević could get what he wanted without taking a risk that the international community would strike back with force.³¹⁵ Subsequently, Milosević's objective was to get the economic sanctions lifted at no cost. Milosević also understood the U.S. strong reluctance to send ground forces to BiH, an understanding he capitalized on as he kept moving toward his goal of a Greater Serbia. The bottom line was that Slobodan Milosević had a strategy and the United States and the rest of the international community, did not. If it had not been for the genocide in Srebrenica in July 1995, with the Serbs so brutally overplaying their "hand", they might never have been called for their aggression. The genocide in Srebrenica was a strategic blunder that changed everything on the ground in BiH. In the end, Milosević responded to the only "language" he fully respected – the language of strength and force. The pressure from the Croat-Bosnian

³¹² Ibid, 186-94.

³¹³ See Doder and Branson, *Milosević*, 137.

³¹⁴ See Halberstam, *War in a time of Peace*, 126-127.

³¹⁵ It should be noted that Milosević according to Sell reacted sharply against the Bosnian Serbs over the hostage crisis. This because he recognized the potential of these actions could have to derail his strategy to get a deal with the United States. See Sell, *Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia*, 230.

offensive on the ground was not enough. However, when NATO's sustained massive high-technology bombing of Bosnian Serb targets was delivered with devastating results, Milosević accepted negotiations, survived and again demonstrated his talent for manipulation and political survival. At Dayton Milosević managed to convince the world that he had converted from "warmonger" to "peacemaker."³¹⁶ When the Dayton Accords were signed he proudly shared the stage with President Clinton and other international high officials.

3.6 Deciding major factors

Based on the preceding analysis in this chapter the following six factors may explain the U.S. approach in BiH:

- The need to defend NATO's credibility. NATO's failure to stop the ethnic cleansing and violent war on its doorstep had a profound impact on U.S. leadership in NATO and America's leadership position in Europe. Only by solving BiH could the alliance's viability be assured.
- The unwelcomed prospect of having to deploy 25,000 U.S. troops to rescue UNPROFOR troops in BiH.
- The challenges from Congress who voted overwhelmingly to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims.
- The genocide of Srebrenica in July 1995 finally pushed the Clinton Administration over the brink.
- The presidential election in 1996. The crisis in BiH had a potential to disrupt the upcoming presidential campaign.
- The lack of action by the UN and the EC/EU.

The confluence of these six factors, finally motivated President Clinton to decide to engage in BiH in the summer of 1995. The decision-making processes discussed in this chapter explain how the *Endgame Strategy* became the preferred policy for engagement.

³¹⁶ Milosević understood that he had to repair his relations with the United States. He had i.e. in the autumn of 1990 gleefully humiliated Senator Bob Dole and eight other Senators when he refused to receive them. He also refused to meet with the U.S. ambassador Warren Zimmermann for almost a year after his arrival. See Doder and Branson, *Milosević*, 140-141; and Sell, *Slobodan Milosević, and the destruction of Yugoslavia*, 143.

4. Case no. 2: Explaining U.S. engagement in Kosovo

In Kosovo we see parallels to World War II. The government of Serbia, like that of Nazi Germany, rose to power in part by getting people to look down on people of a given race and ethnicity and to believe they had no place in their country, and even no right to live.

--- President Bill Clinton³¹⁷

The story of why a U.S. - led NATO went to war over Kosovo raises at least two important questions. The author seeks to disclose (1) *what* factors moved U.S. policy from being distanced to the conflict in Kosovo to launch a U.S.-led NATO air campaign against Serbia on March 24, 1999; and (2) *who* were the dominant power centers shaping President Clinton's different decisions on Kosovo. The objective of this chapter is to examine the key factors shaping U.S. policy toward Kosovo and the role that each of the five chosen power centres played.

The Dayton Accords were viewed as a considerable foreign policy accomplishment for the first Clinton Administration. However, ethnic conflict in potentially the most explosive part of the former Yugoslavia; the province of Kosovo³¹⁸ was not addressed at the Dayton conference.³¹⁹ Neither had European leaders, who had assisted in putting out the flames of conflict in Slovenia, Croatia or BiH, paid much attention to the smouldering conflict in Kosovo.³²⁰ Subsequently, the frustrations among the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo were growing over the U.S. and Western European forceful push to achieve a settlement in BiH without including Kosovo in the negotiations. For radical Kosovo Albanians, the lesson learned from BiH was that violence was a way to win concessions from the international community. On the other hand, the Serbian President Slobodan Milosević had accomplished what he wanted when the Kosovo issue was kept off the docket at Dayton.³²¹ Halberstam has

³¹⁷ President Clinton. "Remarks by the President at the Memorial Day Ceremony," The Amphitheatre, Arlington National Cemetery, Arlington, Virginia, May 31, 1999.

³¹⁸ The two ethnic groups in Kosovo use different names for Kosovo. In this thesis the author uses Kosovo, because this is the most common name in available literature.

³¹⁹ The Dayton Accords addressed the ethnic conflicts in BiH and Croatia, but not in Serbia itself. Kosovo was a province of Serbia. See Dober and Branson, *Milosević*, 7.

³²⁰ The EC established the "Badinter Commission" in the autumn of 1991 to resolve legal issues linked to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Kosovo was avoided as an issue.

³²¹ See Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 65 where Clark stated that Richard Holbrooke several times unsuccessfully tried to raise the issue of Kosovo with Milosević at Dayton. See also Sell, *Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia*, 271. Sell

argued that if Kosovo had been brought up during the Dayton negotiations there would have been no deal on BiH.³²² Consequently, even if the Dayton Accords had ended the fighting in BiH, it had left unanswered complex challenges in Kosovo. The Kosovar Albanians shared the same ambitions as the Croats, Slovenians, Macedonians and Bosniaks who had left the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia to form independent nations; they wanted independence. However, when Yugoslavia broke up Kosovo was a *province* of Serbia, not a *republic*. The international community had entered the Dayton negotiations favoring independence and retention of the former territorial and political boundaries for the former Yugoslavian republics, but not for provinces.³²³ Subsequently, the Dayton Accords gave nothing to the Kosovar Albanians. In the U.S., President Clinton won his second term and made significant changes in his National Security Team.³²⁴ William G. Hyland argued that the new national security team was a much more political team than that of Clinton's first term.³²⁵ President Clinton's choices were according to Hyland interpreted as a steadier need for implementation of his foreign policy and need for more support from Congress. On Capitol Hill, the Republicans retained control of both houses of Congress.

4.1 U.S. diplomacy in Kosovo after the Dayton Accords

In an effort to coordinate their policies and approaches to solve the Kosovo problems, the U.S. and the most powerful European nations re-established the Contact Group.³²⁶ Even if the Kosovo issue was first raised in the Contact Group in late 1997, the member states' policy toward the conflict throughout 1998 was haphazard and marked by a tendency to avoid making difficult political decisions.³²⁷ The position of the Clinton Administration on Kosovo

advocated that Milosević had a plan for Kosovo, but that he would only offer it at Dayton if the subject of Kosovo was raised.

³²² See Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 366.

³²³ The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) 1992-2006 included the two republics of Serbia and Montenegro. The Serbian Republic of Yugoslavia included Vojvodina and Kosovo.

³²⁴ President Clinton's national security team for his second term (1997-2001) was significantly different. Madeleine Albright was selected as the new Secretary of State; Samuel (Sandy) Berger became the new National Security Advisor. General John Shalikashvili continued as CJCS until he was replaced by General Henry Hugh Shelton on October 1, 1997. William S. Cohen replaced William (Bill) Perry as Secretary of Defense. Cohen came from Congress, where he had served in the Congress (Republican Party) for twenty-four years, including eighteen years in the Senate. Although he was not a member of the National Security Council, the new Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), the military leader of NATO, General Wesley Clark became a key actor and power center influence on the U.S. policy and intervention in the FRY.

³²⁵ See Hyland, *Clinton's World. Remaking American Foreign Policy*, 151.

³²⁶ The Contact Group was a transatlantic Balkan Task Force consisting of the United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, Italy and Germany. It should be noted that this unified response by the Contact Group reflected a number of assumptions derived from their joint experience in dealing with the war in BiH.

³²⁷ It should also be noted that the United States during the winter of 1997-98 had a diplomatic delegation working in the Balkan region, including Kosovo. The Clinton Administration's senior envoy was Robert Gelbard. Gelbard had private talks

was non-committal, as the NSC could not agree on who were the bad guys and what actions to take to stop the violence. Moreover, with the U.S. national elections coming in November 1998 and the President embroiled in a growing sex scandal that had turned into a media circus since first reported in February 1998, the President's guidance was typical of an ad hoc approach to problem solving, delay any decisive action, avoid commitment of U.S. military forces, and try to get the two conflicting parties to negotiate a settlement. UNSC Resolution 1160 was to remain in effect until President Milosević initiated a substantive political dialogue with the Kosovar Albanians. In May 1998 the U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke arranged the first ever meeting between the Presidents Milosević and Rugova.³²⁸ However, this move by the U.S. only weakened Rugova's crumbling political position in Kosovo.³²⁹ Subsequently, the KLA challenged Rugova's right to speak on behalf of the Kosovar Albanian people. In response to threats of NATO bombing presented by Holbrooke and continued international economic sanctions, in the Milosević-Rugova negotiations, Milosević accepted establishment of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM).³³⁰ However the fighting and violence continued through the summer of 1998. Subsequently, on September 23, 1998 the UNSC passed Resolution 1199 declaring that the situation in Kosovo threatened peace and stability in the region and that Milosević should follow a series of actions to stop the violence in Kosovo.³³¹ Despite the tough demands from the UNSC, Serb security forces in Kosovo continued their offensive against the KLA and Kosovar Albanian civilians. Subsequently, on September 24, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved the issuing of an activation warning for air strikes.³³² Richard Holbrooke was again sent to Belgrade to demonstrate U.S. commitment and seek to narrow the gap dividing the two parties in Kosovo. On October 13, 1998 the NAC approved activation orders that allowed SACEUR to begin NATO air strikes against Serb targets ninety-six hours after determining that Milosević had not complied with

with Milosević, indicating that a relaxation of sanctions on FRY could be granted if Milosević cooperated in resolving the Kosovo issue. See Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 27.

³²⁸ This meeting was demanded by the Contact Group (at the April 29 meeting). It should be noted that Rugova agreed to meet Milosević only after Holbrooke promised to arrange a meeting between President Clinton and Rugova in Washington D.C. See Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 38-39.

³²⁹ Sell, *Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia*, 283-84. What television viewers in Kosovo saw was Rugova standing beside Milosević with a grin on his face.

³³⁰ KDOM evolved into a permanent international monitoring presence in Kosovo from the summer of 1998.

³³¹ See UNSC Resolution 1199, September 23, 1998 and UNSC Resolution 1203, October 24, 1998. Available at <http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1199.htm> and <http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1203.htm> accessed May 24, 2009.

³³² The *activation warning* is a NATO procedure allowing NATO Commanders to identify the forces they need to implement tasks ordered by NAC. An *activation warning* can be followed by an *activation order* – establishing a date for air strikes or other military actions.

NATO's demands.³³³ Subsequently, the next day, Holbrooke reached an agreement with Milosević as Belgrade accepted 2,000 unarmed Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) observers in Kosovo, withdrawal of Serb security forces and free return for Kosovar Albanian refugees.

However, the Holbrooke-Milosević agreement had its shortcomings. First, it excluded involvement by the KLA which had grown to become an influential political factor and the primary cause of the escalating violence in Kosovo. Secondly, the agreement lacked any means of enforcement if Milosević did not follow up with implementation. With ground forces ruled out, only airpower could back up the threats to persuade Milosević to actually implement the content of the UNSC Resolutions 1160, 1199 and 1203. Holbrooke noted: "The crisis is Kosovo, and there has been no change in the political issues that caused the tragedy, the rampaging and the pillaging this summer."³³⁴ However, in late November 1998 all displaced persons inside Kosovo had returned home or had found temporary shelter elsewhere.³³⁵ Both parties in Kosovo, the Kosovar Albanians and the Kosovski Serbs would use the Holbrooke-Milosević agreement as an opportunity to prepare and renew the conflict the upcoming spring.³³⁶ Indeed, the KLA had an incentive to keep the conflict going and provoke the Serbs into violating the Holbrooke-Milosević agreement. A new Serb response with violence would force NATO to respond on what effectively was the Kosovar Albanian side of the conflict. The international community was not in a position to stop the KLA from exploiting the downsized presence of Serb security forces.³³⁷ The KLA demonstrated new actions provoking Serb forces into reacting. Subsequently, Milosević in November 1998 put into effect a plan – "Operation Horseshoe" to eradicate the KLA and establish a fundamental shift in Kosovo's ethnic balance.³³⁸ Not surprisingly, therefore, violence soon emerged in Kosovo and attacks affecting civilians increased in number.³³⁹ In late December 1998, William Walker, the American diplomat in charge of the monitoring mission in Kosovo told

³³³ Sell, *Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia*, 289.

³³⁴ Quoted in Steven Erlanger "Clinton Presses Yugoslavs as NATO's Role Is Hailed," the *New York Times* on October 14, 1998. Available at: www.nytimes.com Accessed on June 22, 2009.

³³⁵ UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) report "UN Inter Agency Update on Kosovo Situation." Report No. 72, dated November 26, 1998.

³³⁶ Sell, *Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia*, 293. Agim Ceku, the KLA Chief of Staff later stated that "the cease fire was very useful for us."

³³⁷ Downsizing of Serb security forces in Kosovo was a part of the UN Resolutions 1160, 1199 and the Holbrooke-Milosević agreement in October 1998. In a conversation between President Clinton and Prime Minister Tony Blair on January 21, 1998 the concern over KLA's strategy was discussed. Source: Barton Gellman, "The Path to Crisis: How the United States and Its Allies Went to War," in the *Washington Post* on April 18, 1999, A31.

³³⁸ See Dalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 58-59.

³³⁹ It should be noted that both sides; the KLA and Serb security forces launched attacks against each other.

the New York Times; “both sides have gone looking for trouble and they have found it.”³⁴⁰ When the year 1999 approached, the Holbrooke-Milosević agreement lay in tatters.

As Srebrenica had moved the international community to take action in BiH, the massacre in the Kosovo village Racak on January 15, 1999 became a critical lever for those who advocated a military response against the Serbs.³⁴¹ Consequently, in January 1999, the U.S. Secretary of State, Albright, in what became the final major diplomatic attempt at resolving the conflict with peace talks, invited the Serbian government and Kosvar Albanians to meet with representatives of the U.S. and key European countries at Rambouillet, France. Those talks started in on February 6, 1999 ended on March 18 without any agreement between the Kosovo Albanians and the Serbs.³⁴² The failure of the Rambouillet negotiations left the U.S. with little choice but to follow through on its frequent threats of use of military force against Milosević. The road to war between a U.S. - led NATO and Serbia was settled, even if NATO was dealing with a part of the world beyond the scope of its Charter’s Article V security guarantees. On March 24, 1999, NATO unleashed an air campaign against FRY without a UNSC resolution explicitly authorizing the attacks.³⁴³ The U.S. government, based on the reactions of Milosević to NATO bombing at the end of the war in BiH, and probably the consensus assumption of the West was that a few days of airstrikes was enough to convince Milosević to capitulate and accept the Rambouillet framework.³⁴⁴ Rather than capitulate, Slobodan Milosević escalated the conflict in an attempt to defeat the KLA and forcefully expel the Kosovar Albanians. At first, NATO only attacked Serb military targets in Kosovo. But NATO air attacks continued for 78 days, with increasingly important military and political targets being hit throughout Serbia. With the threat of a ground invasion of more

³⁴⁰ Quoted in Mike O’Connor, “Attack by Serbs Shatters a Cease-Fire in Kosovo.” *The New York Times*, December 25, 1998.

³⁴¹ Albright, *Madame Secretary*, 393, 395; Halberstam, 409-10. Forty-five civilians were found killed in massacre at Racak. The U.S. Ambassador Bill Walker, who headed the Kosovo Verification Mission, saw the dead Kosovar Albanians and publicly stated “it was the Serbian police” who had committed the killings in an emotional international press conference. Milosević advocated that the killed persons at Racak were terrorists.

³⁴² For a more comprehensive elaboration on the negotiations at Rambouillet, see Albright, *Madame Secretary*, 397-407; Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 69-89; and Sell, *Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia*, 296. The Rambouillet talks began under U.S., Russian and European auspices. Despite pretension at making these negotiations a European show, the draft agreement was written by the same group of U.S. State Department personnel who had crafted the Dayton Accords. In contrast to Dayton, where Slobodan Milosević himself took an active part, the Serbs sent a minor delegation with little power to negotiate at Rambouillet. The Kosovars were represented by Rugova, who when faced with the explicit threat of the withdrawal of U.S. support for his cause signed an agreement that essentially guaranteed a return to the 1974 Constitutional status of Kosovo and the withdrawal of Serb security forces, within the context of being an autonomous province of Serbia. But the Serbian delegation did not sign the agreement, so Rugova again lost face before the eyes of his countrymen. Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 420-21.

³⁴³ NATO based its actions on several UN resolutions, principally UNSC Resolutions 1199 and 1203. This was the first time in history that NATO had gone to war, and it did so in a time of peace.

³⁴⁴ Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 420, 425-26, and 435.

than 200,000 NATO troops and lack of any Russian support, Milosević finally gave up and requested peace negotiations. On June 10, 1999, the air-campaign ended.³⁴⁵ It was quickly followed by UNSC Resolution 1244 and occupation of Kosovo by NATO peace-keeping forces and UN government Administration.

4.2 President Clinton's views and interests in Kosovo

President Clinton portrayed the Dayton Accords to the American people as a great triumph of U.S. diplomacy; an undertaking to turn BiH into a multicultural European society.³⁴⁶ In his memoirs Bill Clinton argued, "I was determined not to allow Kosovo to become another Bosnia."³⁴⁷ The situation in Kosovo seems to first have come into President Clinton's attention in early February 1993, when Secretary Christopher repeated President Bush's "Christmas warning" that the U.S. would be prepared to respond militarily if the Serbs escalated the conflict in Kosovo.³⁴⁸ However, the fact that Kosovo was a *province* not a *republic* in former Yugoslavia made it a far more sensitive issue than BiH, since the question of sovereignty was more legally challenging. Consequently, adding Kosovo to the Dayton negotiations would simply have been "a bridge too far." President Clinton's position was to rule out independence but support Kosovo's autonomy within a Serbian state.³⁴⁹ Independence posed two major challenges; first, it could destabilize the region, secondly it was feared that granting independence in Kosovo could set a precedent for BiH, where the Bosnian Serbs' and Bosnian Croats' claims for independence were at least as strong, as those of the Kosovar Albanians.³⁵⁰ However, the escalating violence in Kosovo in March 1998 finally drew President Clinton's attention back to Kosovo. As a response, President Clinton gave his first public comment on the situation in Kosovo on March 11, 1998: "We do not want

³⁴⁵ See President Clinton, "Building Peace in the Balkans." Address to the Nation on the Kosovo Agreement. The White House, June 10, 1999.

³⁴⁶ See Doder and Branson, *Milosević*, 225-26.

³⁴⁷ Bill Clinton, *My Life*, 849

³⁴⁸ See Albright, *Madame Secretary*, 379-380; Sell, *Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia*, 264-66; and Doder and Branson, *Milosević*, 173. This warning was a reaffirmation of President George H. Bush's warning given on December 25, 1992. President Bush announced a new U.S. policy toward Kosovo in sternest terms, warning Milosević that America would intervene militarily if the Kosovo crisis escalated into violence; "In the event of a conflict caused by Serbian action, the United States will be prepared to employ military force against the Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia proper." Bush's Christmas Warning was controversial because U.S. allies were not consulted in advance. However, the warning should be seen in the light of inputs from U.S. intelligence that Milosević might take advantage of the interregnum between the presidential election in November 1992 and the Clinton inauguration in January 1993 to ethnically cleanse Kosovo.

³⁴⁹ Albright, *Madame Secretary*, 385.

³⁵⁰ Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 25. It should be noted that independence for the Kosovar Albanians could destabilize Macedonia, which in turn could reignite territorial ambitions among Macedonia's neighbors Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia.

the Balkans to have more pictures like we've seen in the last few days so reminiscent of what Bosnia endured."³⁵¹

Once again the United States reluctantly took the diplomatic and military lead in a violent conflict in the Balkans. However, President Clinton deflected President Rugova's pleas for an enhanced U.S. presence in Kosovo. When the Serbs stepped up the use of force against civilian targets in Kosovo in the spring of 1998, President Clinton decided that the United States should threaten to abandon the Contact Group's process because of its "least common denominator" approach and instead involve NATO in the ongoing confrontation with Serbia.³⁵² The reason why Clinton wanted to involve NATO can be found in the obvious question that had risen during Clinton's presidency: With no superpower enemy, why NATO? On the other hand, the Clinton Administration leadership became especially significant when it came to dealing with Russia. The U.S.-Russian channel established ultimately carried weight in solving the Kosovo conflict. However, to prevent a possible UNSC veto of NATO actions by Russia and China, Clinton maintained that it should be possible to threaten or use military force against Milosević without explicit UN authorization. Although, the absence of that UN authorization posed a problem for several NATO members as they contemplated approving the use of military force on a European neighbor. However, at U.S. urging, NATO started planning how to handle different scenarios based on possible outcomes of the diplomatic efforts against Milosević.³⁵³

In June 1998, Clinton changed his initial policy when he decided that a diplomatic solution in Kosovo required the political participation of the KLA.³⁵⁴ However, Clinton made it clear that the U.S. still regarded President Rugova as the leader of the Kosovar Albanian opinion. Evidence suggests that President Clinton was eager to avoid any form of military commitment in Kosovo. Subsequently, he was unwilling to back his diplomatic efforts with U.S. ground forces.³⁵⁵ Clinton did not follow up the "Christmas warning" given to Milosević

³⁵¹ Quoted in, "Remarks by the President and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in Photo Opportunity." Office of the Press Secretary, the White House on March 11, 1998.

³⁵² See Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 29. One of the challenges with the Contact Group process was the lack of any threat or discussion of military force. By involving NATO, the United States would involve a multinational military instrument as a coercive instrument in addition to the diplomacy efforts.

³⁵³ See Albright, Madame Secretary, 384. President Clinton's plan for NATO was to compel the Serbs to halt their offensive against the KLA and its sympathizers and reduce the presence of security forces in Kosovo.

³⁵⁴ Steven Erlanger, "U.S. Meets With Kosovo Rebel Army Leaders," *The New York Times*, June 28, 1998. Available at www.nytimwa.com accessed July 4, 2009. It should be noted that Serbia protested strongly on the extended discussions between U.S. diplomats and the KLA. Photos of Holbrooke smiling with armed KLA members particularly angered Milosević and further fed his anti-U.S. propaganda campaign.

³⁵⁵ See article by Thomas W. Lippmann, "U.S. Could Join Force to Manage Postwar Kosovo," in *the Washington Post*, January 27, 1999, A15.

first by the Bush Administration in December 1992 and repeated by Secretary Christopher in March 1993.³⁵⁶ Nigel Hamilton argued that indecisiveness had always been Bill Clinton's Achilles heel.³⁵⁷ On the other hand, Niall Ferguson advocated that "it is well known that the Clinton Administration's attitude was determined, as usual, by the fear of American casualties."³⁵⁸

There were at least four reasons why President Clinton did not push the issue of threatening with the use of military force: *First*, late 1998 and early 1999 was not a convenient time for President Clinton to push another military intervention in the Balkans even if the violence in Kosovo escalated. An effective foreign policy requires that the President lead with confidence, however, preoccupied with the Monica Lewinsky scandal, Clinton found it challenging to personally offer the leadership necessary for a decisive diplomatic and military action in Kosovo.³⁵⁹ As the Monica Lewinsky scandal unfolded and impeachment became a possibility, the "last thing" President Clinton needed was a new fight with Congress and Pentagon over a conflict in the Balkans.³⁶⁰ *Secondly*, Clinton had a belief that any threat of military action against Milosević had to involve the NATO allies; he was unwilling to follow a unilateral approach.³⁶¹ *Third*, Clinton seems to have been convinced that Congress and the public would reject U.S. ground forces in Kosovo.³⁶² *Fourth*, Clinton was concerned about launching any new military action that may risk a repeat of the experience in Somalia prior to the national midterm elections in November 1998.³⁶³

³⁵⁶ According to Daalder held Clinton's national security advisor Samuel Berger a view that the "Christmas warnings" a threat of unilateral U.S. military action had been overtaken by events. See Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 30.

³⁵⁷ Hamilton, *Bill Clinton Mastering the Presidency*, 26.

³⁵⁸ Niall Ferguson, *Colossus. The Rise and Fall of the American Empire*, (London: Penguin Books, 2005), 148.

³⁵⁹ The first six weeks of 1999 were spent more and less on the trial in the Senate following the impeachment by the House on December 19, 1998. The Senate concluded a twenty-one day trial on February 12, 1999.

³⁶⁰ It should be noted that Congress had been (in December 1995) resistant to sending even a limited number of U.S. troops to BiH. Congress would probably not support an open-ended commitment in Kosovo. Pentagon still resisted military interventions as long as the criteria in the Powell Doctrine were not met. Clinton was also aware of the mid-term elections coming up in November 1998. Even though Clinton's name was not on any ballot, in many ways the mid-term election was about Bill Clinton's character due to the Lewinsky scandal.

³⁶¹ It should be noted that in 1998 NATO, due to its large presence in the Balkans (mainly European NATO troops) had become the principal instrument for exerting military influence in the Balkans. At the NATO summit in Brussels on June 11, 1998 NATO defense ministers directed the military staff to undertake tasks to demonstrate NATO's capabilities to project military power against Serbia. A few months later on September 24, 1998 NATO issued a formal warning that airpower would be authorized against the Serbs if their offensive in Kosovo continued. In October 1998 B-52 bombers moved from the U.S. to Great Britain as a demonstrated threat against Serbia. See Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 399-400.

³⁶² Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 55; and Thomas W. Lippman, "U.S. Could Join Force to Manage Postwar Kosovo," *The Washington Post*, January 27, 1999, A15. In early October 1998, President Clinton sent a letter to Senate majority leader Trent Lott regarding the issue of involving ground forces in hostile action in Kosovo. "I can assure you that the United States would not support these options."

³⁶³ See Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*. This was a major theme of Halberstam's book and is supported by several other sources, particularly within the U.S. military.

Evidence suggests that there was no “Clinton Doctrine” or a larger view of what President Clinton actually wanted to do in Kosovo. His politics in the Balkans after years of trouble were still characterized by an “ad-hoc” approach.³⁶⁴ Consequently, an overall and coherent U.S. strategy was missing. On September 30, 1998 the NSC Principals Committee met in the White House to discuss U.S. policy on Kosovo. Among the outcomes of this meeting was the recommendation to President Clinton to send Richard Holbrooke to Belgrade again and present NATO’s terms.³⁶⁵ Indeed, Holbrooke brought a new approach to the Kosovo conflict through the Holbrooke-Milosević agreement in October 1998. However, the violence on both sides in Kosovo continued. President Clinton admitted: “Bosnia taught us a lesson. In this volatile region, violence we fail to oppose leads to even greater violence we will have to oppose later, at greater cost.”³⁶⁶ Consequently, the events in Racak on January 15, 1999 proved to be a turning point that pulled a reluctant President Clinton a step closer toward a second military confrontation in the Balkans. First, President Clinton signed a memorandum on January 21, 1999 approving a new U.S. strategy on how to handle the Kosovo crisis.³⁶⁷ Secondly, he decided to try diplomacy one more time by revitalizing negotiations and increasing leverage over the two parties in Kosovo.³⁶⁸ Third, Clinton decided that the option of making Kosovo an international protectorate under UN Administration was acceptable.³⁶⁹

The basic U.S. plan at the Rambouillet negotiations was to pressure the Kosovar Albanians into accepting the draft agreement developed by the U.S. Department of State, and then use the threat of NATO air strikes to compel Milosević to sign the agreement. Coercive diplomacy based only on weak threats is never a good idea. Subsequently, diplomacy was

³⁶⁴ Sandy Berger, the NSA and closest friend of President Clinton, in 1998 boasted in a New York Times interview that almost everything the Clinton Administration did in foreign policy was ad hoc and actually went on to mock the numerous critics who thought it needed a larger strategic vision. See Halberstam, *War in a Time of peace*, 409.

³⁶⁵ It should be noted that Milosević refused to meet the U.S. diplomat Robert Gelbard after Milosević felt Gelbard had insulted him. Subsequently, Holbrooke was brought back into the diplomatic picture in May 1998. Whatever persuasive arguments presented by Holbrooke, Milosević remained unwilling to change his long-term policy on Kosovo. Subsequently, NATO on October 13, 1998 formally authorized the use of force against Serbia. The next day Milosević accepted the conditions in what is known as the Holbrooke-Milosević agreement. Consequently, the NATO authorization of use of force was suspended.

³⁶⁶ Quoted from President Clinton’s radio address “We Can Make a Difference” on February 13, 1999.

³⁶⁷ This memorandum was forwarded by the NSC, based on a strategy developed by the Department of State after the Racak incident. Secretary of State Albright convinced her colleagues to approve her strategy in the Principal Committee at a meeting on January 20, 1999. This strategy, like the U.S. strategy in BiH which led to the Dayton Accords, tied the stick of eventual military actions to clearly definable objectives at the negotiating table.

³⁶⁸ See Clinton, *My Life*, 849

³⁶⁹ See Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 188-89. It should be noted that President Clinton was not really prepared to do what was necessary to impose a protectorate for Kosovo. It should be noted that James P. Rubin, the State Department spokesman insisted on March 30, 1999 that the Administration stood with the framework which called for Kosovo to stay in Serbia as an autonomous entity. See Jane Perlez, “Crisis in the Balkans: The Future; After Kosovo’s “Cleansing: Can Two Sides Ever Coexist,” *The New York Times*, March 31, 1999.

hard to sell in the winter of 1999 as the two parties in Kosovo were “miles apart” and had little incentive to bridge the chasm that divided them. The answer to the legally problematic question of threatening and even using military force against the sovereign state of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), became more or less solved on January 28, 1999, when the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan met with the North Atlantic Council in Brussels.³⁷⁰ Kofi Annan implicitly provided his blessing to threatening use of force against the sovereign state of FRY even if such action was never explicitly authorized by the UNSC. On February 13, one week after the Rambouillet negotiations had started and the day after the Senate found President Clinton not guilty on charges of perjury and obstruction of justice; Clinton announced in a radio address that the U.S. would send nearly 4,000 troops to Kosovo as part of a 28,000 NATO-led peacekeeping force.³⁷¹ “America has a national interest in achieving this peace,” President Clinton said.³⁷² However, on March 18, 1999 the Rambouillet process came to its unsuccessful end: the Kosovar Albanians reluctantly signed the agreement and the Serbs refused.³⁷³ Subsequently, the stage for President Clinton’s second military intervention in the Balkans was set as he had little choice but follow through the U.S. threats of military force and commerce operations against FRY.

Evidence suggests that until a few days before the air campaign began, Clinton had raised the Kosovo issue only sporadically in a few speeches, statements, and in a radio address. This is interesting because when an issue involves the possible use of military force, there is no substitute for the President to advocate the case frequently and forcefully to the Congress and American people. However, on March 22, Clinton stated: “Our objective in Kosovo remains clear: to stop the killing and achieve durable peace that restores Kosovars to self-government.”³⁷⁴ On March 24, 1999, the day NATO launched its bombing campaign,

³⁷⁰ In his statement, “Secretary-General Calls for Unconditional Respect for Human Right of Kosovo Citizens,” Kofi Annan provided his personal approval to threatening and use of force against Serbia, even if doing so would violate the UN Charter and such action was not authorized by a UNSC resolution. The statement is available at: <http://www.nato-otan.org/docu/speech/1999/s990128a.htm> accessed July, 5 2009. It should be noted that the U.S. and Great Britain unilaterally had previously threatened military strikes against Iraq without a UN mandate in February 1998, which they put into action in November 1998.

³⁷¹ President Clinton, “We can make a difference,” Radio address. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, February 13, 1999. These troops were initiated as a U.S. contribution to a 28,000 troop’s multinational peacekeeping force in Kosovo if a negotiated settlement was reached. However, Clinton ruled out its deployment in anything but a no threatening environment. The Kosovar Albanians began to doubt the Clinton’s commitment to their people’s safety due to this minor force contribution and the preconditions that followed.

³⁷² Ibid.

³⁷³ For a more comprehensive presentation of the Rambouillet negotiations see Sell, *Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia*, 295-304.

³⁷⁴ President Bill Clinton, “Remarks by the President on the Situation in Kosovo.” Washington D.C. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, March 22, 1999.

President Clinton promised the American people in a television address from the White House, “I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war.”³⁷⁵ Why did President rule out a key military option? Clinton’s reasoning seemed to be threefold; (1) keep the fragile NATO consensus on the use of force intact; (2) avoid conflict with a hostile Congress; and (3) both Secretary Cohen and CJCS Shelton both wanted to avoid any commitment of U.S. ground forces.³⁷⁶ In his memoirs Bill Clinton advocated that the bombing campaign against the FRY over Kosovo had three objectives:³⁷⁷ (1) Show Milosević that the U.S. was serious; (2) deter an even bloodier offensive against civilians; and (3) seriously damage the Serbian military capacity. But his statement, “I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war,” by ruling out the use of offensive ground forces, had the effect of supporting Milosević’s conviction that he could endure the bombing and hope to split the resolve of the alliance.

4.3 Approaches of the President’s staff and advisors

With the Dayton Accords quite successfully accomplished, evidence suggests that the second Clinton Administration no longer cared a great deal about the situation in the Balkans.³⁷⁸ American commitments to potential conflict in the Persian Gulf and Korea, where the “vital interests of the United States” took priority in U.S. foreign policy over the problems in the Balkans.³⁷⁹ In December 1995, Secretary Christopher told President Rugova that the U.S. would insist that Slobodan Milosević begin a dialogue with the Kosovar Albanians to restore Kosovo’s autonomy.³⁸⁰ In 1996 the U.S. pushed Milosević to allow it to open a small American culture center in Pristina. However, when the UN High Representative in BiH, Carl Bildt in June 1996 suggested a coordinated U.S.-European push on Kosovo, the response from the Clinton Administration was deafening silence.³⁸¹ For more than two years after Dayton the Clinton Administration essentially ignored Kosovo and their chosen champion in Kosovo, President Rugova. In January, 1998 the Contact Group members agreed at a meeting in Washington to set forth some principles for resolving the Kosovo conflict.³⁸² However, there

³⁷⁵ President Clinton, “Statement on Kosovo” delivered from the Oval Office on March 24, 1999. The address is available at: [www.http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3932](http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3932) accessed, on June 14, 2009.

³⁷⁶ See Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 97.

³⁷⁷ Bill Clinton, *My Life*, 851.

³⁷⁸ *Ibid*, 362.

³⁷⁹ See Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 451.

³⁸⁰ See Sell, *Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia*, 274.

³⁸¹ *Ibid*, 275.

³⁸² See “Statement on Kosovo,” Contact Group, Washington D.C. on January 8, 1998.

was no serious U.S. diplomatic engagement in Kosovo until the situation on the ground began to heat up and violence returned in the early spring of 1998. Furthermore, the Clinton Administration conducted no formal policy review on Kosovo. One possible explanation for the low profile on the situation in Kosovo was that the Clinton Administration's major effort in Balkan diplomacy was to keep peace in BiH, where a large commitment of U.S. military forces were leading the international peace-keeping force. The cooperation of Milosević was regarded as crucial to these efforts in BiH (as well as Macedonia and Croatia), a posture that reduced the Clinton Administration's interests in pushing Milosević too hard on Kosovo.

However, the conflict in Kosovo surfaced an internal rivalry between the Departments of State and Defense over planning and execution of foreign policy in the Balkans.³⁸³ On the one hand, Madeleine Albright as the new Secretary of State continued to be hawkish in her view on Slobodan Milosević and his intentions of establishing a "Greater Serbia." Her position was that the international community had to stop Milosević's plans for Kosovo immediately. On the other hand, Secretary Cohen and the CJCS, General Hugh Shelton were both "dovish" and cautious on the situation on Kosovo.³⁸⁴ The Department of Defense strongly opposed Albright's many proposals to use military power to gain leverage over Milosević.³⁸⁵ Secretary of Defense Cohen and the CJCS General Shelton were unwilling to contemplate further military missions in the Balkans.³⁸⁶ According to General Wesley K. Clark, Secretary Cohen warned Richard Holbrooke that in his diplomatic work in Kosovo, he was to under no circumstances offer U.S. ground troops as peacekeepers.³⁸⁷ General Clark argued that this lack of interest for Kosovo was caused by the Pentagon's commitment to the national military strategy, prioritizing the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia.³⁸⁸ It also had to do with Cohen's firm belief that Congress would not support the use of U.S. ground forces, partly from the lingering affect of the failed mission in Somalia and the new law that required a balanced federal budget.³⁸⁹ Subsequently, the Pentagon did not want to make any move that might engage American forces in more than a minimal way in the Balkans, especially crucial

³⁸³ See Clark, *Waging War*, XLIV. The department of State is responsible for recommending and leading the execution of foreign policy. The Department of Defense, on the other hand, saw its responsibilities as primarily deterrence and warfare.

³⁸⁴ Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 377.

³⁸⁵ Secretary Albright's position was that the U.S. needed to back diplomacy with threatening the use of military force: On April 23, 1998 in a meeting with the NSA Sandy Berger Albright argued to use airpower; and again on January 16, 1999 after the killings in Racak. See Albright, *Madame Secretary*, 383, 394.

³⁸⁶ See Albright, *Madame Secretary*, 383 and 394

³⁸⁷ Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 139.

³⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 122.

³⁸⁹ Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 360-480.

was it to avoid ground forces.³⁹⁰ According to General Clark, Secretary Cohen became very upset when Clark introduced the challenges in Kosovo and the possibilities for future U.S. military involvement and the need for ground forces.³⁹¹ Secretary of Defense William Cohen later recalled, “I was absolutely convinced that the United States could not afford to take any unilateral action, from a political viewpoint, and certainly we were not going to intervene unilaterally without NATO consensus and support.”³⁹² In his book *Waging Modern War*, General Wesley Clark presents an example of the division between the Department of Defense and Department of State on Kosovo. When Clark presented a document on the challenges in Kosovo and his proposals for possible use of U.S.-NATO forces, addressed to the CJCS and the Secretary of Defense, he was instructed by the vice-CJCS General Joe Ralston; “We can’t deal with any more problems and the Secretary [Cohen] is concerned that Madeleine Albright might get a copy of this.”³⁹³

Albright seemed to have had a personal loathing for Milosević after having dealt with BiH for three years.³⁹⁴ When the conflict in Kosovo escalated, Albright forcefully took the lead in devising an appropriate response. After massacres in February and March 1998,³⁹⁵ Albright noted at a press briefing, “We are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with in Bosnia.”³⁹⁶ She followed up with “by his actions in Kosovo, Slobodan has made it clear that he is spurning incentives that the United States and others have offered him in recent weeks – unfortunately the only thing he truly understands is decisive and firm action.”³⁹⁷ As the Kosovo issue again reached the senior members of the Clinton Administration, Albright became a far more central player than she had been during the handling of the conflict in BiH. Albright’s position was that the Clinton Administration could not allow the Serbs to define Kosovo as a purely internal

³⁹⁰ Ibid, 363.

³⁹¹ Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 110-12.

³⁹² Quoted at PBS Frontline, “War in Europe.” Available at: www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo accessed June 12, 2009.

³⁹³ Quoted in Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 111.

³⁹⁴ See Albright characterization of Slobodan Milosević in her memoirs *Madame Secretary*, in Chapter 23 – “Milosević Is the Problem”, 378-92. See also Doder and Branson, *Milosević*, 7 - where Albright believed that Milosević was a “schoolyard bully” who would cave in after a few punches. The outcome of the 78 days of NATO strikes against Serbia in the spring of 1999 showed that Albright’s belief was a serious misreading of Milosević’s character.

³⁹⁵ On February 28, 1998 Serb Security forces killed more than twenty Kosovar Albanians in Qirez and Likosane in central Kosovo. A few days later in the Drenica valley they murdered another fifty Kosovar Albanians, including the KLA leader, Adem Jashari and most of his family members.

³⁹⁶ See Steve Erlanger, “Albright Warns Serbs on Kosovo Violence” article in the *New York Times* on March June 8, 1998. Available at www.nytimes.com accessed May 19, 2009.

³⁹⁷ Albright at Press Briefings at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome on March 7, 1998.

matter.³⁹⁸ In her view the way to stop Milosević was to use concrete measures that would expand the international community's leverage over Belgrade. Based on the experiences and her perceptions from BiH, the only language Milosević would respond to was firm action.³⁹⁹ Halberstam has argued that Albright "was absolutely certain of her beliefs about what needed to be done in Kosovo."⁴⁰⁰ At her direction, the Department of State attempted to build international support for firm action against Serbia; using the Contact Group, which had been a successful approach to bring leverage over Milosević on BiH and get him to Dayton in 1995. Albright's goal was to ensure allied unity rather than division and to forge a roadmap that would keep the Russians on board.⁴⁰¹ However, even with the previous agreement over BiH, the Contact Group was now divided as Russia defended Milosević approach in Kosovo.⁴⁰² Consequently, Russia threatened to veto any UN resolution authorizing NATO's use of military force.⁴⁰³ The lack of common view and common approach among the six Contact Group members on Kosovo caused Albright to recommend to the NSC and President that the U.S. should take the diplomatic lead in Kosovo.⁴⁰⁴ Secretary Albright's position at a Contact Group meeting in London on October 9, 1998 was that an agreement with Slobodan Milosević was possible only if NATO authorized the use of military force.⁴⁰⁵ On the other hand, Secretary of Defense Cohen made it clear before briefing Congress in early October 1998 that he would not raise the question of U.S. ground forces.⁴⁰⁶ Subsequently, the question of ground forces was not reconsidered until after the Racak massacre in mid-January 1999.

Well before the military operations against Serbia over Kosovo begin in the spring of 1999, Albright gained the Clinton Administration's support for a policy of trying to replace

³⁹⁸ Albright, *Madame Secretary*, 381.

³⁹⁹ Albright argued: "Unfortunately, the one thing he truly understands is decisive and firm action on the part of the international community." Quoted in Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 376.

⁴⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰¹ Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 25.

⁴⁰² For a comprehensive discussion of the relationship between Milosević and Russia see Oleg Levitin, "Inside Moscow's Kosovo Muddle," in *Survival*, No. 1, 2000, 130-40.

⁴⁰³ See Albright, *Madame Secretary*, 389, 396-97. The Russian position was that Kosovo was a domestic matter for the sovereign nation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia) to resolve and that it was the Kosovar Albanians that destabilized the situation, not the Serbs. Consequently Russia could not tolerate the use of force against fellow Slavs. It should here be noted that both Russians and Serbs religion is based on the Orthodox Church. The Serbs played the Orthodox card, which meant courting popular opinion in Russia. Russia's position also had to do with a similar situation in Chechnya, a break-away territory in Russia that had declared its independence and against which Russian use of force was drawing criticism from the Western international community. It should also be noted there were division in views between America and Russia over the expansion of NATO. A consequence of the Russian position was that the Contact Group settled on neither the ambiguity of supporting either independence or the maintenance of the status quo. However it should be noted that the Contact Group members, including Russia, did finally reach a basic agreement in March 1999.

⁴⁰⁴ Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 397. The European allies argued the need for a UNSC Resolution before they acted in Kosovo. As the Europeans probably knew this was impossible, since Russia was bound to veto it.

⁴⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 376

⁴⁰⁶ Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 55.

Milosević. For two years. U.S. policy moved both behind the scenes and in the public toward that end state. In public remarks Secretary Albright repeatedly argued: “The United States wants Milosević out of power, out of Serbia, and in custody of the war crimes tribunal.”⁴⁰⁷ The Department of State’s spokesman James Rubin argued publicly: “Milosević has been at the center for every crisis in the former Yugoslavia over the last decade. He is not simply part of the problem – Milosević is the problem.”⁴⁰⁸ Evidence showed that among the NSC members no one else initially shared Albright’s certainty of events on the ground in Kosovo or what the U.S. policy in Kosovo should be. However, General Clark, the new SACEUR of NATO shared Albright’s view.⁴⁰⁹ The views of the rest of the Administration were that the eventual use of United States’ instruments of power should be based on factors as the gravity of U.S. interests, the likelihood of success, the possibility for international support, the degree of domestic popular support, and the possible consequences of inaction – in other words, the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine. As the majority among the principals in the Clinton Administration viewed the context; the situation in Kosovo did not meet these requirements. Especially, the national security advisor Sandy Berger was wary about threatening with military force.⁴¹⁰ As late as January 15, 1999 Secretary Albright was the single NSC principal who pushed for more decisive steps against Milosević.⁴¹¹ The other principals were leery of getting involved militarily in yet another conflict in the Balkans, especially since there was no clear end state to such military involvement. Defense Secretary Cohen and CJCS General Shelton steadily held their positions: (1) the Pentagon did not want to support a second long term mission in the Balkans; (2) argued that the American public would not support the use of American forces in a civil war in Kosovo where the U.S. had no vital interests; and (3) doubted that Congress would provide the needed peacekeeping costs.⁴¹² The Pentagon

⁴⁰⁷ Albright, *Madame Secretary*, 389

⁴⁰⁸ Quoted in Steve Erlanger’s, “U.S. Hardens Stance on Yugoslav Leader,” the *New York Times*, on December 14, 1998.

⁴⁰⁹ See Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 376.

⁴¹⁰ Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 30.

⁴¹¹ See Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 409; and Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 70-71. Present at this meeting on January 15, 1998 were: Albright, Berger, Cohen, Shelton and Tenet.

⁴¹² Albright, *Madame Secretary*, 395. Halberstam stated that Cohen, a former Senator, was convinced that Congress would reject any commitment of U.S. ground forces in Kosovo, *War in a Time of Peace*, 408-43. The position of the Pentagon seem to be based on the content of the Weinberger-Powell doctrine and the well known reluctance in Congress to send U.S. forces on peacekeeping missions after the Somalia incident. See also PDD-25 previously discussed in this thesis. During the 1990s, the U.S. Congress refused to appropriate funds in the military budget for contingency missions like Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia, Iraq, etc. This caused huge financial problems for the armed forces, as they were forced to reallocate funds from planned priority programs to sudden deployments and long-lasting peace operations. The U.S. Army in particular, had to submit multiple appeals during or after major operations to the Congress and hope that a Supplemental Appropriation would be passed to reimburse them for those already depleted funds originally intended for other programs – such as payment of infrastructure operating and repair costs. Source: Colonel Michael Toler, U.S. Army retired and former professor at West Point in interviews with the author.

representatives were furthermore highly dubious that limited air strikes, as Albright had suggested, would gain results.⁴¹³ However, when the principals learned about the massacre at Racak, the division on how to respond in Kosovo was lessened not just within the Clinton Administration but also among the European allies. Immediately after word of the Racak massacre reached Albright, she initiated the development of a new strategy, drawing on a proposal submitted by U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Alexandar Vershbow which went beyond the status quo policy endorsed by the majority of the principals on January 15th.⁴¹⁴ The new “Albright strategy” discussed at the NSC Principals Committee on January 19th, consisted of an ultimatum to the warring parties in Kosovo to accept an interim settlement in which NATO would commit to enforcement of a political agreement with ground troops. Because no one of the other principals could promote a better alternative than Albright’s proposals, she finally gained the interagency support she had long sought. The next day the NSC staff prepared a memorandum for President Clinton’s approval, a document he signed on January 21, 1999.⁴¹⁵

The national security adviser, Sandy Berger was one of the very few original principals still operating in the Clinton Administration in its sixth and seventh year. Halberstam argued that Sandy Berger was both politically and emotionally closest to President Clinton among the principals in the Clinton Administrations.⁴¹⁶ Berger was “dovish” and did not share Secretary Albright’s recommendations on using airpower to gain leverage over a crisis in the Balkans.⁴¹⁷ Berger rejected Albright’s recommendations for some time, asking the General Powell question: “What will happen if airpower doesn’t work?”⁴¹⁸ Halberstam stated that Berger’s position on Kosovo was, to delay any military involvement.⁴¹⁹ Furthermore, Berger was sceptical about threatening military force for fear of having to follow through and implement the threats without having clear political objectives and a defined end state.

General Wesley K. Clark, the Commander of the U.S. European Command and the Commander of NATO military forces, became a dominant figure in facing the conflict in

⁴¹³ See Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 71.

⁴¹⁴ Sell, *Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia*, 295.

⁴¹⁵ See Barton Gellman, “The path to Crisis: How the United States and Its Allies Went to War,” *Washington Post*, April 18, 1999, A31.

⁴¹⁶ See Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 404 - 09. The friendship between Bill Clinton and Sandy Berger was long standing and sealed with real mutual trust. Among Berger’s strengths were that he had considerable analytical power, read Clinton very well and did not seek greater personal power. They first met during the McGovern campaign in 1972 and since then their friendship flourished.

⁴¹⁷ See Albright, *Madame Secretary*, 383; and Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 407.

⁴¹⁸ Quoted in Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 376.

⁴¹⁹ *Ibid*, 377.

Kosovo.⁴²⁰ Thus, General Clark would be the commanding officer in any NATO- led military operation against Serbia and Milosević.⁴²¹ Like Albright, Clark believed that only force would work to obtain leverage over Milosević.⁴²² In early 1998 Clark began to strongly advocate the use of force against the Serbs, at least the threat of air power.⁴²³ However, when General Clark warned the Pentagon that the escalating violence in Kosovo required a stronger diplomatic and military initiative in Kosovo, he was told that the Pentagon could not deal with more problems in the Balkans.⁴²⁴ Evidence showed that Clark pushed hard in devising military force to gain leverage over Milosević.

One other key adviser to the President was Vice President Albert Gore, a man who was publicly intensely loyal to President Clinton and who kept a low key approach to accomplishing the role of governing, as assigned to him by both the U.S. Constitution and his boss. Al Gore was one of the original Clinton Administration survivors and a private adviser of conviction whose opinions were deeply respected by the President. Little has been documented concerning his role in U.S. foreign policy during the Clinton years. But Halberstam argues that Al Gore was convincingly in favour of using military force to back diplomacy in settling the Kosovo issue.⁴²⁵

4.4 Congress

Many members of Congress still felt in 1998 and 1999 that President Clinton had misled them on the scope, cost and duration of the U.S. ground mission in BiH.⁴²⁶

⁴²⁰ When he was appointed Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) in mid-1997 he became the senior ranking U.S. officer in Europe and the senior officer in NATO's chain of command in Europe. It should be noted that General Clark was double-hatted, commander of the U.S. European Command and SACEUR of NATO military forces. Therefore, he had two chains of command to serve – through the U.S. to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and President and through NATO to the Secretary General and North Atlantic Council.

⁴²¹ General Wesley Clark was Richard Holbrooke's U.S. military counterpart at Dayton, making sure that the peace treaty the parties would agree upon was enforceable. Clark met Slobodan Milosević on several occasions before and during the Dayton Accords. Clark's position was that Milosević would negotiate only as a ploy and until he was stopped by force, nothing could be settled. See Wesley Clark's books *Waging War* and *A Time to Lead. For Duty, Honor and Country*. Also see Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 340 to 480.

⁴²² Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 388.

⁴²³ Ibid, 396.

⁴²⁴ See Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 109. Following the 1st Gulf War, U.S. Army and Air Force military forces were essentially halved and budget resources drastically reduced after Clinton took office in 1993, in what he and the Democratic party called "the peace dividend." U.S. military forces were stretched thin by the ever increasing commitment of forces to peace-keeping operations initiated by the Clinton Administration, having troops in over 60 countries – major forces participating in peace operations in Iraq, Kuwait, Haiti, BiH, Macedonia, Honduras, and Korea. With no vital U.S. national interests in Kosovo, with military planning estimates requiring more than 100,000 troops to be deployed and logistically supported in a land-locked, mountainous country, the Pentagon was obviously not enthusiastic about any further commitments. Source: Colonel Michael Toler, U.S. Army, Retired, in interviews with the author, April-May 2009.

⁴²⁵ Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 371- 423, 488.

⁴²⁶ President Clinton, in order to assure Congressional approval, promised in December 1995 that the deployment to BiH would only be for one year, even though this was a totally unrealistic time frame for a peace-keeping mission. Then one year

Consequently, many of them were wary of being drawn into the same open-ended commitment in Kosovo. Prosecuting use of military force in consultation with Congress was a challenging issue for the Clinton Administration.⁴²⁷ However, Congressional support for the Administration's initiatives would only come if Congress understood the issues and challenges the U.S. confronted in Kosovo. However, during the Kosovo process, the Clinton Administration only consulted sporadically with Congress before the U.S.-led NATO air campaign started on March 24, 1999.⁴²⁸ Although the Clinton Administration's often professed position was to consult with members of Congress to secure their support, it never made a case of sending U.S. ground forces into hostile action over Kosovo. In fact, President Clinton on several occasions argued against such deployment.⁴²⁹

In Congress, the Kosovo cause was initially kept alive by a small group of congressmen led by Representative Elliot L. Engel (Democrat – N.Y.). On July 29, 1996 Engel sponsored a resolution in the House (H. Con. Res. 155) urging President Clinton to appoint a special envoy to Kosovo.⁴³⁰ After Representative Engel's initiative in the summer of 1996, evidence showed that the situation in Kosovo was hardly discussed in Congress before violence broke out in March 1998. On March 6, 1998 Senator Joseph R. Biden called for immediate action in Kosovo by arguing: "The violence in Kosovo could provide the spark to ignite the Balkan tinderbox into full-scale regional war, which, in the worst case, could bring in neighboring Albania, Macedonia - and perhaps even Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey."⁴³¹ In the following weeks human rights violations in Kosovo were discussed in Congress; making calls for an end to the violent repression of Kosovar Albanians and for the beginning of a dialogue between the Serb authorities and the leaders of the Kosovar Albanians.⁴³² Examples of this are House

later, while Congress was out of session, President Clinton notified Congress of his decision to continue the deployment for another 18 months.

⁴²⁷ David Halberstam states in his book, *War in a Time of Peace*, that "There was no way to overestimate the damage Somalia had done to the Clinton Administration," 442.

⁴²⁸ After being criticized in early 1999 by members of Congress for not sufficiently consulting members of Congress on Kosovo, Secretary of State Albright promised at a hearing before the House Committee on International Relations on March 10, 1999 that President Clinton and his Cabinet would continue consulting Congress. President Clinton also personally followed up the signals from Congress by calling leaders of Congress to brief them on the Rambouillet negotiations and NATO's plans for Kosovo. On February 13, 1999 he spoke with Senator Trent Lott, the majority leader; Senator Tom Daschle, the minority leader; Dennis Hastert, the Speaker of the House and Richard Gephardt, the House minority leader about Kosovo. Also in February, he sent as his personal envoy, Senator Bob Dole, to the Rambouillet conference to convince the Kosovars that if they failed to sign the proposed agreement, the U.S. government would abandon them.

⁴²⁹ President Clinton acted on the presumption that Congress would not support the use of U.S. ground forces in Kosovo.

⁴³⁰ See "A Resolution on the Crisis in Kosovo," House of Representatives, July 29, 1996. Available at: [www.http://thomas.loc.gov](http://www.thomas.loc.gov) accessed June 29, 2009. See also Michael Dobbs, "Kosova's Albanians Look to U.S. for Help" in the *Washington Post*, on July 21, 1996.

⁴³¹ Senator Joseph Biden, "The Situation in Kosovo," March 6, 1998 – U.S. Senate, 105th Congress, page S1505.

⁴³² See "Human Right Violations in Kosovo", House of Representatives, March 10, 1998, page H929; "Calling for an End to Violent repression of Legitimate Rights of People of Kosova", H. Con. Res. 235, March 17, 1998, page H1202-1204; "The

Concurrent Resolution 235 (1998) which took a strong stand to resolve the situation in Kosovo and Senate Concurrent Resolution 85 (1998) which condemned the Serbian government for gross human rights violations.

In the late summer of 1998, after the Clinton Administration and NATO warned again of impending military action against Milosević, several Republican Senators criticized the Administration's approach toward ending the Kosovo conflict. Senator Don Nickles was not impressed with President Clinton's plan and argued on the Senate floor: "They have a lot of work to do if they're going to convince the Congress."⁴³³ Senator Richard Lugar, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, advocated, "This is an extremely complex issue, but it is clear that the planning on the part of the Administration is inadequate."⁴³⁴ Several other critical Republican senators expressed support for air strikes against the Serbs to end the killings in Kosovo.⁴³⁵ Senator John W. Warner, the Republican chairman of the Armed Services Committee was one of few prominent Republicans who voiced support to President Clinton's February 13, 1999 decision to deploy 4,000 U.S. soldiers as part of a planned peacekeeping operation in Kosovo (KFOR).⁴³⁶ However, President Clinton's decision to deploy peacekeeping troops, if the Rambouillet negotiations were successful, became a torturous experience for his Administration. The larger problem the Clinton Administration faced was that Congress did not value an additional U.S. peacekeeping force in the Balkans. Members of the House and Senate from both parties were critical of the Administration's course, caused by their skepticism about international cooperation in general and a desire to maintain maximum freedom of action for the U.S. in its foreign policy. Subsequently, members of Congress from both parties were openly suspicious about U.S. force deployments to Kosovo. Some members said they feared the mission "was so flawed that it could turn into a nightmare similar to the Vietnam War."⁴³⁷ The bipartisan doubts were reflected in support for another House resolution against sending U.S. troops to Kosovo proposed by

Crisis in Kosovo", Senate, March 17, 1998, page S2141; "Calling for an end to the violent repression of the people of Kosovo" Senate, March 18, 1998, page S2221; "The Situation in Kosovo", House of Representatives on May 22, 1998, page H3967-68; and "Need for Action on Kosovo", Senate on July 8, 1998, page S7677-78.

⁴³³ Quoted in Eric Schmitt, "Republicans Criticize Clinton on Kosovo," *The New York Times*, October 3, 1998. Available at www.nytimes.com accessed July 5, 1998.

⁴³⁴ Ibid.

⁴³⁵ The Senators John McCain, Joseph R. Biden, Thomas Daschle and Mitch Mc Connell were among those who supported military action. One of the strongest supporters of the Kosovar movement for independence was Senator Robert Dole, the unsuccessful 1996 Presidential candidate.

⁴³⁶ See Eric Schmitt, "Republicans Criticize Clinton on Kosovo," *The New York Times*, October 3, 1998.

⁴³⁷ Quoted in Elisabeth Becker, "House to Vote on Kosovo Force Despite White House Appeals" *The New York Times*, March 11, 1999. Available at www.nytimes.com accessed July 4, 2009.

Representative Tillie K. Fowler.⁴³⁸ However, on March 11, 1999 the House of Representatives voted 219-191 to support President Clinton's plan to send the 4,000 U.S. troops should a peace settlement be reached at Rambouillet after a long and passionate debate on United States policy in the Balkans.⁴³⁹ The opponents argued that Kosovo would prove to be a quagmire and that Europe should police any settlement itself. Sentiment in the Congress toward Kosovo, just as it had been in BiH, tended to be similar to that of many in the Pentagon – "We don't have a dog in that fight."

In March 1999, Senators again clashed over United States' role in an eventual NATO air campaign if Milosević refused to sign the peace accord negotiated at Rambouillet. Again, Republicans complained that the Administration had not sought Congressional approval for U.S. participation in an air campaign against Serbia.⁴⁴⁰ Democrats urged the Senate to postpone a vote on this issue. Senator Joseph R. Biden supported the Administration by focusing on the moral obligation the United States had to end the fighting as well as the impact this had on national security. Biden argued, "It's about genocide and ethnic cleansing."⁴⁴¹ However, on March 23, 1999 with a bipartisan majority of 58-41, the Senate voted to support the air campaign against Serbia. Lee H. Hamilton advocated that Congress during the Kosovo crisis acted in a variety of confusing ways that complicated things for the Clinton Administration.⁴⁴² However, significant financial costs were also a consideration for Congress which was under the restraints of the Balanced Budget Amendment. A big military undertaking in Kosovo would demand huge funds for years to come; a fact the Congress had to consider. President Clinton had to lobby hard to get a positive vote in Congress. Just after the NATO bombings started over Kosovo in March 1999, no fewer than 41 senators voted in favour of a motion that condemned the use of military force against FRY.

4.5 The electoral politics

It is difficult for a U.S. Administration to generate public support for military operations in conflicts that few citizens have yet heard about. Most Americans probably had

⁴³⁸ Allison Mitchell, "In Vote Clinton Sought to Avoid, House Backs a Force for Kosovo," *The New York Times* March 12, 1999. Available at www.nytimes.com accessed on July 4, 2009.

⁴³⁹ Bill Clinton, *My Life*, 850; and Alison Mitchell "In Vote Clinton Sought to Avoid, House backs Force for Kosovo," *The New York Times*, March 12, 1999.

⁴⁴⁰ See Eric Schmitt, Conflict in the Balkans: Congress; Senators Clash Over U.S. Role In a NATO Bombing Campaign," *The New York Times*, March 23, 1999. Available at www.nytimes.com accessed July 6, 2009.

⁴⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴⁴² See Hamilton with Tama. *A Creative Tension. The Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress* (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002), 64.

no idea where Kosovo was located and certainly very few were even aware of who were the belligerents or what were the cultural-political causes for the conflict. Subsequently, an underlying challenge in the Clinton Administration's Kosovo policy was its presumption that the American people would not support a more decisive approach dealing with the violence in Kosovo. The failed raid in Somalia in October 1992, in which eighteen U.S. soldiers were killed, was probably most significant in shaping the electorate's attitude toward a new peace-keeping intervention. In 1998, and until his 1999 acquittal in the Impeachment trial, President Clinton was essentially politically paralyzed by "Monicagate." The last thing the Clinton Administration wanted was a military disaster fresh in the minds of voters before the November 1998 elections; so the approach was to delay decisive action until after the elections. Thus to a large extent, an uninformed public was not a major factor or power center in the Kosovo crisis, but the perception of Secretary Cohen that he could not garner public support for the use of ground forces in the conflict certainly limited the policy options.

4.6 The Yugoslav President Milosević's interests and objectives

Slobodan Milosević regarded the Dayton Accords as something of a victory. He, "the arsonist," had been enlisted to extinguish the fires that he himself had created in BiH. Subsequently, Milosević sold Dayton to the Serb nation as a personal diplomatic triumph.⁴⁴³ During the negotiations in Dayton, Milosević had behaved as "Slobodan the Good," trying to convince the international community that he had converted from warmonger to peacemaker.⁴⁴⁴ However, few were persuaded by the "gentler" Milosević, because the "bad" Milosević kept breaking through. The international community's responses after the peace settlement in BiH showed no eager pursuit of the indicted war criminals Radavan Karadzic or General Ratko Mladić.⁴⁴⁵ Consequently, Milosević could quite rapidly assess the situation in the Balkans as "business as usual," even if he felt the Clinton Administration had "double-

⁴⁴³ Newspapers (Milosević controlled) in Serbia had headlines like: "Milosević – the man of peace"; and "Decisive Role of the Serbian President." Incredibly, Socialists from the city of Niš proposed Milosević for the Nobel Peace Prize. However, the majority of Serbs regarded Dayton as a great defeat. See Doder and Branson, *Milosević*, 226.

⁴⁴⁴ See Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 362; see also Doder and Branson, *Milosević*, 7, 223; and Sell, *Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia*, 210-13. Milosević's typical style as a political negotiator was not to be obstructionist but a problem solver. One example where Milosević presented a new and gentler face during the Dayton negotiations was when he sang "Tenderly" with the piano player at the Officers Club and the way he charmed his hosts with his outgoing manner and constructive approach.

⁴⁴⁵ The American Commander of IFOR, Admiral Leighton Smith argued that arresting Karadzic or Mladić was not a part of his mission, which was a true statement from a legal standpoint. So despite wide-spread criticism of inaction by NATO concerning those two fugitives of the Hague, they passed through IFOR checkpoints undetained. See Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 362-63.

crossed” him by continuing the sanctions against the FRY.⁴⁴⁶ Evidence suggests that Milosević left the Dayton negotiations convinced that all sanctions against Serbia would be lifted.⁴⁴⁷ However, the continuing sanctions made Milosević less trustful of the international community, especially of the U.S., and less inclined to take objections on Kosovo from the international community into account.

Milosević's political power was built on Kosovo. In 1987 Milosević had raised the stakes advocating: “Yugoslavia can not exist without Kosovo. Yugoslavia and Serbia will not give up Kosovo.”⁴⁴⁸ Evidence suggests that Milosević regarded the conflict in Kosovo as strictly a domestic matter. His view on the conflict was that FRY were under attack from the “terrorist organization” KLA. Consequently, he had every right to eliminate the “terrorists” and outright reject any suggestion from the international community for possible autonomy for the Kosovar Albanians. Further, Milosević could not politically afford to give up Kosovo voluntarily, even if he had wanted to do so. Louis Sell argued that despite the political importance Kosovo had for Milosević, there is little proof that he cared much for the province and its inhabitants.⁴⁴⁹ When NATO threatened to use airpower against targets in Serbia and Kosovo in the autumn of 1998, Milosević was unconvinced that NATO would move beyond its warnings. Milosević's position was that he could outlast NATO with a duel of wills and that NATO would not attack in an *out of area* operation without a UNSC resolution, a resolution Russia would veto.⁴⁵⁰ If, however NATO attacked, his strategy was quite promising; hunker down, tolerate the airstrikes, and wait for Russian pressure or NATO internal dissension to weaken the alliance's resolve.⁴⁵¹ President Clinton's insistence that ground forces were not on the table only made Milosević more optimistic.

⁴⁴⁶ Doder and Branson, *Milosević*, 227; and Sell, *Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia*, 257. After Dayton were several UNSC Resolutions lifted. However, the U.S. did not lift its “outer wall” of sanctions, which prevented Serbia from joining international organizations and kept Serbia out of financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. This limited international trade and investments in Serbia, and precluded the country from loans needed to restore its armed forces equipment lost in the war.

⁴⁴⁷ See Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 113. Daalder argued that one element in the Endgame Strategy was “the complete lifting of sanctions once Dayton had been implemented.”

⁴⁴⁸ Quoted in Sell, *Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia*, 3.

⁴⁴⁹ See Sell, *Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia*, 269. In the mid 1990s Kosovo Serbs broke with Milosević, bitterly aware that he had used them during his climb to power.

⁴⁵⁰ The author has not found evidence proving that Milosević was promised a Russian veto in the UNSC. However, General Wesley Clark suggested that the Russians might have assured Milosević that there would be no UNSC Resolution explicitly authorizing NATO use of force. See Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 128. However, observers argue that Russia considered Kosovo as a domestic matter and blamed the Kosovar Albanians for the crisis in Kosovo. Subsequently it is logical to expect that Russia would veto a UNSC Resolution that would legitimize a NATO attack against Serbia. See Albright, *Madame Secretary*, 382-86. Halberstam also supports this view, *War in a Time of Peace*, 397-99, 475-77.

⁴⁵¹ See Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 106.

On the other hand, Milosević understood the serious personal confrontation he had with Secretary Albright and her influence in the Clinton Administration. Subsequently, the Serbian media controlled by Milosević accused Albright for being a “Serb hater.”⁴⁵² Evidence shows that Milosević had a split view of America. On the one hand he tended to advocate that America was one-sidedly critical of the Serbs. His propaganda machine drew parallels between the U.S. and Nazi Germany.⁴⁵³ On the other hand Milosević was also fascinated by the United States' position as the sole global superpower. Consequently, Milosević seemed to prefer to deal with the U.S. rather than European nations. However, Kosovo became the field of Milosević's greatest political struggle and another serious catastrophe for Serbia. Milosević's lack of foreign experience and his disregard of information and advice given by his advisors led him to ignore the changes around him.⁴⁵⁴ One of the changes Milosević failed to fully detect was the change underway in Russia.⁴⁵⁵ Certainly, Moscow's historical, cultural, ethnical, and religious links to the Serbs were strong, but with the Soviet Union gone, and Russia dependent on the West for financial support, Russia had no leverage to stop the NATO bombardments of Serbia in 1999. It can be argued that Milosević became a partial victim of the dynamic he himself had created over Kosovo. Milosević had enjoyed some flexibility when it came to BiH; he had none in Kosovo. With so many strong emotions in most Serbs over Kosovo, giving it up without struggle would have been political suicide. There has been speculations about why Milosević rejected the Rambouillet negotiations when this brought him into conflict with NATO. Richard Holbrooke has suggested four possible reasons:⁴⁵⁶ (1) Milosević had paid close attention to Operation Desert Fox in Iraq in December 1998, and thought he could survive something similar;⁴⁵⁷ (2) Milosević may have seen the list of bombing targets and realized it was light;⁴⁵⁸ (3) Milosević believed he could outlast NATO in a duel of wills. This because he was well aware of the political divisions

⁴⁵² See Doder and Branson, *Milosević*, 210. One of the most poisonous snakes in the Belgrade Zoo was officially named “Madeleine Albright,” accompanied by several comments in Serbian media.

⁴⁵³ See Sell, *Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia*, 145-45.

⁴⁵⁴ See Doder and Branson, *Milosević*, 69 and 253.

⁴⁵⁵ Slobodan Milosević made a severe political miscalculation on August 19, 1991 when Yugoslavia as one of very few nations supported the communist hard-liners in Russia who attempted a failed coup against Mikhail Gorbachev. Milosević spent an enormous amount of effort to repair this damage in the Russia-Yugoslav relationships during the following years. See Doder and Branson, *Milosević*, 71.

⁴⁵⁶ See Sell, *Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia*, 300-01.

⁴⁵⁷ Operation Desert Fox was a seventy-two hour bombing campaign against Saddam Hussein by U.S. and British aircraft.

⁴⁵⁸ Evidence suggested that Serbian military intelligence had insight in NATO planning process and target list. Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 468-78.

within NATO;⁴⁵⁹ and (4) the drafted Annex B at Rambouillet would allow NATO personnel, aircraft and vehicles an unimpeded access to FRY territory, a demand Milosević would not accept.⁴⁶⁰ When the war started on March 24, 1999 Milosević proved that consensus among NATO members saying that he would give in after a few days of bombing, was wrong. However, the most significant response by Milosević to NATO's threats of bombing was his escalation of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo the days before the NATO bombing started on March 24, 1999.⁴⁶¹ In the end Kosovo's significance to Milosević's political survival made him prepared to fight against the most powerful military alliance – NATO, a fight neither Serbia nor he could win. However, the ethnic cleansing initiated in March 1999 must stand as Milosević's greatest strategic blunder. It fully engaged the Western opinions and built a strong motivation among the NATO member states.

4.7 Deciding factors to attack Serbia over its Kosovo policies

Overwhelming evidence suggests that the conflict in Kosovo did not occupy a central place in the second Clinton Administration's national security policy until the early spring of 1999. However, gradually and unwilling it was drawn into this violent conflict. In the Kosovo conflict, the shadows of Somalia and Vietnam were still present; the possibility for the U.S. to be involved in a domestic conflict with no end and no vital interests. Therefore, U.S. policy on Kosovo was, as it had been in BiH, lurching from one problem to the next until the policy became outpaced by escalation of violence on the ground in Kosovo.

Policy clarity influences the most serious developments of war and peace. However, evidence suggests that Washington had no holistic plan, clear strategy, or political objectives for Kosovo. Subsequently, the Clinton Administration sent mixed messages: on the one hand it argued it did not support an independent Kosovo and on the other hand it was preventing Serbia from exercising its sovereign rights in Kosovo. Another limitation was President Clinton's evident reluctance to lead; his mind seemed to be focused on the impeachment trial he was facing. It also appears that the Clinton Administration overestimated the degree of Congressional opposition to a well-argued case for a military intervention in Kosovo. An underlying factor, derived from the inherent conflict of the Pentagon's national military

⁴⁵⁹ One example supporting this argument is what Milosević told the German Foreign Minister Joscha Fisher in March 1999: "I can stand death – lots of it – but you can't". Quoted in Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 94.

⁴⁶⁰ See Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 87.

⁴⁶¹ This escalation of ethnic cleansing was made possible because the two-thousand OSCE observers were withdrawn from Kosovo in mid March 1999.

strategy and the need for Congressional support, was the lack of a unified American national strategy for dealing with Kosovo. Furthermore, the failure at the Rambouillet Conference included threats of use of force against FRY if it did not sign the proposed agreement. Once Milosević called their hand, the U.S. was committed. Following through to preserve credibility became a matter of vital interest. Given this basic situation, it was quite difficult to prevent war. Michael Ignatieff advocated: “Humanitarian intervention in Kosovo...was never exactly what it appeared. It was never just an attempt to prevent Milosevic from getting away with human rights abuses in Europe’s backyard. It was also a use of imperial power to support a self-determination claim by a national minority – a claim that used violence in order to secure international notice and attention.”⁴⁶²

The policy context that finally moved U.S. policy toward the Kosovo conflict from reluctance to military engagement can be found in six prominent factors; which in sum made it “almost impossible” to continue President Clinton’s preference of coercive diplomacy. The role of the various explanatory factors can only be understood, the author argues, in combination with each other. However, the confluence these factors, finally motivated President Clinton to use air power against FRY from March 24 to June 10, 1999:

- Coercive diplomacy against Milosević required a credible threat of force. However, the United States harmed its prospects for a successful diplomatic solution by threatening an amount and type of military force that carried little weight in the mind of Slobodan Milosević. Following through to preserve credibility became a matter of vital interest for the United States, a credibility that was of ultimate value to the U.S. in its global leadership role and to enhance the viability of the NATO alliance after the end of the Cold War.
- The alternative of standing by and observing what Milosević assumingly would do with the Kosovar Albanians was simply unacceptable from a humanitarian perspective, especially in light of the atrocities previously committed by Serbian and Montenegrin military and para-military forces in Croatia, BiH, and Kosovo.
- The killing in Racak on January 15, 1999 mobilized popular opinion and was the event that finally pushed the Clinton Administration “over the brink.”
- Milosević’s personal arrogance and unwillingness to compromise were certainly key factors. But his biggest mistake was his lack of realization that he actually would face severe military actions as long as he did not make any concessions.

⁴⁶² See Michael Ignatieff, *Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan*, (London: Chatto & Windus, 2003), 70.

- The United States overestimated its dependence on Slobodan Milosević to secure the implementation of the Dayton Accords. Consequently, the Clinton Administration lost some of its leverage over Milosević on an issue unrelated to BiH – Kosovo.
- The personal conviction and convincing influence of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and the NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Wesley Clark, coupled with the extraordinary diplomatic expertise of Richard Holbrooke cannot be underestimated. These three key individuals were key to persuading President Clinton to first enter diplomatic negotiations, threaten the use of force, and then to actually use it to stop the violence in Kosovo.

5. Conclusion

The conclusion of this thesis suggests that the Clinton Administrations' followed an *ad-hoc approach* in their Balkans foreign policy. There is little evidence that either of the Clinton Administrations followed a coherent policy approach in the Balkans. Rather, the evidence suggests that what the Clinton Administrations lacked, their opponent, Slobodan Milosević possessed – a clear vision, political objectives, a strategy, courage and willingness to use available instruments of power. Consequently, the United States' contribution to the efforts of the international community to obtain peace in BiH and Kosovo took much longer than it might have if there had been a coherent foreign policy that stayed the course over the years.

Evidence presented in the previous chapters also suggests that the decisions of President Bill Clinton to respond militarily in BiH and Kosovo were a confluence of several factors.⁴⁶³ However, a closer reading of the Clinton Administrations' policy processes in the Balkans yields a clear impression that very few of these factors were of primary importance. Consequently, the conclusion of this thesis suggests that Clinton primarily became motivated in the Balkans by two significant factors:

1. The prolonged crises in BiH and Kosovo were producing unacceptably high political risks and costs to President Clinton.
2. The genocide in Srebrenica in July 1995 and the killings in Racak on January 15, 1999 forced the U.S. to take a proactive leadership role toward finding a peaceful settlement.

The analyses and the conclusion of this thesis demonstrates that using Hilsman *Political Process Model* was a useful approach to identify the significant motivating factors and the impact that each power center had on President Clinton's decision-making processes in the Balkans.

After this brief introduction, my final chapter identifies and elaborates on the two significant factors that motivated President Clinton to respond militarily in the two cases examined. This is followed by a suggested verdict on President Clinton's foreign policy leadership on the BiH and Kosovo crises. Finally, the dominant power centres, as espoused by Roger Hilsman are examined.

⁴⁶³ For an elaboration on identified factors, see subchapters 3.6 and 4.7 in this thesis.

5.1 Significant motivating factors

As presented in this Chapter's introduction, evidence suggests two central arguments which had significant impact in motivating President Clinton to respond militarily in BiH and Serbia. The single most influential motivation factor was Clinton's realization that prolonged crises in BiH and Kosovo were producing unacceptably high political risks for America and his Administrations. These risks had the potential to put Clinton's prime political agenda in jeopardy, i.e., the U.S. economic well-being; and in the case of BiH, retaining his office for a second term. In the case of Kosovo, his focus was on attempting to restore his Presidential historical legacy in the face of public humiliation as a result of "Monicagate." Furthermore, the preservation of America's and NATO's credibility became a matter of vital interest for the President Clinton. Evidence also suggests that the ethnic massacres in Srebrenica and in Racak became turning points for President Clinton's involvement and decision-making processes towards interventions. These most influential motivating factors are elaborated in the successive subchapters.

The other factors presented in the previous chapters were of secondary importance. This author does not believe, based on available evidence, that a principled concern for humanitarian crises drove the Clinton Administrations to the interventions in the Balkans. This is not to argue that his Administrations did not care about humanitarian crises, but it seems clear that this was not a primary factor in triggering intervention. Evidence suggests that far fewer people had been killed in Kosovo than the millions that had been slaughtered or forced out of their homelands in more violent civil crises in Sudan, Rwanda and Sierra Leone – African nations in which President Clinton showed no interest in intervening.⁴⁶⁴ This lack of consideration for African crises underscores that President Clinton did not establish a principled concern for genocide and ethnic cleansing; instead evidence suggests he followed a case-by-case approach which seemingly favored Europe, due to vital American historical, cultural, and economic ties to Europe. In the Rwanda case, evidence suggests, that perceived domestic opposition to intervention from Congress, stoked by the U.S. Army casualties in Mogadishu, Somalia, helped convince President Clinton to avert his eyes from humankind's greatest evil.⁴⁶⁵ For these reasons, it can be argued that factors other than international humanitarian concerns were of greater concern in determining the Clinton Administrations'

⁴⁶⁴ See Michael Mandelbaum. "A Perfect Failure." *Foreign Affairs* 78, no 5, 1999, 2-8.

policies. Consequently, evidence suggests, perhaps surprisingly to many readers, that humanitarian concerns and public opinion were of secondary importance to the President and his Administrations.

The prolonged crises in BiH and Kosovo were producing unacceptably high political risks and costs to President Clinton

President Clinton was the first Chief Executive to fully understand and advocate the implications of the emerging global economy as a result of the information technologic revolution, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of a bi-polar world. The evidence suggests that Clinton understood that U.S. economic opportunities in the Globalization Era would lead to a structural shift from nations to global markets. Subsequently, Clinton kept arguing “Foreign policy is domestic policy.”⁴⁶⁶ In part, because of Congressional opposition to the Clinton Administrations’ economic agenda, President Clinton had a firm view that closer ties to Europe were central to U.S. economic diplomacy and trade in order to secure America’s economic well-being.⁴⁶⁷ The EU emerged as America’s most important trade and investment partner. This economic relationship became highly and increasingly politicised in the 1990s.⁴⁶⁸

However, diplomatically-demanded and threatened use-of-force deadlines came and went in both BiH and Kosovo without sustained, hard-hitting military force to stop the violence and fulfil U.S. political objectives. The longer President Clinton delayed his decisions, the greater he undermined America’s credibility. Consequently, evidence presented in this thesis suggests that the escalating crises in BiH and Kosovo and the credibility of the U.S. became inextricably linked. A slow realization in the Clinton Administrations surfaced and it was recognized that prolonged crises in BiH and Kosovo would have significant impact on the trans-Atlantic political and economic relations.⁴⁶⁹ The trans-Atlantic split over the

⁴⁶⁵ See President Bill Clinton’s remarks delivered to genocide survivors, assistance workers and U.S. and Rwanda government officials at Kigali Airport in Rwanda. 25 March 1998. White House Press Release, March 25, 1998.

⁴⁶⁶ Klein, *The Natural*, 78.

⁴⁶⁷ It should be noted the U.S. and the EU are by far the biggest players in the global economic system. America and EU, acting both individually and together, play a leading role in the world’s economic governance. When acting in partnership, they control or steer globalization, at least within the World Trade Organization and International Monetary Fund.

⁴⁶⁸ Clinton made the EU itself a central focus of U.S. diplomacy by establishing the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) in 1995. To emphasize the importance of world trade to the economic security of the United States, President Clinton also added in his first term of office, an Economic Adviser to membership on the National Security Council.

⁴⁶⁹ After years of mixed failed diplomatic and humanitarian approaches to stop the escalating violence, the reality that something had to be done to defend its foreign policy record and United States’ credibility in the post Cold War era came to the forefront of issues within the first Clinton Administration. This was a seemingly slow realization in both Clinton Administrations; evidenced by the fact that in 1993 and early 1994 the Clinton Administration seemed determined to get BiH out of the U.S. public eye and abdicated leadership to the UN and the EC/EU. However, when it became clear that the

conflicts in the Balkans produced unacceptable political risks and potential cost for the Clinton Administrations. First, a deteriorating trans-Atlantic relationship could put the centrepiece of Clinton's domestic political agenda (getting control of burgeoning budget and balance-of-trade deficits) in jeopardy. Even if the U.S. and the EU had the most comprehensive two-way trade and investment relations, the two parties appeared to be engaged in a bloody competitive trade fight. Consequently, it was of great importance for President Clinton to substantially implement a policy of substance into the trans-Atlantic link; thus proving that America still had a fundamental interest in peace and stability in Europe. Such substance would affect the level of trade and investments and hence the American economy. However, Clinton's reluctance to deploy forces to the Balkans raised questions about America's interest in preserving its leadership position in Europe and NATO in the post Cold War era. Only by clearly proving that Europe's security still was a matter of vital interest for the U.S. would America's credibility in Europe and global leadership be preserved.

Secondly, the future of NATO was naturally questioned after the demise of the Soviet Union.⁴⁷⁰ Evidence suggests that the regional conflicts in the Balkans undermined NATO's credibility as guarantor of stability in Europe. Not only did NATO risk irrelevancy but the leadership position of the U.S. in NATO became threatened by Clinton's reluctance to stop the ethnically-motivated conflict in BiH and Kosovo.⁴⁷¹ Over time, the U.S. recognized that its leadership role in NATO was at risk and the President became aware that America had a vital interest in maintaining NATO's relevance and maintaining its leadership role in NATO. It was largely through this role that U.S. gained leverage over its Allies in Europe, a leverage that secured American industry contracts worth billions of dollars. Consequently, President

EC/EU and UN approaches were failing in BiH, there was no substitute for U.S. leadership and the need to prove U.S. interest in European security. This was especially true when the UN was humiliated in BiH where UN-designated "safe areas" supposedly protected by the UNPROFOR were overrun with tragic humanitarian consequences. Subsequently, the UN was thoroughly marginalized by the Clinton Administration and its NATO allies when the Kosovo crisis escalated in 1998. This approach by the Clinton Administration can be explained by two reasons: (1) the lingering distaste from not only what happened with UNPROFOR in BiH, but also the ineptness of the UN chain of command and tragic consequences of the U.S. pursuing enforcement of UNSC resolutions in Somalia, and (2) threat of Russian veto in the UNSC concerning taking military action against their Slav brothers in Serbia.

⁴⁷⁰ During the Cold War, both sides of the Atlantic had powerful incentives to cooperate and avoid discord in the face of a Soviet threat. A serious transatlantic split in NATO would have long term strategic consequences.

⁴⁷¹ It should be noted that the European nations re-examined their own situation at the end of the Cold War and separately developed an enhanced common market, reduced political-legal personal and trade restrictions, and were rapidly moving toward a united Europe that seemed to Americans to be an attempt to compete economically and perhaps for political influence independent of NATO. The European Union (EU) was established by the Treaty of Maastricht on November, 1 1993, upon the foundations of the pre-existing European Economic Community. The newly formed European Union developed a distinct European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in the mid-1990s, including the establishment of armed forces directly under the command and control of the EU. Additionally, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was also founded and enhanced during the early 1990s, to include a primary political-military focus in its member states, which included most of the former Soviet bloc countries.

Clinton's decisions to take the lead in responding to the crises in BiH and Kosovo can largely be explained by the Administrations slow realization that the prolonged conflicts were producing unacceptable political risks and economic costs that could not be resolved without firm U.S. leadership.

By taking the lead in BiH and later in Kosovo, and in both cases using NATO as the selected instrument when diplomacy failed to gain leverage over Milosević, the U.S. reaffirmed its commitment to European stability and peace, secured NATO's viability. Additionally, it preserved America's credibility and leadership in the trans-Atlantic cooperation. These actions reaffirmed that the U.S. was a trustworthy partner for European security and business; a partnership which contributed to the growth of the American economy.

The massacres in Srebrenica and in Racak

A close reading of the Clinton Administrations' diplomatic history in the Balkans yields the verdict that its policy towards BiH and Kosovo were decisive only twice. The first time was immediately after the Srebrenica, BiH genocide in July 1995 when news reached Washington D.C. The second time was when Serbian security forces killed forty-five civilian Kosovar Albanians in Racak, FRY on 15 January 1999. The evidence suggests that Srebrenica and Racak were turning points for the Clinton Administration. After these two massacres it became obvious that new policies were needed, policies that stressed decisive actions involving U.S. military forces. Consequently Srebrenica and Racak put in motion increased U.S. diplomatic and military activism against Milosević and the Serbs that resulted in U.S. military interventions. Furthermore, it is very likely that the affect that the adverse media coverage had on these two incidents produced a stimulus for decisive action by *the always politically sensitive* President Clinton.

5.2 President Clinton's leadership on foreign policy issues in the Balkans

In the end, to understand what significant factors motivated President Clinton to respond militarily in the Balkans, they appear to have been linked to his leadership style and his decision-making processes. The verdict on President Clinton's foreign policy leadership in BiH and Kosovo seems quite clear: For years, Clinton followed a *passive case-by case, ad-hoc approach* with a narrow conception of vital interests of the U.S. guiding his decisions. Furthermore, during that time he was hesitant, unfocused, and indecisive in his policy

responses. However, evidence suggests that it was the personal decisions of President Clinton, after months of reluctance in 1995 and in 1999 to finally commit the full force of U.S. diplomacy, backed by use of military force that was what made the differences in BiH and Kosovo. The fact that Clinton's National Security teams were divided over which policy approach should be followed surely severely impacted upon Clinton's decision-making. This fact probably contributed to Clinton's indecisiveness in foreign issues. However, the lack of clear and consistent advice led to postponements of decisions that should have been made earlier to influence the course of events at less cost. It should also be noted that President Clinton was subject to powerful domestic constraints in which he had to lobby hard to obtain a positive vote; the Dayton Agreement would have been undermined if Congress had not supported the U.S. troop contribution to IFOR and *Operation Allied Force* could have been in jeopardy if Congress had condemned the air campaign. Consequently, President Bill Clinton should not be regarded as the dominant power center as envisioned by Roger Hilsman.

5.3 The Dominant Power Centers

Evidence suggests that the most influential power center during the conflicts in the Balkans was Slobodan Milosević. He had in most ways what his American and European opponents lacked: a clear vision of what he wanted to achieve, clear political objectives and the instruments needed to materialize his vision and objectives. He possessed tactical flexibility, courage, and superb manipulation and negotiation skills. Yet, Milosević lacked the morals professed by his Orthodox Christian faith; he was cruel and he showed little personal interest in the well-being of individuals. Although politically and diplomatically skilful, Slobodan Milosević was not good at using power for anything other than keeping it. For him nationalism seems just to have been a tool to gain personal political power.

To meet his objectives, Milosević used dynamic approaches to test the international community. Milosević quickly learned when the UN, NATO, EC/EU and the U.S. were not able or willing to challenge him. Consequently, Milosević exploited those weaknesses and magnified the tensions to enhance his personal political power by appealing to the nationalism of his fellow Serbs. Milosević understood and exploited the splits in American politics and the strong American reluctance to deploy ground troops to the Balkans. However, in the end Milosević seriously misjudged the international community's resolve, and especially the Clinton Administrations' willingness to use force against him. He also overestimated the degree of support he would receive from his Russian ally. Milosević had a firm strategy for

BiH and Kosovo, while the U.S. did not such a strategy. Subsequently, Milosević over the years controlled the tempo and actions on the ground in BiH and Kosovo, while the international community was repeatedly outpaced by Milosević's initiatives and momentum. Consequently, Milosević defines his position as the most influential power center as described by the Roger Hilsman Model, even though Serbia lost four wars and became a very poor nation under his leadership.

Madeleine Albright, to a certain degree, maintained a position as a power center throughout the Clinton Era which was enhanced when she moved from the external ring of Presidential advisers as U.S. Ambassador to the UN to the inner circle as Secretary of State. Although her role in the establishment of peace in BiH was limited, she did manage to keep the UN from being the dominant force in resolving that conflict and thereby embroiling U.S. and European ground forces in a major war in the Balkans. Whereas the UN played a large but somewhat inept role in attempting to resolve the initial violent break-up of the former Yugoslavia; it played a negligible role in the Kosovo crisis based upon the influence of Madam Secretary Albright. There is overwhelming evidence that Madeleine Albright, from the day she became a member of the National Security Council in the Clinton government, forcefully advocated for an appropriate response to stop the violence and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. An appropriate response, in her view, included the use of military force. Consequently, it can be argued that Albright was the most hawkish member of the two Clinton Administrations. Because of her hawkish position, and perhaps because of her sex in a male-dominated organization, she faced a great deal of resistance from other members of the National Security Council and especially from Pentagon representatives. As Secretary of State, she drove the U.S. policy in Kosovo by consistently arguing more interventionist policies to counter Milosević's intentions and was often motivated by advocating a humanitarian justification. Evidence suggests that Albright desired to thwart the ethnic cleansing in BiH and Kosovo. Aside from arguing a strong response against the Serb leadership, she also took the lead in ensuring allied unity. Subsequently, she successfully managed during the Kosovo crisis to keep the Russians on board and NATO unified. When President Clinton was preoccupied with the Lewinsky Scandal, Albright demonstrated her leadership and developed a coherent plan that resulted in military intervention on March 24, 1999. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that Secretary Albright was the "mother" of President Clinton's Kosovo policy. She was also the dominant force who advocated the use of military force against the Bosnian Serbs in 1995. For these reasons Albright, as a key member

in the Clinton Administrations, should be assessed as a power center in U.S. Balkan policies during Clinton's Presidency.

Evidence suggests that Congress was an influential actor on Clinton's Balkan policies, especially because they were Republican-dominated during both crises and opposed the use of military force, opposed U.S. forces coming under UN command, and therefore could potentially threaten not to fund the operations. However, due to evidence presented in this thesis, Congress should not be assessed as a dominant power center as envisioned by Roger Hilsman. Furthermore, the American public was quite unfamiliar with the Balkans and its history. The majority of the American public opposed the deployment of ground forces to the Balkans. Subsequently, there was no influential pressure from the "electorate politics" on the Clinton Administrations to intervene with ground forces in either BiH or Kosovo. For those reasons, "electoral politics" should neither be assessed as a power center in U.S. Balkan policies.

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